Using Carrots To Bring Peace?: Negotiation And Third Party Involvement

by Martina Klimes

Overview

How can peace be brokered between warring sides in conflicts over self-determination and what roles do external third parties play? This book is the first of its kind to thoroughly explore the effectiveness of aid conditionality and other external tools that third parties — from states and regional organizations to NGOs — bring to the table in peace negotiations. Surveying the existing academic debate on incentives and peace conditionality, the author first identifies the gaps between theory and the needs of third party mediators and facilitators. Analysing in depth the negotiation processes in Sri Lanka (Eelam), Indonesia (Aceh), and the Philippines (Mindanao) as case studies, policy tools likely to be most effective are then identified and policy recommendations developed. This book is an invaluable resource for students, scholars, and practitioners alike.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9789814699105
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Company, Incorporated
Publication date:	12/30/2015
Pages:	344
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.81(d)

Table of Contents

Preface xv

Foreword xvii

List of Abbreviations xix

Acknowledgments xxiii

About the Author xxv

1 Introduction: How to Make Peace Effectively? 1

1.1 New tools for conflict resolution initiatives 3

1.2 Emerging trends in negotiation and conflict resolution practices 4

1.3 Emerging trends in negotiation and conflict resolution theory 6

1.4 General aims of this book 8

1.5 Formal and informal processes and third party involvement 9

2 Negotiation and Peace Incentives: Overview 11

2.1 Peace negotiation and internal armed conflicts in academic discourse 12

2.2 Third party involvement - leverage and conditionality 18

2.3 Timing - when is the time ripe for incentives? 22

2.4 What is missing in the current theoretical debate? 24

3 Negotiation Ripeness and Third Party Incentives 27

3.1 Peace negotiation and internal armed conflicts 28

3.1.1 Negotiation dynamics 30

3.1.2 Negotiation strategies: do incentives stipulate problem-solving? 33

3.2 Third party involvement 34

3.2.1 Conditionality 37

3.3 Using carrots: impact of incentives on peace negotiation 38

3.3.1 The impact of incentives on negotiation strategies and negotiation dynamics 39

3.3.2 Mixing incentives and threats: impact on negotiation 41

3.3.3 Outline of the incentives 47

3.4 Perception of timing: ripeness and incentives 51

3.4.1 Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO) 53

3.4.2 Can carrots induce and sustain ripeness? 55

3.5 Theoretical purpose 57

3.6 Theoretical summary 58

4 Sri Lanka: Eelam Peace Process (The GoSL-LTTE Peace Negotiations, 2002-2003; 2006) 59

4.1 When the lion fights the tiger: the context of the GoSL-LTTE peace negotiations 61

4.1.1 Previous peace initiatives and third party involvement 64

4.2 GoSL-LTTE negotiations and third party involvement (2002-2008) 67

4.2.1 Context of the Norwegian involvement 67

4.2.2 CFA: 22 February 2002 71

4.2.3 Direct talks: September 2002-April 2003 (six rounds) 72

4.2.4 Negotiations with President Rajapaksa: 2006 83

4.2.5 Collapse of the peace process - 2006-2008 87

4.3 The role of incentives during the GoSL-LTTE peace negotiations 89

4.3.1 Non-material incentives: involvement of international actors in the peace process 89

4.3.1.1 External facilitation 90

4.3.1.2 Monitoring - Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission 95

4.3.1.3 Capacity building 96

4.3.1.4 Proscribing of the LITE as a terrorist organization 96

4.3.2 Material incentives 100

4.3.3 Incentives for process opponents and spoilers 105

4.4 Negotiation strategies and third party involvement 105

4.4.1 GoSL negotiation strategies 106

4.4.2 LTTE negotiation strategies 110

4.4.3 Third Party strategies and involvement 116

4.4.3.1 Norway 116

4.4.3.2 Japan, U.S., and the EU 122

4.4.3.3 Regional and other actors 127

4.5 Explaining the collapse of the GoSL-LTTE peace process 130

4.5.1 Political cohabitation and the lack of Sinhala unity 130

4.5.2 Personal relations between the President and Prime Minister 131

4.5.3 Velupillai Prabhakaran and lack of trust in the LTTE leadership 132

5 Indonesia: Aceh Peace Process (The GoI-GAM Peace Negotiations, 2002-2003; 2006) 135

5.1 Context for the HDC's involvement 136

5.2 HDC facilitation: peace talks in Aceh (2000-2003) 139

5.2.1 External actors 141

5.2.2 Negotiating the humanitarian pause and the CoHA 144

5.3 The role of external incentives during the HDC facilitation: 2000-2003 149

5.3.1 Non-material incentives: international involvement in the peace process 149

5.3.2 Material incentives 154

5.4 Negotiation strategies (2000-2003) 156

5.4.1 GoI negotiation strategies 156

5.4.2 GAM negotiation strategies 157

5.5 Explaining the failure of the HDC-facilitated peace process 159

5.5.1 Lukewarm support of Jakarta 160

5.5.2 Agenda setting 160

5.5.3 Spoilers too strong, incentives for spoilers too weak 161

5.6 Context for the CMI's involvement 162

5.7 CMI facilitation - the Helsinki peace process (2005) 163

5.7.1 Five rounds of the Helsinki peace process 166

5.8 The role of incentives during the Helsinki peace process 170

5.8.1 Non-material incentives 171

5.8.2 Material incentives 174

5.8.2.1 Post-conflict reconstruction 175

5.8.2.2 Incentives in Helsinki 176

5.8.3 Incentives for spoilers 178

5.9 Negotiation strategies: Helsinki peace process 179

5.9.1 GoI negotiation strategies 179

5.9.2 GAM negotiation strategies 183

5.10 Explaining the success of the Helsinki peace process 185

5.10.1 The Ahtisaari phenomenon 186

5.10.2 Monitoring 188

6 The Philippines: Mindanao Peace Process (The GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations 2001-2008) 189

6.1 Context of the GRP-MILF peace negotiations 191

6.1.1 Defining the Bangsamoro homeland, land ownership, social, and security issues 194

6.1.2 Previous lessons from Mindanao: incentives in the GRP-MNLF peace process 199

6.2 GRP-MILF negotiations: 2001-2008 201

6.2.1 From pre-negotiations to the Tripoli II agreement 201

6.2.2 Core negotiation I - Cluster I (ceasefire) and Cluster II (rehabilitation, reconstruction, development) 205

6.2.2.1 Cluster I: implementing guidelines of the security aspect of the TPA 205

6.2.2.2 Cluster II: implementing guidelines of the humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aspect of the TPA (rehabilitation, reconstruction, development agreement) 207

6.2.3 Core negotiation II - Cluster III (AD) 211

6.2.3.1 Bangsamoro homeland 211

6.2.3.2 Collapse of the talks: August 2008 213

6.3 The role of incentives during 2001-2008 214

6.3.1 Non-material incentives: international involvement in the GRP-MILF peace process 214

6.3.1.1 Internationalization of the Bangsamoro issue 217

6.3.1.2 Monitoring 218

6.3.1.3 (De)proscribing the MILF 219

6.3.1.4 Capacity building 220

6.3.2 Material incentives 220

6.3.2.1 Mindanao Trust Fund-Reconstruction and Development Program (MTF-RDP) 221

6.3.2.2 Bangsamoro Development Agency 223

6.3.2.3 Aid as a counter-insurgency tool 225

6.3.3 Incentives for spoilers 226

6.4 Negotiation strategies and third party involvement 227

6.4.1 GRP negotiation strategies 227

6.4.2 MILF negotiation strategies 230

6.4.3 Third party involvement and strategies 233

6.4.3.1 Malaysia 233

6.4.3.2 United States 236

6.4.3.3 Japan 240

6.4.3.4 Other actors 243

6.5 Explaining the derailing of the GRP-MILF talks in August 2008 245

6.5.1 Lack of overall communication 246

6.5.2 Exclusion of stakeholders 246

6.5.3 Impotent external leverage 247

7 Perils and Pitfalls of Using Carrots in Conflict Resolution: Do Carrots Bring Peace? 249

7.1 Peace negotiation and incentives 249

7.1.1 Third party involvement 250

7.1.2 Negotiation asymmetry 257

7.1.3 Negotiation strategies 261

7.1.4 Conditionality 264

7.2 Impact of incentives: Do carrots bring peace? 265

7.2.1 Impact of incentives on the GoSL-LTTE negotiations 266

7.2.2 Impact of incentives on the GoI-GAM negotiations 269

7.2.3 Impact of incentives on the GRP-MILF negotiations 270

7.2.4 Do incentives bring peace? 272

7.3 Incentives and timing 274

7.3.1 Reaching a ripe moment 274

7.3.2 Can carrots serve as ripening agents? - The concept of the MEO 276

7.4 Analysis summary 278

8 Conclusions: Effective Tools for Forging Peace 281

8.1 Main conclusions: what makes the difference? 281

8.2 Contribution to the conflict resolution field 285

8.3 Policy implications for conflict resolution practitioners 285

8.4 Recommendations for future research 288

References 291

Index 313