The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command

by John A. English

Overview

The reverses experienced by Canadian troops during the late stages of World War II continue to be the subject of intensive inquiry among military historians. Going beyond the obvious immediate causes of these setbacks, the author presents a detailed historical examination of the role of the Canadian army in Normandy and of the organization, training, and fighting-style that the Canadians brought to the battlefield in 1944.

In Book I, the author analyzes the impact of the British military model on the Canadian corps in terms of doctrine, training, command and staff appointments, equipment, and organization. He discusses the contribution of Canadian troops in World War I and the failure of the Canadian military to maintain a high level of professionalism in the interwar period. Drawing on archival records, particularly Montgomery's personal correspondence, the author offers new information on attempts to turban Canadian troops into an effective fighting force as late as 1943. Book II presents a critical analysis of Canadian operations in Normandy. The author gives special attention to the Canadian Army's inability to close the Falaise Gap in a timely manner—a delay that may have prolonged the war in Europe by several months. Providing both theoretical and practical perspectives on the relationship of peacetime preparation to the operation of large field forces in battle, this work will be of interest to students and buffs of military history and to professional analysts and strategic planners in the armed services.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780275930196
Publisher:	Bloomsbury Academic
Publication date:	05/23/1991
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	376
Product dimensions:	6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.88(d)
Lexile:	1580L (what's this?)

About the Author

JOHN A. ENGLISH is Associate with the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He recently completed a three-year tour on the Directing Staff of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College. He is the author of the acclaimed book On Infantry (Praeger, 1981) and principal editor of The Mechanized Battlefield: A Tactical Analysis. He has also written a number of articles on military subjects that have appeared in Jane's Military Review, Infantry, Naval War College Review, Canadian Defense Quarterly, Marine Corps Gazette, and Military Affairs.

Table of Contents

Foreword by Gunther E. Rothenberg
Preface
Prologue: Of Ignorant Armies
Long Forgotten Winters
The Canadian Corps and the British Mold
The Bellows of Peace
Shaping an Expeditionary Force
The Staff Caste
Battle Drill Die
The Montgomery Measurement
Epilogue: Final Tempering
Half-Forgotten Summer
The Imprint of Doctrine
Cast of Commanders
Throes Beyond the Beach
Cold Eye on Death
The Amiens Alchemy
Case Hardening
Conclusion: Final Casting
Appendix A: Some General Notes on What to Look for When Visiting a Regiment by Lt.-Col. B. L. Montgomery
Appendix B: Tank and Gun Comparisons
Select Bibliography
Index

Editorial Reviews

Analyzes the pretty dismal showing of the Canadian army late in World War II through an examination of its organization, training, and fighting style. Drawing on the personal correspondence of Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, concludes that the error was in not keeping the army prepared between the world wars. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

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