Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals

by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra

Overview

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780199243778
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	08/01/2002
Pages:	252
Product dimensions:	8.60(w) x 5.70(h) x 0.90(d)

About the Author

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra is Fellow and Tutor of Philosophy at Hertford College, Oxford.

Table of Contents

Introduction1. The Problem of Universals: A Problem about Truthmakers2. The Explananda of the Problems of Universals3. The Many over One4. Resemblance Nominalism5. The Coextension Difficulty6. Russell's Regress7. The Resemblance Structure of Property Classes8. Goodman's Difficulties9. The Imperfect Community Difficulty10. The Companionship Difficulty11. The Mere Intersections Difficulty12. The Superiority of Resemblance NominalismAppendix: On Imperfect Communities and the Non-communities they EntailReferences, Index

Editorial Reviews

"Dan Dennett's 'Philosophical Lexicon' contains the entry: Exhume, v. to revive a position generally thought to be humed. This book is the most brilliant philosophical exhumation that it has been my pleasure to encounter. This book argues that our attributions of properties and relations can be given satisfactory truthmakers using no more than resemblances holding between ordinary particulars. Many of us had assumed that this program is bankrupt, but now we must think again...With patient and ingenious argument [Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra] has shown that the theory has more to be said for it than ever I, and I suspect many others, had imagined. The fundamental nature of properties and relations may be the central question in metaphysics. He has made an important contribution to the topic"—D. M. Armstrong, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

From the Publisher