Table of Contents
1. Introduction.- 2. Public Pensions and Economic Growth: The Basic Framework.- 2.1. The Analytical Elements.- 2.1.1. The Individuals.- 2.1.2. The Firms.- 2.1.3. The Public Pension Program.- 2.1.4. The Competitive Equilibrium.- 2.2. Productivity Growth.- 2.3. Allocative Efficiency.- 2.4. Public Pension Reform.- Appendix 2.- 3. The Allocative Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Endogenous Growth Economies.- 3.1. Investment Externalities, Intergenerational Transfers, and Pareto-improvements.- 3.1.1. A Subsidy to Private Savings.- 3.1.2. A Pareto-Improving Policy.- 3.2. The Length of the Working Life.- 3.2.1. A Two-Period Model without Retirement.- 3.2.2. A Three-Period Model with Retirement.- 3.3. Endogenous Innovation.- 3.4. Human Capital Formation.- 3.4.1. Externalities from Human Capital Formation.- 3.4.2. An Optimal Public Pension Scheme.- Appendix 3.- 4. Public versus Private Intergenerational Transfers.- 4.1. Dynastic Altruism.- 4.2. Gifts, Bequests, and Growth.- 4.3. When Are Private Intergenerational Transfers Operative?.- 4.4. Old-Age Security and Neutrality.- 4.5. Legislating Public Pensions (I).- 4.5.1. The Political Equilibrium.- 4.5.2. An Intergenerational Conflict.- 4.5.3. The Role of Population Growth.- 4.5.4. Concluding Remarks.- Appendix 4.- 5. The Family as an Old-age Security Device.- 5.1. A Twofold Fertility Motive.- 5.2. The Interplay between Productivity Growth and Fertility.- 5.2.1. Operative Intrafamily Transfers.- 5.2.2. Productivity Growth.- 5.2.3. Fertility.- 5.2.4. The Economy’s Growth Factor.- 5.3. Legislating Public Pensions (II).- 5.3.1. The Political Equilibrium.- 5.3.2. Reduced Joy of Having Children.- 5.3.3. A Numerical Example.- Appendix 5.- 6. Summary.- List of Symbols.- References.- Author Index.
