Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact / Edition 1

by Mark J. Roe

Overview

The political and social predicates that make the large firm possible and that shape its form are not always taken into account, despite the fact that variation in the political and social environment can deeply affect which firms, which ownership structures, and which governance arrangements survive and prosper. Focussing on the US, the larger nations in continental Europe, and Japan, Mark Roe uses statistical and qualitative analyses to explore the relationship between politics, history, and business organization.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780199240746
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	02/20/2003
Series:	Clarendon Lectures in Management Studies
Pages:	244
Product dimensions:	9.30(w) x 6.40(h) x 0.90(d)

About the Author

Mark J. Roe is Berg Professor Law at the Harvard Law School. He has previously held positions at Columbia University School of Law; University of Pennsylvania School of Law; and Rutgers University School of Law. His publications include Corporate Reorganization and Bankruptcy: Legal and Financial Materials (Foundation Press, 2000) and Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press, 1994).

Table of Contents

List of Graphs and FiguresList of TablesIntroductionPart I: Political Conflict and the Corporation1. Peace as Predicate2. The Wealthy West's Differing Corporate Governance Structures3. A General TheoryPart II: Social Conflict and the Institutions of Corporate Governance4. Social Democracies and Agency Costs: Raising the Stakes5. Reducing Shareholders' Power to Control ManagersPart III: Left-Right Politics and Ownership Separation: Data6. Data and ConfirmationPart IV: Nation by Nation7. France8. Germany9. Italy10. Japan11. Sweden12. United Kingdom13. United States14. Extending the Sample?Part V: The Direction of Causality15. Alternative Formulations of the Thesis16. Backlash17. Contract as Metaphor18. Rents19. Rents and Politics20. Rents and Ownership Concentration21. Political Change in Continental Europe22. Alternative Formulations: DataPart VI: Corporate Law's Limits23. Corporate Law as the Foundation for Securities Markets: The Theory24. Its Limits: Theory25. Its Limits: Data26. The Quality of Corporate Law and Its LimitsPart VII: Unifying the Political Theories27. Populism and Socialism in Corporate GovernanceConclusionAcknowledgementsBibliographyIndex

Editorial Reviews

"Mark J. Roe's compact but probing study investigates a previously overlooked variable in the development of corporate governance structures: political cultureProfessor Roe supports his provocative thesis with empirical data as well as rich qualitative descriptions of the interactions between corporate governance and politics in eight economically advanced nations."—Harvard Law Review

From the Publisher