Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook / Edition 1

by Dennis C. Mueller

Overview

Public choice or rational politics differs from other approaches to the study of political behavior in that it builds on models in which rational individuals seek to advance their own interests. This five-part volume surveys the main ideas and contributions of the field. It contains twenty-five essays written by thirty scholars, both economists and political scientists, from North America and Europe. The contributors cover topics such as the nature and justification for the existence of government, the properties of different voting rules, and electoral politics in two-party governments.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780521556545
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	10/28/1996
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	692
Product dimensions:	5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x 1.54(d)

Table of Contents

1. Public choice in perspective Dennis C. Mueller; Part I. The Need for and Forms of Cooperation: 2. Economic theories of the state Russell Hardin; 3. Neither markets nor states: linking transformation processes in collective-action arenas Elinor Ostrom and James Walker; 4. The political economy of Federalism Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld; 5. The public choice of international organizations Bruno S. Frey; 6. Constitutional public choice Dennis C. Mueller; Part II. Voting Rules and Preference Aggregation: 7. Cycling and majority rule James M. Enelow; 8. Majority rule Douglas W. Rae and Eric Schickler; 9. Group choice and individual judgments H. Peyton Young; 10. Some paradoxes of preference aggregation Prasanta K. Pattanaik; 11. Voting and the revelation of preferences for public activities T. Nicolaus Tideman; Part III. Electoral Politics: 12. The spatial analysis of elections and committees: four decades of research Peter C. Ordeshook; 13. Multiparty electoral politics Norman Schofield; 14. Interest groups: money, information and influence David Austen Smith; 15. Logrolling Thomas Stratmann; 16. Political business cycles Martin Paldam; Part IV. Individual Behavior and Collective Action: 17. When is it rational to vote? John H. Aldrich; 18. Voting behavior Morris P. Fiorina; 19. Public Choice Experiments Elizabeth Hoffman; Part V. Public Choice in Action: 20. Modern bureaucratic theory Ronald Wintrobe; 21. The positive theory of public bureaucracy Terry Moe; 22. The political economy of taxation Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer; 23. Rent seeking Robert D. Tollison; 24. Endogenous protection: a survey Stephen P. Magee; 25. Why does government's share of national income grow? An assessment of the recent literature on the US experience Cheryl M. Holsey and Thomas Borchering.