Is Science Value Free?: Values and Scientific Understanding / Edition 1

by Hugh Lacey

Overview

Exploring the role of values in scientific inquiry, Hugh Lacey examines the nature and meaning of values, and looks at challenges to the view, posed by postmodernists, feminists, radical ecologists, Third-World advocates and religious fundamentalists, that science is value free. He also focuses on discussions of 'development', especially in Third World countries. This paperback edition includes a new preface.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780415349031
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
Publication date:	05/20/2004
Series:	Philosophical Issues in Science
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	304
Product dimensions:	5.44(w) x 8.50(h) x (d)

About the Author

Hugh Lacey is Professor of Philosophy at Swarthmore College. He is also the co-author (with Barry Schwartz) of Behaviourism, Science and Human Nature.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction: the idea that science is value free 2 Values 3 Cognitive values 4 Science as value free: provisional theses 5 Scientific understanding 6 The control of nature 7 Kuhn: scientific activity in different ‘worlds’ 8 A “grassroots empowerment” approach 9 A feminist approach 10 Science as value free: revised theses 11 Conclusion

Editorial Reviews

'Lacey's book must be considered a major contribution and should be of interest to all philosophers of science and others interested in the role of values in supposed rational thought.' - Stephen Mumford, Mind

'Lacey's arguments are readily accessible and do not require a specialist's knowledge - the book can easily serve as an introduction to the topical and controversial question of the role of values in scientific inquiry as well as challenging taken-for-granted positions of specialists.' - James Sauer, Research in Philosophy and Technology

'Adds richness to the terms of the debate and intriguing philosophical framework for the problems that arise ... This work will raise important questions for anyone who has wondered, not whether science currently is value-free, but what such an ideal would be and whether the idea is defensible.' - Heather Douglas, Philosophy of Science

From the Publisher