| Preface | ix |
| Acknowledgments | xv |
1 | Introduction: The Issue Is Deeper than American Movies | 1 |
| The Evolving Global System | 3 |
| Economic Issues | 6 |
| Objectives of the Study | 7 |
| Organization of the Volume and Summary of Findings | 9 |
2 | A Road Map for the TRIPs Ahead | 15 |
| General Obligations | 17 |
| Copyrights | 17 |
| Trademarks and Indications | 19 |
| Patents | 20 |
| Integrated Circuits | 22 |
| Trade Secrets | 22 |
| Control of Anticompetitive Practices | 24 |
| Enforcement | 24 |
| Transition Periods | 25 |
| Administration of TRIPs | 25 |
| Summary | 26 |
3 | Globalization and the Economics of Intellectual Property Rights: Dancing the Dual Distortion | 27 |
| Economics of Intellectual Property Rights | 28 |
| Structures and Objectives of IPRs | 36 |
| Sectoral Reliance on IPRs | 51 |
| The Evolving US System: Protectionism Unchained? | 65 |
| Globalization and the Technology Content of Trade | 66 |
| Pressures for Change in the Global IPRs System | 83 |
| Summary | 84 |
4 | The Global Effects of Intellectual Property Rights: Measuring What Cannot Be Seen | 87 |
| Measuring Intellectual Property Rights across Borders | 88 |
| Determinants of Intellectual Property Rights | 102 |
| The Effects of IPRs on International Economic Activity | 109 |
| IPRs and International Technology Transfer | 136 |
| Summary | 141 |
5 | Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development: Patents, Growth, and Growing Pains | 143 |
| How IPRs Contribute to Development | 145 |
| Global Research and Development | 156 |
| How IPRs Hamper Economic Development | 157 |
| Evidence on the Overall Impact of IPRs on Growth | 169 |
| Summary | 169 |
6 | The Global Policy Framework: Intellectual Property Rights and Wrongs? | 171 |
| Putting TRIPs into Action | 171 |
| TRIPs as an Economic Optimizer | 192 |
| Regional Initiatives | 194 |
| Summary | 197 |
7 | Benefiting from Intellectual Property Protection: Take the Medicine, but Get Some Exercise, Too | 199 |
| National Policies to Optimize IPRs | 200 |
| IPRs and Social Regulation | 216 |
| International Initiatives | 225 |
| Summary | 232 |
8 | Conclusions and Policy Recommendations: Are We There Yet? | 235 |
| Where We Are | 235 |
| Where We Are Going | 238 |
| Does TRIPs Belong in the WTO? | 238 |
| The Way Forward Is to Be Forward-Looking | 239 |
| References | 243 |
| Index | 255 |
| Tables | |
Table 2.1 | Substantive requirements of the TRIPs agreement in the WTO | 18 |
Table 3.1 | Instruments and agreements for protecting IPRs | 37 |
Table 3.2 | Patent applications in selected countries | 68 |
Table 3.3 | Trademark applications in selected countries | 70 |
Table 3.4 | Applications for registrations of plant varieties in selected countries | 71 |
Table 3.5 | Indicators of demand for copyright products in selected countries | 72 |
Table 3.6 | Trade in IPR-sensitive goods for selected countries | 74 |
Table 3.7 | Trade in IPR-sensitive services and royalties and license fees | 80 |
Table 3.8 | Inward and outward stocks of foreign direct investment | 82 |
Table 4.1 | Membership trends in key intellectual property conventions | 89 |
Table 4.2 | Qualitative trends in intellectual property protection, selected countries | 92 |
Table 4.3 | Indices of the strength of IPRs laws | 95 |
Table 4.4 | Survey indices of perceived strength of IPRs | 98 |
Table 4.5 | Estimated rates of software piracy and lost revenues | 100 |
Table 4.6 | Determinants of Ginarte-Park Patent Rights Index | 106 |
Table 4.7 | 1985 income levels and 1990 predicted patent indices | 108 |
Table 4.8 | Simulated increases in total imports by sector into developing countries resulting from strengthened patent laws | 115 |
Table 4.9 | Percentage of firms claiming that strength or weakness of IPRs has a strong effect on whether direct investments will be made, by type of facility, 1991 | 126 |
Table 4.10 | Percentage of firms claiming that intellectual property protection is too weak to permit type of investment, 1991 | 128 |
Table 4.11 | Simultaneous equations models of the impact of patent strength on international exploitation of intellectual assets | 132 |
Table 4.12 | Estimates of the general-equilibrium knowledge capital model | 134 |
Table 5.1 | Simulated static effects of stronger IPRs enforcement in Lebanon, 1996 | 158 |
Table 6.1 | Estimated static rent transfers from TRIPs-induced strengthening of 1998 patent laws | 184 |
Table 6.2 | Estimates of how TRIPs patent changes affect international flows of economic activity for selected countries | 187 |
Table 7.1 | Summary of IPRs exhaustion regimes | 210 |
| Figures | |
Figure 3.1 | Basic access innovation trade-off in IPRs | 30 |
Figure 4.1 | Relationship between patent rights and per capita GNP | 104 |