Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 1 and 2: Metaphysics and Epistemology; Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics

by Michael Brownstein, Jennifer Saul

Overview

Implicit Bias and Philosophy brings the work of leading philosophers and psychologists together to explore core areas of psychological research on implicit (or unconscious) bias, as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology is comprised of two sections: 'The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, and Stereotype Threat,' and 'Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality.' The first section contains chapters examining the relationship between implicit attitudes and 'dual process' models of the mind; the role of affect in the formation and change of implicit associations; the unity (or disunity) of implicit attitudes; whether implicit biases are mental states at all; and whether performances on stereotype-relevant tasks are automatic and unconscious or intentional and strategic. The second section contains chapters examining implicit bias and skepticism; the effects of implicit bias on scientific research; the accessibility of social stereotypes in epistemic environments; the effects of implicit bias on the self-perception of members of stigmatized social groups as rational agents; the role of gender stereotypes in philosophy; and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning.

Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics is comprised of three sections. 'Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias' contains chapters examining the relationship of implicit biases to concepts that are central to moral responsibility, including control, awareness, reasons-responsiveness, and alienation. The chapters in the second section—'Structural Injustice'—explore the connections between the implicit biases held by individuals and the structural injustices of the societies in which they are situated. And finally, the third section—'The Ethics of Implicit Bias: Theory and Practice'—contains chapters examining strategies for implicit attitude change, the ramifications of research on implicit bias for philosophers working in ethics, and suggestions for combatting implicit biases in the fields of philosophy and law.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780198766186
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	05/31/2016
Pages:	640
Product dimensions:	6.40(w) x 9.50(h) x 1.80(d)

About the Author

Michael Brownstein, John Jay College/City University of New York,Jennifer Saul, University of Sheffield

Michael Brownstein is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at John Jay College/City University of New York. His research focuses on philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, with emphasis on the nature of the implicit mind. In 2014-2015 he was a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies, and visiting faculty at Deep Springs College. His published articles on automaticity, spontaneity, and implicit bias have appeared in journals such as Philosophical Studies, Mind and Language, and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. These mark a small transition from his first publication, 'The Wonderful World of Tame Reptiles', in Reptile Hobbyist.



Jennifer Saul is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield and Director of the Society for Women in Philosophy UK. Her research is primarily in philosophy of language, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of race. She is the author of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said (OUP, 2012); Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions (OUP, 2007); and Feminism: Issues and Arguments (OUP, 2003). She directed the Leverhulme International Network in Implicit Bias and Philosophy (2011-2013) that gave rise to these volumes. She has also served as a consultant on a zombie movie script.

Table of Contents

Volume 1: Metaphysics and EpistemologyIntroduction, Michael Brownstein and Jennifer SaulSection One: The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, and Stereotype Threat1.1. Playing Double: Implicit Bias, Dual Levels, and Self-Control, Keith Frankish1.2. Implicit Bias, Reinforcement Learning, and Scaffolded Moral Cognition, Bryce Huebner1.3. e Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias, Jules Holroyd and Joseph Sweetman1.4. DeFreuding Implicit Attitudes, Edouard Machery1.5. Stereotype Threat and Persons, Ron MallonSection Two: Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality2.1. Bias: Friend or Foe? Reflections on Saulish Skepticism, Louise M. Antony2.2. Virtue, Social Knowledge, and Implicit Bias, Alex Madva2.3. Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality, Stacey Goguen2.4. The Status Quo Fallacy: Implicit Bias and Fallacies of Argumentation, Catherine E. Hundleby2.5. Revisiting Current Causes of Women's Underrepresentation in Science, Carole J. Lee2.6. Philosophers explicitly associate philosophy with maleness: an examination of implicit and explicit gender stereotypes in philosophy, Laura di Bella, Eleanor Miles and Jennifer SaulVolume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and EthicsIntroduction, Michael Brownstein and Jennifer SaulSection One: Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias1.1. Whose Responsible for This? Moral Responsibility, Externalism, and Knowledge about Implicit Bias, Natalia Washington and Daniel Kelly1.2. Alienation and Responsibility, Joshua Glasgow1.3. Attributablity, Accountability, and Implicit Attitudes, Robin Zheng1.4. Stereotypes and Prejudice: Whose Responsibility? Indirect Personal Responsibility for Implicit Bias, Maureen Sie and Nicole van Voorst Vader-Bours1.5. Revisionism and Moral Responsibility, Luc FaucherSection Two: Structural Injustice2.1. The Too Minimal Political, Moral, and Civil Dimension of Claude Steele's 'Stereotype Threat' Paradigm, Lawrence Blum2.2. Reducing Bias: Attitudinal and Institutional Change, Anne JacobsonSection Three: The Ethics of Implicit Bias: Theory and Practice3.1. A Virtue Ethics Response to Implicit Bias, Clea F. Rees3.2. Implicit Bias, Context, and Character, Michael Brownstein3.3. The Moral Status of Micro-Inequities: In Favour of Institutional Solutions, Samantha Brennan3.4. Discrimination Law, Equity Law, and Implicit Bias, Katya Hosking and Roseanne Russell