God, Humans, and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge Our Moral Universe / Edition 1

by Robert N. Wennberg

Overview

This is a book about animals and the moral life. The kinds of questions it raises are profound and consequential: Do animals have moral standing? Do human beings have moral obligations to animals? If so, how extensive and weighty are those obligations? Robert Wennberg finds it troubling that society at large seems to care more about such concerns than the Christian community does, and he invites people of faith not only to think more deeply about ethical concerns for animals but also to enter into a richer, more sensitive moral life in general.

Over the course of his thought-provoking discussion, Wennberg educates readers about some of the history of ethical concern for animals and the nature of that concern. He also invites serious reflection on the moral issues raised by the existence of animals in our world, while granting readers considerable latitude in reaching their own conclusions. Wennberg arrives at his own conclusions through careful interaction with church history, Christian theology, the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, and the best philosophical thought on the moral status of animals. Two compelling case studies — of factory farming and painful animal research are also included.

All in all, God, Humans, and Animals offers a complete, balanced, and convincing argument for the moral recognition of animals. Most readers will be challenged — and some may be changed — by this provocative study.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780802839756
Publisher:	Eerdmans, William B. Publishing Company
Publication date:	12/11/2002
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	384
Product dimensions:	6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.78(d)

About the Author

Robert N. Wennberg is professor of philosophy at Westmont College, Santa Barbara, California.

Read an Excerpt

God, Humans, and Animals

An Invitation to Enlarge Our Moral Universe

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By Robert N. Wennberg

Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company

Copyright © 2002 Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company
All right reserved.
ISBN: 0-8028-3975-4

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Preface

This is a book about animals and the moral life. It is, first, an attempt to educate readers about some of the history of ethical concern for animals and the nature of that concern. Second, it is an invitation to reflect on the ethical issues raised by the existence of animals in our world. It is an invitation to take these issues seriously, while at the same time granting the reader considerable latitude in reaching his or her own conclusions. Third, it is intended, in particular, to articulate a moral concern for animals from a perspective that is sensitive to church history, Christian theology, the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, and the best philosophical thought on these matters.

The British philosopher and historian of ideas Richard Sorabji has argued that in the West, under the profound and far-reaching influence of Augustine, a very healthy debate over the moral status of animals came to an end. Prior to Augustine, there was at least a debate, both in the church and in the larger community. With Augustine the debate ended, and animals were declared to be inappropriate objects of direct moral concern. Animals simply did not count morally. Though there were dissenting voices here and there, the prevailing and standard approach to ethical matters became exclusively human-centered.

In the past thirty years that pre-Augustinian debate has vigorously re-emerged in the larger community, especially among philosophers. Animal rights and animal welfare organizations have proliferated and their memberships have grown, of ten with the more radical groups garnering the most publicity. Additionally, an impressive body of literature has been produced, including the founding of journals devoted to just this subject. It would seem that it is time this discussion found its way into the Christian community. Although this is happening in a few places, the Christian church (at both the academic and the pastoral levels) lags well behind the secular community. Indeed, studies indicate that there is a correlation between the degree of one's "religiosity," and one's sensitivity to animal welfare issues and knowledge about the nature of animals themselves. It seems that the greater one's religiosity, the greater one's insensitivity to animals and to animal concerns, and the greater one's ignorance. This ought not to be so.

Having said this, I should also indicate that I am not a crusader on the issue of moral concern for animals. Nor am I just a curious intellectual dabbler. I am someone who is still journeying, someone whose thoughts and sensitivities are still being shaped. Since my moral journey is still in progress and the conclusions that I am at this time prepared to affirm are relatively moderate ones, I think I may be able to speak more effectively to those morally serious people who are "turned off" by those animal activists who strike them (perhaps wrongly) as rabid or fanatical. The fact is, there are important issues here, and they should be the concern of all of us. Perhaps in my own way I can speak an effective word and help some others to begin their journey, as well as speak to those whose journey is in progress. I hope, for these reasons, that those who may be more advanced in these matters, who are more passionate in their advocacy and who are convinced that my conclusions are too conservative, will view my efforts charitably. Despite this moderation, my main conclusion - the necessity for moral recognition of animals - is substantially at odds with the controlling anthropocentric ethic of our society and of the church. Moral recognition of animals means that there are things we are not to do to animals even when it is in our interest to do them. That is what moral recognition means. That is also something most of us are reluctant even to hear about. So, although there may be those animal liberationists who will find my conclusions too restrained, this will not be so in the larger world of thought and practice. In that context these words may even be revolutionary.

But this is more than a book about the ethical treatment of animals. It is an invitation to a richer, more sensitive, and more complex moral life in general, because reflecting on the place of animals in the moral universe necessarily raises for us issues that illumine, challenge, and augment our understanding of the moral life even as it relates to humans. It does this in numerous ways. Consider the fact that women are more sensitive to the suffering and destruction of animals than are men. In general, women are said to have different ethical priorities than men, of which this difference over animals is but one. How, then, do we construct an ethic that is sensitive and respectful of these gender differences? Or consider that in discussions of animal suffering, the charge of emotionalism is often directed at those protesting the cruel treatment of animals. The implication is that a cool rationalism undistorted by emotion is the desirable way to go about our moral business. But can we even conceive of the moral life devoid of emotion, devoid, say, of sympathy or compassion? What, then, is the place of emotion in the moral life? Or consider the attempt to argue for a special moral status for humans, while at the same time acknowledging the appropriateness of a serious moral concern for animals. This involves one in defending the claim that humans are in some crucial ways superior to animals, a superiority that justifies a preferential moral treatment but not a preferential treatment that allows just any human interest to override any and all animal interests. Or consider the claim by the animal advocate that the predation we see in nature, with all its pain, dismembering, suffering, and death, is a tragic state of affairs, even though, as it is argued by some, predation works for the best overall. There is nothing, of course, that we can do to change matters without making things worse. This raises for us the important and more general question of how the morally good person should respond to those tragic elements in our world and in our life, about which we and others can do absolutely nothing. In these and many other ways, reflecting on the moral standing of animals occasions reflections that can only deepen and enrich our moral life in general.

In arguing for the moral recognition of animals with whom we share this planet, I am arguing for something that ought to receive a more receptive hearing among Christians (and religious believers in general) than among secularists - the reverse of what is presently the case. After all, f or those religious believers who have a doctrine of creation, animals are not simply here on this planet. Rather, they are here because of the good purposes of God. They themselves have been declared "good" by their Creator. This establishes a presumption that there is in the animal kingdom that which merits respect and appropriate treatment. Therefore, the task of discovering what that appropriate treatment might be and what form that respect is to take is an important and worthy enterprise. It is that task to which this book is devoted.

In enlarging our moral vision so that it embraces animals, we are not simply imposing on ourselves and on others one more unwelcome set of moral burdens. Gaining an enlarged moral vision is not like that. Rather, it is to see old things with a new appreciative eye, to come to hold dear and valuable what was once viewed indifferently, and it is this new "holding dear" that lightens the load and makes new burdens anything but burdensome. After all, in caring for what God cares for there should be joy. So this book is not only an invitation to enlarge our moral universe, it is also an invitation to new joys.

(Continues...)

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Excerpted from God, Humans, and Animals by Robert N. Wennberg Copyright © 2002 by Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company . Excerpted by permission.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

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Table of Contents

	Preface	xi
1.	Animal Advocacy and the Christian Tradition: The Lay of the Land	1
	A Little History: The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries	1
	A Little More History: The Twentieth Century	5
	Animal Lovers and People Lovers	8
	Resentment toward Animal Welfare	9
	The Logic of the Line	11
	Taking Animal Advocacy Seriously	14
	Attitudes toward Animals	15
	Christianity as Culprit	19
	What Is an Animal?	23
	Summary	26
2.	Animal Advocacy and Environmentalism Contrasted	29
	Introduction	29
	Two Perspectives on the Individual Animal	32
	Environmentalism: Three Versions	36
	Deep Ecology Contrasted with Traditional Morality	43
	Nature, Animals, Predation, and Evil	46
	Entering a More Complex Moral World	51
	Avoiding Some Dangers	54
	Summary and Conclusions	57
3.	Animal Advocacy, Women, and Feminist Theory	59
	Introduction	59
	Gender Differences, Again	60
	Carol Gilligan and the Female Moral Vision	62
	A Female Ethic	67
	Eco-feminism and the Insights of Female Experience	73
	Objectifying Animals	75
	Feminism and Scientific Attitudes	76
	Some Reflections on the Feminist Critique	80
	Conclusions	81
4.	What Are Animals Like?	84
	Introduction	84
	Are Animals Conscious and Do They Experience Physical Pain?	85
	Animals as Automata	90
	Animal Consciousness: Point-Counterpoint	92
	The Ape-Language Projects	99
	Language and the Mental Life of Animals	111
	Animal Minds	113
	Self-Consciousness	116
	Summary	117
5.	Animals and the World of Moral Theory	119
	Introduction	119
	Duties to Animals Are Only Duties to Humans: Aquinas and Kant	120
	The Claim That Humans Do Not Have Duties to Animals	124
	Duty: An Analytical Interlude	125
	Aquinas: The Less Perfect Is Available for Use by the More Perfect	127
	Aquinas Again: Animals Are Not to Be "Loved out of Charity"	129
	Kant: We Have Duties Only to Rational Moral Agents	130
	Social Contract Theory: Only Rational Agents Have Moral Standing	131
	Social Contract Theory and Cruelty	132
	Social Contract Theory: Some Awkward Implications	134
	Utilitarianism: Everyone's Happiness Counts	137
	Utilitarianism: Everyone's Happiness Counts Equally	139
	A Problem for Utilitarianism	145
	A Principle of Beneficence	145
	A Principle of Non-Maleficence	147
	Summary	148
6.	More on Animals and the World of Moral Theory	152
	Introduction	152
	Animal Rights	152
	The Quick Route to Animal Rights	155
	Tom Regan and Animal Rights	157
	Andrew Linzey: A Theological Case for Animal Rights	162
	Virtue Theory: Avoiding Cruelty	167
	Stewardship: Caring for What Belongs to Another	172
	Summary and Conclusions	177
7.	Respecting Animal Life	180
	Introduction	180
	Some Initial Assumptions	181
	Killing as an Act of Harm	182
	God's Will and Harm to Animals	185
	Plants, Animals, and Humans	187
	The Possibility of an Animal Right to Life	189
	Hesitancy over "Animal Rights"	191
	Alternatives to a Right to Life	192
	Animals as Intrinsically Valuable	194
	Moral Vegetarianism: Some Brief Comments	195
	Summary and Conclusion	198
8.	A Special Moral Status for Humans	200
	Introduction	200
	Defining a Special Moral Status	201
	The Challenge to Human Specialness	204
	The Human Difference	207
	Species Equality without Denying the Human Difference	211
	Attacks on Human Superiority and the Enlightenment Agenda	214
	More about the Enlightenment Agenda	217
	The Argument for Animal Liberation from Marginal Cases	219
	Summary	222
9.	A Case Study: Factory Farming	224
	Introduction	224
	Engaging the Emotions	226
	Sympathy, Sentimentality, and a Good Word for Rats	228
	Sympathy and Animals: A Cautionary Note	230
	Factory Farming	232
	It Began with the Chicken	233
	Chickens: How Concerned Should We Be?	235
	Factory Farming Spreads: Pigs and Veal	237
	Commercial Interests and Animal Interests	239
	A Better Way	240
	Conditional Vegetarianism as a Response to Factory Farming	241
	Conditional Vegetarianism: Additional Justifications	244
	An Alternative to Vegetarianism	246
	What Does Moral Integrity Require of Us?	247
	Putting Vegetarianism in Its Place	250
	Summary	252
10.	A Case Study: Painful Animal Research	254
	Introduction	254
	On Not Taking the Animal Researcher's Word for It	256
	The Animal Advocate and the Catalogue of Horrors	258
	Serendipity, Curiosity, and Scientific Progress	261
	The Vice of Curiosity	263
	Toxicity Testing	265
	Other Research Using Animals	270
	Animal Research: Three Positions	279
	A Case in Point	281
11.	Christianity, the Bible, and Animal Concern	285
	Introduction	285
	World Religions and Animal Concern	286
	Some Biblical Reflections	289
	The Fall and Killing Animals for Food	292
	Some Possibly Not-So-Congenial Reflections	295
	The Bible, Slaves, and Animals	299
	Augustine and After	302
	Conclusion	308
12.	Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil	309
	Introduction	309
	Animals Do Not Feel Pain	311
	Animals Feel Little Pain	314
	It Doesn't Matter That Animals Feel Pain	316
	Animal Pain Can Be Compensated for in an Afterlife	318
	Animal Immortality: Its History	319
	Scripture and Animal Resurrection	321
	An Objection to Animal Resurrection Considered	322
	Another Objection to Animal Resurrection Considered	324
	But Does an Animal Resurrection Help?	326
	The Origins of Animal Pain: An Angelic Fall?	327
	Sorting Out Our Options	330
	Adam's Fall Revisited	332
	Justifying Animal Pain: Some Possibilities	334
	Why Something More Is Needed	336
	A Cautionary Ethical Note	339
	Conclusion	340
	Bibliography	342
	Index	355

Editorial Reviews

Stephen Webb
"Careful and comprehensive, this book is a model of moral argument that should be taught in theology and ethics classes from the undergraduate to the seminary level. Robert Wennberg's refreshingly sensible and moderate voice will challenge secular animal-rights activists and skeptical Christians alike. He has raised the whole debate about animals to a new level, advancing every issue he addresses with a balanced treatment that is at once creative and analytical. This is truly a new chapter in the struggle to define the moral standing of animals. "

Lawrence Johnson
"A welcome contribution to the literature concerning the moral significance of animals. Wennberg writes from a Christian perspective, relating the moral status of animals first to God and then to humans on the one hand and to the environment on the other. Animals have moral significance in their own right, not just as they contribute to the environment or to human welfare. All value, of course, is within a theocentric framework. Wennberg is to be commended for bringing to his task both scholarship and fresh insight."

From the Publisher