Freedom within Reason / Edition 1

by Susan Wolf

Overview

Philosophers typically see the issue of free will and determinism in terms of a debate between two standard positions. Incompatibilism holds that freedom and responsibility require causal and metaphysical independence from the impersonal forces of nature. According to compatibilism, people are free and responsible as long as their actions are governed by their desires. In Freedom Within Reason, Susan Wolf charts a path between these traditional positions: We are not free and responsible, she argues, for actions that are governed by desires that we cannot help having. But the wish to form our own desires from nothing is both futile and arbitrary. Some of the forces beyond our control are friends to freedom rather than enemies of it: they endow us with faculties of reason, perception, and imagination, and provide us with the data by which we come to see and appreciate the world for what it is. The independence we want, Wolf argues, is not independence from the world, but independence from forces that prevent or preclude us from choosing how to live in light of a sufficient appreciation of the world. The freedom we want is a freedom within reason and the world.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780195085655
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	10/21/1993
Edition description:	REPRINT
Pages:	176
Sales rank:	837,772
Product dimensions:	5.49(w) x 8.24(h) x 0.55(d)
Lexile:	1550L (what's this?)

About the Author

Johns Hopkins University

Table of Contents

1.	The Dilemma of Autonomy (In Which the Problems of Responsibility and Free Will Are Presented)	3
	Setting Up the Problem(s): The Dilemma of Autonomy	4
	Defending the Problem as a Problem: The Metaphysical Stance	15
2.	The Real Self View (In Which a Nonautonomous Conception of Free Will and Responsibility is Examined and Criticized)	23
	Relating the Problems of Free Will and Responsibility to Determinism	24
	Avoiding Autonomy: Developing the Idea of an Agent's Real Self	26
	Problems with the Real Self View	35
3.	The Autonomy View (In Which an Autonomous Conception of Free Will and Responsibility Is Examined and Criticized)	46
	The Apparent (but Only Apparent) Autonomy of Valuing Selves	49
	Autonomy as the Ability to Make Radical Choices	53
	The (Non) Desirability of Autonomy	55
	A Last Voice in Favor of Autonomy: The Skeptic's Perspective	62
4.	The Reason View (In Which a Nonautonomous Conception of Free Will and Responsibility Is Proposed)	67
	The Reason View Compared with the Autonomy View	68
	The Reason View Compared with the Real Self View	73
	The Reason View as an Intermediary between the Other Views	76
	The Asymmetry of the Reason View	79
	The Reason View Applied	81
	Blameworthiness According to the Reason View	85
	The Unity and Spirit of the Reason View	89
5.	Ability and Possibility (In Which the Implications of Determinism for Responsibility Are Discussed)	94
	Determinism and the Reason View	96
	Conditional Analyses of Ability	97
	An Alternative Characterization of Ability	100
	The Story	103
	The Moral of the Story	112
6.	The True and the Good (In Which the Metaethical Assumptions of the Reason View Are Examined)	117
	The Role of "the True and the Good" in the Reason View	118
	The Metaethical Spectrum	123
	Varieties of Antiobjectivism	126
	Conceptual Subjectivism's Implications for the Reason View	132
	Normative Pluralism and Its Conjunction with the Reason View	135
	How Much Freedom (and Reason) Do We Need?	142
	Notes	149
	Selected Readings	155
	Index	159

Editorial Reviews

"Highly intelligent, original, and provocative. Her criticisms of the Autonomy View and the Real Self View are both vigorous and incisive. Her alternative approach—the Reason View—is developed with considerable subtlety and refinement. It is a distinctive approach to free will and moral responsibility, which deserves to be taken seriously."—Ethics

"Refreshing....Bold positions are advanced, elaborated with adequate, not exorbitant detail, and forcefully defended. The writing is crisp and not ponderous....Wolf's perspective on the issues is original. Although the theories that are surveyed are familiar, the way in which they are sorted is illuminating."—Journal of Philosophy

"Thoughtful and persuasive....A valuable dimension of Wolf's book is her clear summary of arguments that in their original form, are virtually inpenetrable to those who are not trained in academic philosophy."—American Political Science Review

"[Wolf's] view is marked by a refreshing simplicity that does not undermine its philosophical soundness or its persuasiveness....One can find little to discredit in Wolf's arguments, and her approach to the problem of the relationship between responsibility and freedom provides a relief from the tedious and convoluted debates that often take place when this issue is the topic."—Review of Metaphysics

"This book is brilliantly written and full of stimulating argument. Because it states the fundamental issues intuitively and clearly, it is accessible to a wide audience. Because many claims and arguments are original and well presented, it will also appeal to professionals....It is an important book that deserves a very wide audience."—Choice

From the Publisher