Empirical Industrial Organization

by Paul L. Joskow, Michael Waterson

Overview

This two-volume collection presents the most important recent articles on empirical issues in industrial organization, related primarily to the analysis of imperfect competition.

The papers cover empirical analysis of non-cooperative and cooperative oligopoly, auctions, differentiated product markets, dynamic competition and entry, plus selected work on innovation, vertical contractual relationships, and incentive issues. New research in these areas relies on detailed data for specific industries, typically integrates modern imperfect competition theory into the empirical specifications, commonly uses structural empirical models derived directly from microeconomic theory, and applies modern econometric techniques. This work and the associated techniques play an increasingly important role in antitrust policy, market design and in newly deregulated markets. This collection provides an easily accessible source of the key papers on these topics, which are otherwise not readily available.

Empirical Industrial Organization will be of interest to policymakers as well as academics and students.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781843763147
Publisher:	Edward Elgar Publishing
Publication date:	03/28/2004
Series:	The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series , #172
Pages:	1112
Product dimensions:	6.62(w) x 9.62(h) x (d)

About the Author

Edited by Paul L. Joskow, Elizabeth and James Killiam Professor of Economics and Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US and Michael Waterson, Professor of Economics, University of Warwick, UK

Table of Contents

Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Paul L. Joskow and Michael Waterson
PART I STATIC COMPETITION AND MARKET POWER
1. Severin Borenstein (1989), ‘Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the U.S. Airline Industry’
2. David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin (1998), ‘Testing Static Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost in the Sugar Industry, 1890–1914’
3. Richard J. Green and David M. Newbery (1992), ‘Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market’
4. Catherine D. Wolfram (1999), ‘Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market’
5. Severin Borenstein, James B. Bushnell and Frank A. Wolak (2002), ‘Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California’s Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market’
6. Judith A. Chevalier (1995), ‘Capital Structure and Product-Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from the Supermarket Industry’
PART II PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND PRICE DISPERSION
7. Steven Berry, James Levinsohn and Ariel Pakes (1995), ‘Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium’
8. Jerry A. Hausman and Gregory K. Leonard (2002), ‘The Competitive Effects of a New Product Introduction: A Case Study’
9. Aviv Nevo (2000), ‘Mergers with Differentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-eat Cereal Industry’
10. Alan T. Sorensen (2000), ‘Equilibrium Price Dispersion in Retail Markets for Prescription Drugs’
11. Severin Borenstein and Nancy L. Rose (1994), ‘Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry’
12. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Frank Verboven (2001), ‘The Evolution of Price Dispersion in the European Car Market’
PART III DYNAMIC COMPETITION, COLLUSION AND STRATEGIC INTERACTION
13. Timothy F. Bresnahan (1987), ‘Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: The 1955 Price War’
14. Margaret E. Slade (1987), ‘Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion’
15. Robert H. Porter (1983), ‘A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880–1886’
16. Glenn Ellison (1994), ‘Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee’
17. Margaret E. Slade (1995), ‘Product Rivalry with Multiple Strategic Weapons: An Analysis of Price and Advertising Competition’
18. Satwinder Singh, Michael Utton and Michael Waterson (1998), ‘Strategic Behaviour of Incumbent Firms in the UK’
Name Index

Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I COMPETITIVE ENTRY AND MARKET STRUCTURE
1. Timothy F. Bresnahan and Peter C. Reiss (1991), ‘Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets’
2. Steven T. Berry (1992), ‘Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry’
3. Michael D. Whinston and Scott C. Collins (1992), ‘Entry and Competitive Structure in Deregulated Airline Markets: An Event Study Analysis of People Express’
4. Steven T. Berry and Joel Waldfogel (1999), ‘Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting’
5. Otto Toivanen and Michael Waterson (2000), ‘Empirical Research on Discrete Choice Game Theory Models of Entry: An Illustration’
6. John Sutton (1991), ‘Econometric Evidence’
7. John Sutton (1997), ‘Gibrat’s Legacy’
PART II AUCTIONS
8. Kenneth Hendricks and Robert H. Porter (1988), ‘An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information’
9. Robert H. Porter and J. Douglas Zona (1993), ‘Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions’
10. Susan Athey and Jonathan Levin (2001), ‘Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions’
11. Robert H. Porter (1995), ‘The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions’
12. Nils-Henrik Mørch von der Fehr and David Harbord (1993), ‘Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry’
13. Catherine D. Wolfram (1998), ‘Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales’
PART III TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND NEW PRODUCTS
14. Ariel Pakes (1986), ‘Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks’
15. Nancy L. Rose and Paul L. Joskow (1990), ‘The Diffusion of New Technologies: Evidence From the Electric Utility Industry’
16. Garth Saloner and Andrea Shepard (1995), ‘Adoption of Technologies with Network Effects: An Empirical Examination of the Adoption of Automated Teller Machines’
17. Manuel Trajtenberg (1989), ‘The Welfare Analysis of Product Innovations, with an Application to Computed Tomography Scanners’
18. Amil Petrin (2002), ‘Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the Minivan’
PART IV VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS AND INCENTIVES
19. Paul L. Joskow (1987), ‘Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets’
20. Francine Lafontaine and Kathryn L. Shaw (1999), ‘The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data’
21. Andrea Shepard (1993), ‘Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing’
22. Timothy F. Bresnahan and Peter C. Reiss (1985), ‘Dealer and Manufacturer Margins’
23. Judith Chevalier and Glenn Ellison (1997), ‘Risk Taking By Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives’
Name Index

Editorial Reviews

'These two volumes offer a carefully selected set of contributions to empirical industrial organization. Replete with classics, but resolutely forward-looking, they provide the reader with both methodological tools and insights into the working of many imperfectly competitive markets of our modern economies. A must-read for anyone interested in industrial organization.'

Jean Tirole