Battle of Camden: A Documentary History

by Jim Piecuch

Overview

On the foggy morning of August 16, 1780, American and British armies clashed in the pine woods north of Camden, South Carolina, in one of the most important and influential battles of the Revolutionary War. An American victory would quash British plans to subjugate the southern colonies and virtually guarantee the independence of the fledgling United States. A victory for the British would pave the way for the conquest of North Carolina and Virginia.

After nearly an hour of frenzied, bloody combat, the British army emerged victorious, and American morale plummeted to its lowest point of the war. The rout at Camden was not a total loss, however, as Patriot forces eventually came away with a renewed determination to resist British advances, and the lessons from the defeat were applied to secure future victories that finally allowed the Patriots to triumph in the South.

This engaging new book presents the Battle of Camden as never before: through the eyes and words of American and British participants and contemporary observers. The events leading up to the conflict, the combat itself and the consequences of Camden are all described in striking detail. The cunning strategies of both American Major General Horatio Gates and British Lieutenant General Lord Cornwallis are revealed, as are a number of battlefield reports from soldiers on both sides. In addition to these compelling first-hand accounts, The Battle of Camden includes analysis of the battle and its effects in America and Europe from George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and Lord George Germain. With this landmark text, author and historian Jim Piecuch offers a comprehensive consideration of a vital Revolutionary battle and its effects on the war for American independence.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781596291447
Publisher:	History Press, The
Publication date:	09/28/2006
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	159
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.20(h) x 0.60(d)

About the Author

Throughout his career as a historian and writer, Jim Piecuch has worked to promote various aspects of Revolutionary War history knowledge to the general public. He has published hundreds of articles in a variety of publications, and frequently presents at Revolutionary War conferences and meetings. This is his first book.

Read an Excerpt

CHAPTER 1

American Commanders' Accounts

General Horatio Gates was swept from the field early in the battle by the mob of fleeing militia, and was therefore unable to give a detailed description of the engagement. He eventually rode all the way to Hillsborough, North Carolina, covering the 180 miles in three days. Gates was clearly still upset when he composed this report to Samuel Huntington, President of the Continental Congress, on August 20, 1780.

In the deepest Distress and Anxiety of Mind, I am obliged to acquaint your Excellency with the Total Defeat of the Troops under my Command. — I arrived with the Maryland Line, the Artillery, and North Carolina Militia on the 13th Instant at Rugely's, 13 miles from Camden, took post there, and was the next Day joined by Genl Stevens with 700 Militia from Virginia — Colonel Sumpter, who was at the Waxhaws, had the Sunday before, with 400 So Carolinians killd and taken 300 of the Enemy, who were posted at Hanging Rocks; this and other Strokes upon the Enemy's Advanced posts occasioned their calling all their Outposts to Camden. — The 15th, at Daybreak, I reinforced Colonel Sumpter with 300 North Carolina Militia, 100 of the Maryd Line and two Three-pounders from the Artillery ... and directed, as soon as the Reinforcements joined him he should proceed down the Wateree opposite to Camden, intercept any Stores coming to the Enemy, and particularly their Troops from 96 — who were likewise withdrawn from that Post. — This was well executed by Colonel Sumpter ...

Having communicated my plans to the General Officers in the Afternoon of the 15th Instant, it was resolved to march at 10 at Night, to take post in an Advantageous Situation, with a Deep Creek in front, Seven Miles from Camden. — The Heavy Baggage, &c, being ordered to march immediately by the Waxhaws Road — At Ten the Army began their march in the following Order — Colonel Armand's Legion in Front, supported on both Flanks by Colo Porterfield's Regiment, and the Light Infantry of the Militia. — The Advanced Guard of Infantry. The Maryland Line with their Artillery in Front of the Brigades. — The North-Carolina Militia — The Virginia Militia — The Artillery Stores, &c, and the Rear Guard — Having marched about Five Miles, the Legion was charged by the Enemy's Cavalry, and well supported on the Flanks as they were ordered by Colonel Porterfield, who beat back the Enemy's Horse, and was himself unfortunately wounded; but the Enemy's Infantry advancing with a heavy fire — the Troops in Front gave way, even to the Front of the First Maryland Brigade, and a Confusion ensued, which took some time to regulate. At Length the Army was ranged in Line of Battle in the following Order — General Gist's Brigade upon the Right — with His Right close to a Swamp — The North Carolina Militia in the Centre, — and the Virginia Militia, with the Light infantry and Porterfield's Corps, upon the Left. — The Artillery divided to the Brigades — and the First Maryland Brigade as a Corps de Reserve, and to cover the Cannon on the Road at a proper distance in the Rear — Colonel Armand's Corps were Ordered to the Left to support the Left Flank and oppose the enemy's Cavalry. — At day Light the Enemy attacked, and drove in our Light Parties in Front, when I ordered our Left to advance and attack the Enemy — but, to my Astonishment, the Left Wing and North Carolina Militia gave Way. General Caswell and Myself, assisted by a number of Officers did all in our Power to rally the broken Troops, but to no purpose; for the Enemy's Cavalry, coming round the Left Flank of the Maryland Division, Completed the Rout of the Whole of the Militia, who left the Continentals alone, to oppose the Enemy's Whole Force. — I then endeavored with General Caswell to rally the Militia at some Distance, on an advantageous piece of ground, but the Enemy's Cavalry continuing to harass their Rear, they ran like a Torrent, and bore all before them. This being the situation of General Caswell and myself at a pass; the Militia pressing us forward, and the Enemy's Cavalry pursuing, we were obliged to Retreat with them — hoping yet that a few miles in the Rear they might recover from their panic, and again be brought into order; — but this likewise provd in vain — and the Firing in a Manner ceasing in the Rear — there was no hopes that the Maryland Division, had any longer sustained the Attack of the Enemy's Whole Infantry. — Though overpowered by numbers their bravery is highly to be commended and honoured, as they made as great an opposition as it was possible so small a Force could make against one so vastly superior.

By this time the Militia had taken the Woods in all directions, and I concluded with General Caswell to retire towards Charlotte, I got there late in the night — but reflecting that there was neither Army, Ammunition, nor any prospect of collecting any Force at that Place, adequate to the Defence of the Country I proceeded with all possible Despatch hither: — to endeavor to fall upon some Plan, in conjunction with the Legislature of this State, for the Defense of so much thereof as it is yet possible to save from the Enemy — I shall immediately Despatch a Flag to Lord Cornwallis to know the Situation of our wounded — the number of Prisoners and Condition in his Hands — I send this Letter open to the Governor of Virginia that he may take proper measures in the present Emergency. He will Seale and forward it immediately by the Bearers Colo Senf and Major Magill my Aid de Camp — who are well acquainted with all the Circumstances of my march, from where I joined General de Kalb, to the unfortunate Hour of the Defeat. The Distresses of the Campaign previous thereto, almost exceed Description, Famine, Want of Tents for the Militia, and of every Comfort necessary for the Troops in this unwholesome Climate has no doubt, in a Degree, contributed to our Ruin. Had it been practicable to have rallied the Militia at any given Distance from the Field of Battle, and could I have even Collected Ammunition and a Magazine; there was no making a Post properly defencible; as I had not any Intrenching Tools — a Want which I so long represented. We lost only Eight Pieces of Cannon in the Action ... but most assuredly the small arms are gone, for those that the Enemy did not take are carried off by the Militia. I mention this that proper Measures may be taken to supply Arms. It is a considerable Consolation to my Mind, that I never made any Movement of Importance ... without the consent and approbation of all the General officers, and particular in the Night of the 15th, after the First attack of the Enemy — they gave their unanimous opinions, that there was no retreating with Safety, and that a Battle must be fought at all Events. — Seized with a violent Disorder, occasioned by the Fatigues I have undergone, I must entreat the Indulgence of Congress, for the defects of this Letter, and have therefore sent Colonel Senf Chief Engineer and my Aid de Camp Major Magill to answer any Questions and clear up every Doubt, that can be suggested.

Ten days later, Gates had regained his composure, and concluded that the defeat at Camden was not quite so disastrous as he had originally feared. On August 30, he sent George Washington an updated report from Hillsborough, which included a description of the steps he was taking to salvage the situation in the South.

My public Letter to Congress has surely been transmitted to yr Exclly — Since then, I have been able to collect authentic Returns of the killed wounded and missing of the Officers of the Maryland Line, Artillerists and those of the Legion under Colo Armand. They are inclosed. The Militia broke early in the Day, and Scattered in so many Directions upon their Retreat, that very few have fallen into the Hands of the Enemy. — By the Firmness and Bravery of the Continental Troops the victory is far from Bloodless on the part of the Foe; — they having upward of 500 men with officers in proportion killd and wounded. I do not think Ld Cornwallis will be able to reap any advantage of consequence from his Victory — as this State seems animated to re-instate and support the Army. Virginia I am confident, will not be less patriotic — and by the joint Exertions of the two States, there is good Reason to hope, that ... all South Carolina might be again recovered. Ld Cornwallis remained with his Army at Camden, when I received the last accounts from thence; — I am cantoning ours at Salisbury, Guilford, Hillsborough and Cross Creek ... This is absolutely necessary, as we have no Magazines of Provisions, and are only supplied from Hand to Mouth ... What encouragement the numerous Disaffected in this State may give Lord Cornwallis to advance further into the Country; I cannot yet say.Colonel Sumpter since his Surprise and Defeat upon the West Side of the Wateree, has reinstated and increased his Corps to upward of 1000 men.I have directed him to continue to harass the Enemy upon that Side. Lord Cornwallis will therefore be cautious how he makes any considerable movement to the Eastward, while this Corps remains upon his Left Flank — and the Main Army is in a manner cantoned on his Front. Anxious for the Public Good I shall continue my unwearied Endeavors to stop the Progress of the Enemy — to reinstate our affairs — to recommence an Offensive War, and recover all our Losses in the Southern States. But if being unfortunate is solely a Reason sufficient for removing me from Command I shall most cheerfully submit to the Orders of Congress; and resign an office few Generals would be anxious to possess — and where the utmost skill and Fortitude is so subject to be baffled by the difficulties which must for a Time, surround, the Chief in Command here.

Colonel John Christian Senf, a European volunteer serving with the American forces, was the engineer for the Southern army. Although Gates said little in his reports about the strategy that led him to advance toward Camden, Senf explained the reasons in detail because his survey of the ground was largely responsible for Gates's decision. Senf left the battlefield with Gates and later carried news of the defeat to the Continental Congress in Philadelphia.

The 13th August, 1780, General Gates arriv'd with the Southern Army at Rugely's House, 13 miles this side Camden, on the Road from Charlotteburg to Camden, where the Enemy had a Post, but retreated precipitately on the approach of Genl Gates. That afternoon, Night & next Morning Reconoitering partys were sent out, the Enemy at Camden and inferior to our Army. Upon intelligence of the Engineer the Genl detach'd in the Night of between the 14th and 15th inst. 400 men, with 2 field pieces, Conducted by Col. Senf, to join Brig Genl Sumpter of the South Carolina Militia (12 miles West from the Army), who was moving down the West Side of Wateree river ... This junction was effected the 15th in the morning ... Genl Sumpter march'd down the river (on which the Enemy evacuated several out posts on the river), Surprised a Guard on the West Side of Wateree Ferry, 3 miles from Camden, consisting of about 40 Men, under a Militia Col (Carey), took them prisoners, with which he took also 40 waggons with Drivers, 4 Horses & Waggon, loaded with Rum, Flour, Corn, &c., 300 head of Cattle & some Sheep.

A few Hours after this a Detachment of 70 men of the 71st & 33d Regts came from Ninety Six to join the Enemy at Camden, were likewise taken Prisoners by Genl Sumpter, after which the Enemy made motion to cross the river below to attack him; he retreated up the River that Night for 10 miles, of which Col Senf return'd to report to Genl Gates.

The 15th Genl Gates, as the 700 Virg'a Militia, under B Genl Stevens made junction, consulted with all the General Officers on taking another Position for the Army, as the Ground where they were upon was by no means tenable. On reconoitering a Deep Creek, 7 miles in the front, was found impassable 7 miles to the Right, & about the same distance to the left, except only at the place where the Ford intersects the great road. It was Unanimously agreed upon to march that Night the Army to that Creek, by which means they would get a more secure Encampment, come nearer Genl Sumpter, occupy the road on the East side of Wateree river, and would be able to get nearer intelligence of the Enemy. As for to march back on that Road, and take an equal Strong or Stronger Position, was not certain, would have given the Enemy a weak opinion of our Strength & more encouragement to attack — The Communication with Genl Sumpter ... would have been given up again, difficult of getting Intelligence of the Enemy, & our Horses in want of Forage. To march to the Right to fall into the road on the East side of Wateree river (if even the road would have admitted of it), but it would not without a great deal of work, & Pioneers too were wanted, the Baggage of the Army would have been exposed; the Road where Supplys came from open to the Enemy & impossible to turn those Waggons directly into another road before the Enemy's Horse might have cut them off from the Army.

Certain Intelligence came the 15th to Genl Gates that Lord Cornwallis had arriv'd the Evening before at Camden, & a reinforcement had arriv'd that Day, but no certainty of the Strength could be obtain'd.

The 15th, the Evening, at 10 o'clock the Army march'd from Rugeley's to take Post in Front at the mentioned Creek ... During the march Reconoitering Parties, sent out from the advanc'd Corps, came back, & nothing seen in the Road, soon after, (about half an Hour after two in the morning of the 16th August) Col. Armand's Van party got hail'd by an advanc'd party of the Enemy; an answer was made directly on our side on which the Enemy's Horse immediately charg'd furiously with a great deal of Huzzas.Col Armand stood the charge, & Col Potterfield's light Infantry gave a crossing Fire upon the enemy's Horse, which made them retreat immediately, upon which the Enemy's Light Infantry advanced, and after a fire of about five minutes drove our Advanc'd Corps back upon our Advanc'd Guard and Main Body, and then likewise retreated; This affair caused a little Confusion in the Line, but was soon redress'd. The Army drew up in order of Battle, & having taken a Prisoner of the Enemy, who confirm'd that Lord Cornwallis Commanded the Army himself consisting of not above 3000 men, and that he was come out with an Intention to attack General Gates in his Camp at Rugeley's, upon which Genl Gates call'd all the General Officers together to hear their opinion on that occasion, & it was their Unanimous Opinion that it was now too late to retreat, a Battle ought to be fought, & some of them were glad to have an opportunity of such, as they had no Idea of the Enemy's Superiority or of the following behaviour of the Militia.

General Gates form'd order of Battle, viz —

The Second Maryland Brigade about 400 men under Brig Gen Gist on the right of the road leading to Camden, two field pieces on his right & an almost unpassable Swamp & Gregs Quarter Creek on the right of field pieces, on the left of the Brigade in the main road two Field Pieces, the three Brigades of North Carolina Militia of 1200 Men under the Brigadiers Rutherford, Graigery & Butler, two Field Pieces the Virginia Militia of 700 men under Brigadier Genl Stevens, the Light Infantry then about 300 men under Col Potterfield and Col Armand with the Horse about 60 in the rear of the Light Infantry to support the left. The first Maryland Brigade about 400 men under Brig Genl Smallwood in the rear of the Line across the road, as a Corps of Reserve.

(Continues…)

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Excerpted from "The Battle of Camden"
by .
Copyright © 2006 Jim Piecuch.
Excerpted by permission of The History Press.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements,
Introduction,
1. American Commanders' Accounts,
2. British Commanders' Accounts,
3. American Soldiers' Accounts,
4. British Soldiers' Accounts,
5. Contemporary American Observations and Reports,
6. Contemporary British Observations and Reports,
Epilogue,
Appendix,
Notes,