A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games / Edition 1

by John C. Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten

Overview

The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well. By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality. The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780262582384
Publisher:	MIT Press
Publication date:	06/29/1988
Series:	MIT Press Series
Edition description:	Fourth Edition
Pages:	396
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.00(d)

About the Author

John C. Harsanyi is Flood Research Professor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley.

The late Reinhard Selten was Professor at the University of Bonn and was a co-winner of the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics.

Table of Contents

Foreword p.xiRobert J. Aumann
1. The Need for a New Solution Concept p.1
2. Games in Standard Form p.29
3. Consequences of Desirable Properties p.67
4. The Tracing Procedure p.131
5. The Solution Concept p.195
6. A Bargaining Problem with Transaction Costs on One Side p.243
7. Trade Involving One Seller and More than One Seller p.273
8. Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information on One Side p.285
9. Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides p.311
10. Postscript p.341
Notes p.365
Bibliography p.369
Index p.373

What People are Saying About This

Ariel Rubinstein

The book provides for the first time a heroic and thorough attempt to suggest a very general selection theory. No other task may be more significant within game theory. A successful theory of this type may change all of economic theory.

Endorsement

The book provides for the first time a heroic and thorough attempt to suggest a very general selection theory. No other task may be more significant within game theory. A successful theory of this type may change all of economic theory.

—Ariel Rubinstein, Hebrew University

Editorial Reviews

"The book provides for the first time a heroic and thorough attempt to suggest a very general selection theory. No other task may be more significant within game theory. A successful theory of this type may change all of economic theory."- Ariel Rubinstein, Hebrew University

& quot; The book provides for the first time a heroic and thorough attempt to suggest a very general selection theory. No other task may be more significant within game theory. A successful theory of this type may change all of economic theory.& quot; - Ariel Rubinstein, Hebrew University

" The book provides for the first time a heroic and thorough attempt to suggest a very general selection theory. No other task may be more significant within game theory. A successful theory of this type may change all of economic theory." - Ariel Rubinstein, Hebrew University

From the Publisher