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Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780191536526 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
| Publication date: | 11/10/2005 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| File size: | 373 KB |
About the Author
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Two kinds of ignorance about prawns 1
1.2 The zombie idea 3
1.3 Outline 4
2 Zombies and Minimal Physicalism 7
2.1 Causal closure and epiphenomenalism 7
2.2 Redescription and strict implication 8
2.3 More about physicalism and strict implication 12
2.4 A posteriori necessity and physicalism 14
2.5 Psychological and physical explicability 17
2.6 Seeing whether descriptions fit reality, versus looking for analytic connections 19
2.7 Conclusion 22
3 The Case for Zombies 24
3.1 Kinds of zombies 24
3.2 Two old arguments 25
3.3 The argument from conceivability 27
3.4 Does conceivability entail possibility? 28
3.5 Chalmers's arguments for conceivability 31
3.6 The 'knowledge argument' 33
3.7 The argument 'from the absence of analysis' 35
3.8 Conclusion 36
4 Zapping the Zombie Idea 37
4.1 Conflict among intuitions 37
4.2 The jacket fallacy 38
4.3 The e-qualia story 39
4.4 E-qualia, causation, and cognitive processing 41
4.5 Are e-qualia alone enough for epistemic intimacy? 44
4.6 My zombie twin's sole-pictures 45
4.7 The e-qualia story is not conceivable 46
4.8 If zombies were conceivable, the e-qualia story would be conceivable 48
4.9 Objections 52
4.10 Sole-pictures versus soul-pictures 55
4.11 Corollaries 56
4.12 Looking ahead 57
5 What Has To Be Done 58
5.1 Varieties of consciousness 58
5.2 Nagel's two kinds of concepts 61
5.3 Three problems: (i) What is it like? (ii) Is it like anything? (iii) What is it? 63
5.4 Do we have to get a priori from physical facts to what it is like? 64
5.5 Must there be a third type of event? 68
5.6 Block's two concepts of consciousness 69
5.7 Do we need anew science? 71
5.8 Does this project involve 'conceptual analysis'? Does it involve armchair science? 72
5.9 More on the what-is-it problem 73
5.10 The moderate realism of everyday psychology 74
5.11 Summary 75
6 Deciders 77
6.1 What really matters? 77
6.2 Perception and control 79
6.3 Pure reflex systems 79
6.4 Pure reflex systems with acquired stimuli 82
6.5 Built-in triggered reflex systems 83
6.6 Triggered reflex systems with acquired conditions 84
6.7 Monitoring and controlling the responses 85
6.8 Deciders 88
6.9 Unity of the basic package 89
6.10 The basic package and perception 92
6.11 Usefulness of the basic package idea 95
7 Decision, Control, and Integration 97
7.1 Simple organisms 97
7.2 'Bees can think say scientists' 98
7.3 Interpretation, assessment, and decision-making by the whole organism 100
7.4 The human embryo, foetus, and neonate 102
7.5 The artificial giant 104
7.6 Block's machines 105
7.7 The machine-table robot 108
7.8 Untypical deciders 111
7.9 Other robots 115
7.10 An indeterminate case 117
7.11 Some lessons 117
7.12 Basicness of the basic package 118
8 De-sophisticating the Framework 119
8.1 The objection 119
8.2 The 'concept-exercising and reasoning system' 120
8.3 Concept possession is not all-or-nothing 122
8.4 More on having concepts 124
8.5 Representation 126
8.6 Concepts and theories 129
8.7 Mistaken beliefs and 'public norms' 132
8.8 The basic package and rationality 134
8.9 Deciders might be subjects of experience without being persons 134
8.10 The basic package and 'non-conceptual content' 135
8.11 The contents of deciders' informational states 138
8.12 Conclusion 139
9 Direct Activity 140
9.1 The basic package, control, and consciousness 140
9.2 Why the basic package seems insufficient for perceptual consciousness 141
9.3 The Evans-Type model 143
9.4 Concepts and the acquisition of information 146
9.5 Registration and conceptualization 147
9.6 Two points about information and registration 149
9.7 Directly active perceptual information: instantaneity and priority 150
9.8 A holistic approach to direct activity 154
9.9 Can we really understand direct activity holistically and not in terms of 'poisedness'? 155
9.10 Significance of direct activity 158
9.11 Degrees of consciousness and the richness of perceptual information 159
9.12 Phenomenal consciousness in general 160
9.13 Why is it like this? 161
9.14 Conclusion 162
10 Gap? What Gap? 164
10.1 Extending the sole-pictures argument 164
10.2 Zoëet; 166
10.3 Being able to tell the difference 167
10.4 Zoëet;'s abilities 170
10.5 Provisional conclusions 171
10.6 Some misconceptions 172
10.7 What this account does 174
10.8 Blindsight 175
10.9 Automatism 178
10.10 General objections to functionalist accounts 179
10.11 The 'explanatory gap' 186
10.12 Awareness of experiences 188
10.13 Carruthers's critique 189
10.14 'Worldly-subjectivity', 'mental-state subjectivity', and higher-order thought 192
10.15 More objections 193
10.16 Why there will always seem to be a gap 197
11 Survival of the Fittest 199
11.1 Scientific-psychological and neuroscientific accounts 199
11.2 Dualism and physicalism 201
11.3 Wittgenstein and Sartre 202
11.4 Behaviourism 203
11.5 Other functionalisms 204
11.6 Dennett on 'multiple drafts' and 'Joycean machines' 206
11.7 Pure representationalism 209
11.8 Higher-order perception 212
11.9 Higher-order thought 213
11.10 Core points 216
Bibliography 219
Index 227