Wittgenstein on Rules and Nature

by Keith Dromm

Overview

The celebrated 20th century philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, developed an interest in his later career in natural forms of behavior, what he calls 'primitive' and 'natural reactions', and the role they play in our linguistic and other intellectual practices.
To many, Wittgenstein appears to be advancing a theory about these practices as originating in natural forms of behavior. However, theories of this sort seem out of place in philosophy, especially in light of Wittgenstein's own expressed views on the purpose of philosophy. Keith Dromm offers a way of understanding these apparently incongruous aspects of Wittgenstein's writings that is more consistent with his views on the proper purpose of philosophy.
The book shows that Wittgenstein does not in fact offer theories about natural human behavior. Rather, these references belong to a type of philosophical reasoning that is not meant to contribute to our knowledge, as explanations in science do, but instead to help clarify our thinking on certain philosophical topics. In particular, they serve to relieve apparent tensions between the things we do know. This book offers a more useful interpretation of a recurring motif in Wittgenstein's later writings that has puzzled many of his readers.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780826498625
Publisher:	Bloomsbury Academic
Publication date:	08/26/2008
Series:	Continuum Studies in British Philosophy
Pages:	160
Product dimensions:	6.20(w) x 9.30(h) x 0.70(d)

About the Author

Keith Dromm is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Louisiana Scholars' College, Northwestern State University.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ix

Abbreviations for Works Ludwig Wittgenstein xi

Introduction: The Primeval Chaos xiii

Chapter 1 The 'Primitive' and the 'Natural' 1

1.1 'All the facts we need to know' 1

1.2 Language-learning and Development 4

1.3 Rule-following 10

1.4 Influences and Comparisons 12

1.5 Interpretations 18

1.6 Facts and Philosophy 23

1.7 Possibilities 25

1.8 Conclusion 28

Chapter 2 Philosophical Explanations

2.1 'We are not interested in causes' 31

2.2 Philosophical Explanations 32

2.3 Learning to Talk about Mental Phenomena 34

2.4 'Look at it like this' 37

2.5 Comparisons: Freud, Plato and Nietzsche 41

2.6 Conclusion 44

Chapter 3 The Third-person 46

3.1 Introduction 46

3.2 Avowals 47

3.3 The Modified Expressive Account 51

3.4 Interpretation and Third-person Ascriptions 56

3.5 Conclusion 62

Chapter 4 Scepticism and the Natural 63

4.1 Introduction 63

4.2 The Normativity of Rules 63

4.3 Training 68

4.4 The Origins of Language 79

4.5 Conclusion 85

Chapter 5 Science and the Natural 87

5.1 Introduction 87

5.2 Understanding Ancient Practices 88

5.3 'A common spirit' 94

5.4 Historical Explanations 99

5.5 Conclusion 103

Notes 104

Bibliography 117

Index 121