When Is True Belief Knowledge?

by Richard Foley

Overview

A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief.


In this provocative book, Richard Foley finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs—something important that she doesn't quite "get." This may seem a modest point but, as Foley shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information.


Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691154725
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	07/22/2012
Series:	Princeton Monographs in Philosophy , #38
Pages:	168
Product dimensions:	5.50(w) x 8.50(h) x 0.90(d)

About the Author

Richard Foley is professor of philosophy and vice chancellor for strategic planning at New York University. He is the author of Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others,
Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology, and The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.

Table of Contents

Part I: The Basic Idea

Chapter 1: An Observation 3

Chapter 2: Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge 6

Chapter 3: Knowledge Stories 9

Chapter 4: Intuitions about Knowledge 12

Chapter 5: Important Truths 19

Chapter 6: Maximally Accurate and Comprehensive Beliefs 32

Chapter 7: The Beetle in the Box 41

Chapter 8: Knowledge Blocks 46

Chapter 9: The Theory of Knowledge and Theory of Justified Belief 51

Part II: Puzzles and Questions

Chapter 10: The Value of True Belief 59

Chapter 11: The Value of Knowledge 65

Chapter 12: The Lottery and Preface 70

Chapter 13: Reverse Lottery Stories 73

Chapter 14: Lucky Knowledge 78

Chapter 15: Closure and Skepticism 81

Chapter 16: Disjunctions 86

Chapter 17: Fixedness and Knowledge 88

Chapter 18: Instability and Knowledge 91

Chapter 19: Misleading Defeaters 95

Chapter 20: Believing That I Don't Know 99

Chapter 21: Introspective Knowledge 102

Chapter 22: Perceptual Knowledge 106

Chapter 23: A Priori Knowledge 110

Chapter 24: Collective Knowledge 113

Part III: The Structure of Epistemology

Chapter 25: A Look Back 121

Chapter 26: Epistemology within a General Theory of Rationality 124

Chapter 27: The Core Concepts of Epistemology 134

Notes 137

Index 149

What People are Saying About This

From the Publisher

"This engaging and imaginative book proposes an original and strikingly simple account of propositional knowledge, and offers an ingenious, many-sided argument for preferring it to alternatives already abroad. It makes many interesting and unexpected moves along the way."—Ernest Sosa, Rutgers University

"Going against the grain, Foley argues that knowledge does not require justified belief and that the pedigree of a true belief has nothing to do with whether it counts as knowledge. His impressive defense of this view is a singular achievement. He shows that his account can easily accommodate cases that might appear problematic, and that it offers more intuitive explanations for a variety of epistemic phenomena than available alternatives. Beautifully written, carefully argued, and a pleasure to read, this book will be required reading for everyone in epistemology."—Hilary Kornblith, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Editorial Reviews

"This book is an illustrative and erudite contribution to the field of epistemology. Foley departs from the typical rational objective and presents an intuitive account of knowledge and true belief."—-Diana Karbonowska, European Legacy

"This highly original book will be of interest to both epistemologists and philosophers from other sub-disciplines whose work engages with the theory of knowledge. Thought provoking and well argued, it is well worth the reader's time."—-Lisa Warenski, Mind

From the Publisher

"[Foley's] book impressively combines breadth, succinctness, and readability. It will profit both professional philosophers and advanced students in epistemology."

Choice

This book is an illustrative and erudite contribution to the field of epistemology. Foley departs from the typical rational objective and presents an intuitive account of knowledge and true belief.

European Legacy - Diana Karbonowska