What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa

by David E. Murphy

Overview

“A riveting account of one of history’s greatest blunders.”—William L. O’Neill, The New Leader

This extensively researched book illuminates many of the enigmas that have surrounded the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, offering keen insights into Stalin’s thinking and the reasons for his catastrophic blunder. 

“If, after the war, the Soviet Union had somehow been capable of producing an official inquiry into the catastrophe of 6/22—comparable in its mandate to the 9/11 commission here—its report might have read a little like [this book]. . . .  Murphy brings to his subject both knowledge of Russian history and an insider’s grasp of how intelligence is gathered, analyzed and used—or not.”—Niall Ferguson, New York Times Book Review

"A fascinating and meticulously researched account of mistaken assumptions and errors of judgment that culminated in Hitler’s invasion of Russia in June 1941. Never before has this fateful period been so fully documented."—Henry A. Kissinger

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780300119817
Publisher:	Yale University Press
Publication date:	12/01/2006
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	352
Product dimensions:	6.12(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)

About the Author

David E. Murphy, now retired, was chief of CIA’s Berlin base from the early 1950s to 1961 and then became chief of Soviet operations at CIA headquarters in the U. S. He is coauthor of Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War, also published by Yale University Press.

Interviews

A Conversation with

David Murphy

Q: How culpable was Stalin for the German invasion of June 22, 1941?

A: Stalin bears full responsibility for having allowed German preparations to go forward without taking measures to improve the USSR’s defensive posture and for his naïve acceptance of German deception, fed to him personally by Hitler.

Q: What steps could he have taken to prevent it?

A: Many actions were possible, but Stalin’s greatest failure was his refusal to halt extensive, long-term German aerial reconnaissance operations even though he was aware of them from border troops’ reporting and from Soviet agents in the German Air Ministry. This resulted in the pinpointing and massive destruction of Soviet defensive works, troop concentrations, logistical installations, armor, and parked aircraft within hours of the June 22 attack.

Q: How do we know for certain that Stalin knew the meaning and urgency of the intelligence reports?

A: We know Stalin received reports on the German threat but discounted or rejected them because they disagreed with what Hitler told him were his plans to invade the British Isles in the summer of 1941 and not attack the USSR.

Q: In what way did the system Stalin created abet his natural paranoia and conspiratorial thinking? How was he able to manipulate the system so that he could remain convinced that he was right? Or was he the victim of that system?

A: Stalin did not create the system. He amplified, expanded, and exploited Lenin’s dictatorship, using terror and the purges to instill abject fear in all those who opposed him. There were very few military officers, party, or government officials who dared dispute Stalin’s views, and those who did were tortured and executed. On the contrary, some encouraged his acceptance of German deception by slanting intelligence estimates to fit Stalin’s misconceptions. Thus not Stalin but the entire Soviet people became victims of Stalin’s mistakes.

Editorial Reviews

The former chief of Soviet operations at C.I.A. headquarters, Murphy brings to his subject both knowledge of Russian history and an insider's grasp of how intelligence is gathered, analyzed and used -- or not.
— The New York Times

Niall Ferguson

David Murphy has provided a complete indictment of the purblind prejudice and fixed ideas which prevented Stalin from crediting the terrible truth being offered him by many sources. The result was ‘The Great Fatherland War of the Soviet People’ and the deaths of still untold millions of Soviet citizens.”—William J. Spahr, author of Zhukov: The Rise and Fall of a Great Captain

William J. Spahr

“Fascinating and shrewd, this intelligence officer’s investigation throws new light onto Stalin’s colossal blunder, one of the war’s greatest mysteries—as well as tells the story with the suspense of a wartime thriller.”—Simon Sebag Montefiore, Author of Stalin: The Court Of The Red Tsar and Potemkin: Catherine The Great’s Imperial Favourite

Simon Sebag

This is a masterly book, very well documented and composed. It casts a clear and strong light on what is (and remains) the enigma of June 1941 and of the two or three months preceding it: what Stalin knew, and, perhaps more telling: what Stalin did not want to know. David Murphy’s knowledge and his reading of Russian papers, books, and articles is the fundament of this extraordinary reconstruction. It should be of high interest, well beyond the ranks of Russian and Soviet specialists, for every serious reader about the Second World War.”—John Lukacs

John Lukacs

"What Stalin Knew is a fascinating and meticulously researched account of mistaken assumptions and errors of judgment that culminated in Hitler’s invasion of Russia in June 1941. Never before has this fateful period been so fully documented."—Henry A. Kissinger

Henry A. Kissinger

David Murphy has written a valuable and detailed account of the intelligence from Soviet sources warning Stalin of Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, that helps to explain his costly refusal to heed their warnings.”—Donald Kagan, Yale University

Donald Kagan

"David Murphy brings the incisive eye of a former intelligence professional to the dramatic story of Operation Barbarossa. The result is a significant addition to our understanding of Stalin and the Second World War."—David Stafford, author of Churchill and Secret Service and of Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets

David Stafford