Voters' Victory: New Zealand's First Election under Proportional Representation
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Voters' Victory: New Zealand's First Election under Proportional Representation
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| ISBN-13: | 9781775582335 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Auckland University Press |
| Publication date: | 11/01/2013 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 280 |
| File size: | 17 MB |
| Note: | This product may take a few minutes to download. |
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Voters' Victory?
The New Zealand's First Election Under Proportional Representation
By Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, Jeffrey Karp
Auckland University Press
Copyright © 1998 Jack Vowles Peter Aimer Susan Banducci Jeffrey KarpAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-77558-233-5
CHAPTER 1
EXPECTATIONS OF CHANGE
Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp
Unbroken transitions between substantially different electoral systems are rare events. An unbroken transition takes place when there is an interval of relatively 'normal politics' between two democratic elections under different rules. It therefore excludes changes following disruptions such as war, dictatorship, the establishment of a new state, or the reappearance of an old one. There were only 14 such transitions in Europe between 1885 and 1985, with five concentrated in one country, France (Bartolini & Mair 1990, 154 — 5).
Examples of particular shifts are even fewer. Of the 14 European transitions, only five involved the introduction of proportional representation (PR) prior to the early 1920s, but since then only France has experienced a transition to PR (in 1985), and that was reversed. Most electoral-system transitions involve small changes to electoral formulae (see Lijphart 1994, 78 — 94). The other major transition is from PR to 'plurality' or first-past- the-post systems, where the party or candidate who wins the most votes is elected. This has been more frequent in recent times: in France in 1928, 1958, and in the late 1980s, and in Japan and Italy in the early 1990s. In the case of the two latter countries, 'mixed member' systems were adopted, but their design did not promote proportionality as effectively as New Zealand's new electoral system.
New Zealand's transition from plurality electoral rules to a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system is therefore a rare event. Its significance is increased by the identification of New Zealand by electoral system analysts as a classic example of Anglo-American majoritarianism (Taagepera & Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1984). According to Lijphart, New Zealand was 'the purest Westminster democracy' because it concentrated political power in one House of Parliament, and elected its members by the first-past-the-post (FPP) method, thereby encouraging single-party governments with strong majorities in Parliament.
This 'majoritarianism' paradoxically made it possible for governments to rule with the support of minorities of voters: for example, National in 1978 with 39.8 per cent of votes and 55.4 per cent of seats; National again in 1981, with 38.8 per cent of votes and 51.1 per cent of seats; and Labour in 1984, with 43 per cent of votes and 60 per cent of seats. Lijphart calls his alternative model of democracy 'consensus', a word which advocates of reform in New Zealand embraced (and even some of their opponents used too). But PR alone will not generate 'consensus'. It is more likely, however, to generate broadly based governments which have majority public support (Vowles 1991; Nagel 1997).
MMP is based on the German electoral system, and was also adopted in Venezuela in the late 1980s (Shugart 1992). Under MMP the House of Representatives, the only legislative body inNew Zealand's unicameral Parliament, has increased in size to 120 members, 65 of whom are elected as candidates under simple plurality or FPP rules in single-member districts. The remaining MPs are elected by means of a party vote from closed national lists supplied by political parties. Those list MPs are allocated so as to top up the party shares of seats in the House to ensure proportionality according to the overall distribution of party votes cast. Thus MMP deploys the party vote as a corrective mechanism to ensure proportionality, in a way that distinguishes it from other less proportional mixed systems (Blais & Massicote 1996). Table 1.1 shows how this happened as a result of the 1996 election. The allocation formula is known as the Sainte Lague method, which is the most proportional of the various available mechanisms for allocating seats. A party's access to proportionality is subject to a 5 per cent party vote threshold under which a party cannot gain representation, unless one of its candidates wins an electorate seat (which also makes it potentially entitled to further list seats). Subject to this limitation, MMP can be described as a fully proportional system.
Opposed Expectations
Expectations of change as a result of a new electoral system were most extensively outlined in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System (1986). The report recommended MMP for several reasons. MMP would produce greater fairness between political parties, because the number of seats allocated to political parties would be proportional to the number of votes received; it would elect more representatives of minority and special interest groups, including Maori and women; and it would not reduce political integration, but would recognise social diversity and encourage wider social group representation, particularly in the party lists. The threshold below which smaller parties could not gain seats would prevent the proliferation of small or extreme parties, or any undesirable fragmentation of the party system.
Retaining electorates for about half the members of Parliament, MMP would retain direct electorate representation. Reducing the number of directly elected MPs would increase the size of electorates, but not beyond tolerable bounds. Some list MPs would attach themselves to an electorate and provide choices for voters who might want to approach a person from a different party to that of their local MP. List members would remain indirectly accountable to voters through the political parties that selected them as candidates.
MMP would make voting more effective and satisfying and thus enhance public participation in politics. Voters in safe electorates would have as much incentive to vote as those in closely contested electorates; thus turnout would be likely to increase. Opponents of PR argue that it often removes the choice of government from electors and places it in the hands of parties negotiating to form a government in the aftermath of an election. The commission expected that 'potential coalition arrangements would be evident before an election' (p. 56), and that if the formation of a new coalition between elections was inconsistent with such assumptions, a convention would develop that a new election should be held as soon as possible. Voters might use their two votes to signal support for particular combinations of parties, voting for a major party in the electorate and for a smaller party on the lists. While MMP might give power to a minor party out of proportion to its share of the vote, voter attitudes would prevent a minor party from exacting excessive concessions from a coalition partner or minority government. The Royal Commission did not consider the possibility that a party might signal one apparent coalition preference before an election, and act differently afterward. If presented with that scenario, the commission's likely response would have been that such a party would face severe punishment at the next election if voters still considered they had been misled. While MMP might provide some opportunities for voters or parties seeking to distort proportionality, such efforts would be difficult to achieve and would run the risk of voter backlash.
MMP would reduce the likelihood of single-party majority governments, but it would not significantly reduce the stability and decisiveness of governments because the relatively high threshold would prevent the proliferation of an excessive number of small parties. Governments under MMP would take longer to make decisions on contentious issues, but this would be welcomed by electors wishing for more consultative government and greater continuity of policy. Parliament and parliamentary committees would become more significant policy actors. MMP would strengthen the effectiveness and policy role of political parties, particularly because it would encourage the recruitment of candidates with skills, knowledge, and experience, and able members could be made less electorally vulnerable. Finally, because of its proportionality, MMP was 'fair and legitimate' in ways that FPP could never be.
Other arguments in favour of MMP surfaced as the debate intensified. One in particular emphasised the opportunity for split voting, arguing that voters would be able to vote both for the candidate of their choice, regardless of party, and for their party, even when they did not like their party's local candidate. Electorate MPs would therefore become more autonomous from their parties and more responsive to the will of their electorates. The Royal Commission, on the other hand, had simply reported that in Germany few people distinguished closely between the two categories of MP. Of the arguments for change, the two with most public resonance were fairness, and the weakening of the power of government because MMP makes it far more difficult for a single party to form a majority government.
Those opposed to change mobilised their intellectual resources only at the last moment. It was the New Zealand Business Roundtable (BRT) which commissioned the most consistent defence of FPP and critique of MMP (Cowen, Cowen & Tabbarok 1992). While the Royal Commission had framed its arguments largely in the context of normative democratic theory, the principal opponents of MMP used the language and concepts of public choice theory, based on assumptions that individuals' and political parties' actions and choices are motivated by self-interested rationality (for the classic in this field, on which much subsequent analysis draws, see Downs 1957). The BRT- commissioned analysis began by asserting theoretical claims based on the assumption that FPP and MMP generated different incentives for voters and parties. FPP systems, by encouraging two parties, provide an incentive for parties to compete for the support of the 'median voter': that is, for voters whose policy preferences lie in the centre between the two sides in the debate about the roles of the state and the market. Under MMP, 'no single party' would attempt to 'stake out the middle ground'.
Instead, under MMP parties and politicians would tend to differentiate themselves more by ideology, yet would be less able to put those ideological objectives into effect. For example, the ability of the government to increase taxes or redistribute wealth would be reduced, because of the need to generate more consensus behind such policies, a more difficult process across party boundaries than within a single broad party. MMP would also 'decrease the ability of a government to respond favourably and effectively to changing international constraints'. The BRT authors clearly favoured New Zealand's existing electoral arrangements because those had made possible 'rapid responses to major policy problems or exogenous shocks' (p.24): in other words, the process of market liberalisation pursued since 1984. In accord with their sponsor (the BRT), the three authors regarded the FPP system as more consistent with the continued pursuit of that policy agenda. They acknowledged that in the past FPP had allowed governments to introduce policies that had been economically damaging, but believed that the increasing sensitivity of the economy to global influences would discourage such policies in future.
MMP would strengthen national party organisations, and also increase the number of political parties represented. List MPs would be accountable to their parties rather than to voters, and party loyalty would be necessary for list MPs wishing to further their careers. Only in the case of electorate MPs would direct accountability to voters be retained. In practice the difference between the two classes of MPs would be small, as most voters tend to vote for the party rather than the candidate in FPP electorate contests. Nonetheless, the BRT report suggested with approval that in some cases strong candidates for unpopular parties might distance themselves from their party and so perhaps escape the effects of their party's low reputation.
The report noted that support for PR tended to be based on the notion that an election should produce a representative parliament, whereas that for FPP is based on the belief that voters should directly choose a government. Under MMP, promises made during an election campaign have to be formally renegotiated later within the framework of a coalition or minority government. The BRT report noted the essential contestability of the concept of representation, and argued that a more representative parliament need not guarantee more representative policy outcomes. While MMP would strengthen the representation of minorities, it would reduce that of 'the median voter'. MMP would not so much increase participation, but shift the grounds for participation or non-participation: as the authors put it, 'individuals with strong ideological views are more likely to go to the polls because they will find at least one of the available parties to their liking. Individuals with moderate views, in contrast, will be less happy with all parties and perhaps less inclined to vote' (p.26).
The authors of the BRT report argued that parties in a government coalition under MMP would be less accountable to the electorate in general and more accountable to other coalition members. Yet they tended to approve of this, because politicians in other political parties are more informed than ordinary voters and therefore are likely to monitor the performance of a government more closely. However, such monitoring tends to focus more on 'good government' than on the keeping of pre-election commitments. The BRT authors agreed with the Royal Commission that MMP would weaken the power of executive government, and slow down the process of policy formation. Governments would be less likely to commit errors but also less likely to implement policy improvements. They agreed with advocates of PR that political instability would not be a significant problem under MMP, particularly given the high threshold; governments might be somewhat less durable, but policies would be more so. The lower durability of governments might also be an advantage if this reflected a response to voter dissatisfaction. On the other hand, necessary policies (such as further market liberalisation) might fail to be implemented.
The BRT report cited evidence that even in Germany, after nearly half a century in operation, understanding of MMP was low. In an election campaign only half of German voters understand that the party vote almost entirely determines the composition of the legislature. While the authors of the Royal Commission report had noted the possibility of strategic voting under MMP designed to pervert the objectives of the system, they rejected it as remote; the BRT report made more of these issues.
On balance, the BRT authors rejected MMP because they expected that minority parties could extract excessive policy concessions from a government and that they, rather than the voters, could decide the government; that government would become less accountable because voters would be less likely to know which parties in a coalition to blame for particular policies; that promise-breaking would become 'institutionalised'; and that the influence of 'party machines' would increase, and parties would have greater control over candidate selection.
Both the Royal Commission and the BRT report relied not just on theory and deliberation, but also on empirical evidence. The Royal Commissioners visited Germany and other countries and analysed the literature on electoral systems. The BRT authors deployed a range of data, much gleaned from the works of those who promoted PR. However, it was not always clear from their analysis whether a particular claim was derived from theory or evidence. Another weakness in their approach was a subtle idealisation of the operations of FPP systems. For example, the claim that voters find it more difficult to dismiss unpopular governments under MMP appeared to be based on the assumption that dismissing such governments under FPP is unproblematic — hardly consistent with much recent experience, not only in New Zealand but also in Britain, nor with the claim and evidence that governments would be a little less durable under MMP. This point is made not so much as an intervention in the continuing debate, but as a warning that it is the comparison of outcomes under MMP and FPP which most concerns us here.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Voters' Victory? by Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, Jeffrey Karp. Copyright © 1998 Jack Vowles Peter Aimer Susan Banducci Jeffrey Karp. Excerpted by permission of Auckland University Press.
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Table of Contents
Contents
Tables and Figures,Preface,
1 Expectations of Change Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp,
2 Countdown to MMP Jack Vowles,
3 A New Post-MMP Party System? Jack Vowles,
4 Old and New Party Choices Peter Aimer,
5 Issues, Leaders, and the Campaign Richard Johnston,
6 Campaign Activities and Marginality: The Transition to MMP Campaigns David Denemark,
7 Vote Splitting Under MMP Susan Banducci, Jeffrey Karp and Jack Vowles,
8 Coalition Government: The People's Choice? Raymond Miller,
9 Representation Under a Proportional System Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp,
10 Voter Satisfaction After Electoral System Change Jeffrey Karp and Susan Banducci,
11 Realignment? Maori and the 1996 Election Ann Sullivan and Jack Vowles,
12 Voter Rationality and the Advent of MMP Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp,
Appendix A: 1996 NZES: Research Design and Implementation,
Appendix B: Methodology, Statistical Methods, and Variable Coding,
Appendix C: Supplementary Tables,
References,
Notes on Contributors,
Index,