Voters' Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the Consolidation of Minority Government
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Voters' Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the Consolidation of Minority Government
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| ISBN-13: | 9781775582328 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Auckland University Press |
| Publication date: | 11/01/2013 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 280 |
| File size: | 9 MB |
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Voters' Veto
The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the Consolidation of Minority Government
By Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, Jeffrey Karp, Raymond Miller
Auckland University Press
Copyright © 2004 Jack Vowles Peter Aimer Susan Banducci Jeffrey Karp Raymond MillerAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-77558-232-8
CHAPTER 1
POLLS THAT COUNT: FROM ONE ELECTION TO THE NEXT
Peter Aimer
Sample surveys now have a decisive influence on the timing, the personnel, the issues, the language, the strategy, and perhaps the outcome of election. David Butler, 1996
Politicians habitually say that the only 'poll' that matters is the count of votes on election day. Of course they have a point. And indeed about every eighth voter does finally decide how he or she will vote only on the day itself. Yet, as the quotation which begins this chapter reminds us, other polls in the form of regular surveys of public opinion are also an influential part of the political process. What regular opinion polls and the politicians are reminding us is that people's political judgements are continuous and evolving. At the individual level, compressed into each person's one or two ticks on the ballot paper on election day are opinions which have emerged and travelled with the voter for varying periods of time, with degrees of clarity or vagueness, certainty or doubt, consistency or change. Public opinion is always temporary.
Change — more often referred to as volatility when we speak of electoral choices — is now an acknowledged fact of competitive party politics. Living in a volatile, or at least potentially volatile, time, we cannot predict the outcome of the next election from that of the previous one with any confidence. Indeed, we have learned that considerable changes can occur in parties' electoral fortunes even during the short period of an election campaign. This chapter looks back at the 30 months of the country's first centre-left coalition government, from December 1999 to the end of June 2002. After that, chapter 3 picks up the story of the five-week campaign preceding 'the poll that really counted'.
The background
Since the 1980s, there have been some spectacular demonstrations of electoral volatility. Labour, re-elected comfortably in 1987, plunged only three years later to its worst defeat for half a century. National surfed only briefly on a tidal wave of votes in 1990 before flopping within a year to a mere 22 per cent in opinion polls. Election night in 1993, besides delivering a referendum result in favour of MMP, found Labour again almost level-pegging with National. But not for long. For the next three years, a divided Labour party struggled to defend its historic major-party status against challenges from the Alliance in 1994-5, and New Zealand First in 1996. Yet during the 1996 campaign, Helen Clark, contesting her first election as Labour leader, did much to revive the party's electoral standing. The momentum of the recovery continued into 1997, when Labour surpassed National in opinion polls. Thereafter, the two parties criss-crossed in the polls as National, now in its third term of government, and saddled until August 1998 with an unpopular and fractious coalition partner, struggled to recover and maintain electoral support. Yet as the 1999 campaign commenced, although the odds were tilting in Labour's favour, the election result 'was anything but a foregone conclusion' (Vowles, Aimer, Karp, Banducci, Miller, Sullivan 2002, 15).
The outcome that the polls had begun to foreshadow before the election was confirmed on election night. Labour won an 8 per cent margin over National in the vital party vote that determines the allocation of parliamentary seats. This did not mean that Labour would automatically govern. Although the proportional allocation of seats under MMP gave Labour 49 seats, 10 more than National, it fell short of a majority in the 120-seat parliament. Under MMP, the contest for the Treasury benches involves not only Labour and National, but also the vote-winning capacity and ideological leanings of the smaller parties. In 1999, the parties of the combined left bloc in Parliament — Labour, the Alliance and the Greens — had a majority with 66 seats. Well prepared for the event, Labour and the Alliance swiftly announced the terms of a minority two-party coalition, with the Greens offering support on issues of confidence and supply, as the basis of a new government.
The aftermath of the 1999 election was markedly different from that of the previous election. In 1996, negotiations to determine the government had dragged on for nine weeks, trying the patience of an electorate used to knowing within hours of the closing of the poll who would govern. Moreover, the resulting accommodation between National and New Zealand First both surprised and outraged many voters. In 1999, by contrast, the process of government formation was completed in 12 days, and Labour's coalition with the Alliance was not only expected by most electors, but was also the preferred option of the largest group among them (Miller 2002, 120-1). The second MMP election had thus delivered the basis for a theoretically stable coalition government.
Yet the Prime Minister's announcement on 11 June 2002 that there would be an early general election on 27 July concluded an eventful 30 months in the country's politics. During this time, significant changes occurred within the party system, the electoral 'shape' of which in June 2002 was very different from that on the eve of the preceding election in November 1999. figure 1.1 shows the trail of opinion polls for Labour and National from the 1999 election to the beginning of the 2002 election campaign. The pattern displayed in the figure is extraordinary in its simplicity. For the first year of the government's term it seemed as if the alternating peaks and troughs of the preceding three years might continue. After soaring 10 per cent over the millennium summer, Labour's poll ratings sagged again while National's rose, and the two parties briefly swapped places. From November 2000, however, Labour was dominant. On the eve of the campaign, at the end of June 2002, the gap between Labour and National had widened to a staggering 30 per cent.
Such polls do count. Parties, whether in government or opposition, respond to them, as much as they are able to. How effective that response has been is then read from subsequent polls, as well as from the parties' privately commissioned surveys and focus group research. For the public, the regular reporting of opinion polls is political news, something of passing interest and a temporary talking point among those who follow the news at all. Like the passage of runners in a multi-lap race, the attention-grabbing value of polls is greatest when the places keep changing and predictions of the final outcome are uncertain. Yet a runner who goes to the front early and leads all the way also commands attention and spectators' plaudits. There the analogy ceases. For spectators are not also participants as electors are in the party political race, either directly if they are interviewed by pollsters, or by proxy through the construction of representative samples. Labour's lead was the gift of the electorate.
The reasons for electors' judgements of the parties are often difficult to pin down. But it is now widely and reliably documented in election studies in various democracies that the key factors are the health of the economy, qualities of party leadership, and perceptions of government performance in the often unpredictable course of day-to-day politics — the issues that make the headlines (and perhaps equally the headlines that make the issues). The various factors do not always work in harmony, the effects of one being prone to either reinforcement or weakening by others. Thus, in summing up the defeat of the Shipley government in 1999, we concluded that 'the cumulative effect of the government's problems appeared also to cancel out any electoral benefit it might have been expected from favourable economic conditions in its final year' (Vowles, Aimer, Karp, Banducci, Miller, Sullivan 2002, 14).
Winter of discontent
The graph line in the bottom section of figure 1.2 shows that the Labour — Alliance coalition took over a growing economy, as measured by the quarterly figures for GDP. Along with this, the job market strengthened, the numbers in work grew, and unemployment rates continued to decline. We would expect the political benefits of this to flow more freely to the new government, unhindered by its predecessor's problems. Yet such objective economic indicators find only imperfect political expression through people's somewhat blurred perceptions of government performance and their sense of economic optimism. While the economy continued to grow, both electors' economic optimism, which had been tracking upwards along with GDP, and their support for Labour, suddenly collapsed in mid-2000, as the top section of figure 1.2 shows. As Labour's poll ratings declined, National's rose to level-pegging by September and moved ahead — for the last time — in October. Although economic growth had slowed in mid-2000, the slump in the government's popularity owed more to a crisis in its relations with the business sector, and several damaging events that reflected the underlying tensions in race relations between Maori and non-Maori.
Business interests, whose historical preferences have been for centre-right governments, were wary of the new coalition. They regarded some of Labour's core promises as anti-business. Their unease was increased by the presence of the left-leaning Alliance at the cabinet table, as well as the possible influence of the Greens on government decisions. The government's legislative priorities in its first months of office were widely opposed by business groups and sympathetic media. In particular, the government moved quickly to raise taxes on incomes over $60,000, renationalise accident compensation provision, and repeal the Employment Contracts Act, the centrepiece of the previous government's labour relations policy. The Employment Relations Act which would replace the ECA was vigorously resisted by opposition parties and business lobby groups, who saw it as reviving the potential for excessive trade union influence in the labour market.
Attitudes in the business sector proved contagious. As figure 1.2 shows, even though the economy was still strong, economic confidence sagged, along with evaluations of 'the government's performance' in general. Other issues doubtless contributed to the trend. Closer to the pockets of many electors than debates over the labour market were increases in mortgage rates and a succession of petrol price rises. For electors less attuned to economic issues, early in the year there were allegations of past financial malpractice by John Tamihere, a prominent and colourful Maori Labour MP, followed in June by the dismissal of the Minister of Maori Affairs, Dover Samuels, while rumours of his past personal life were investigated (and, like the allegations against Tamihere, found unproven). A third Maori Labour MP, Tariana Turia, also generated headlines — and the instant indignation that has become the common response to them — by joining the Waitangi Tribunal in likening the historical experience of Taranaki Maori to the Holocaust.
The government responded on both counts, being concerned to soothe opinion on race issues, as well as relations with the business sector, without making any fundamental policy shifts. The emphasis of policies collectively entitled 'Closing the Gaps' was shifted away from targeting the social and economic disadvantages of Maori and Pacific Island people to addressing all inequalities. The title itself, which had become a magnet for opposition parties, was abandoned. Relations with business were repaired through a busy round of formal and informal events. Dubbed a 'charm offensive' by the media, these occasions brought business leaders face-to-face with the Prime Minister, Alliance leader Jim Anderton (Minister of Economic Development, and Minister of Industry and Regional Development), and Michael Cullen (Minister of Finance). While business was still opposed to many of the government's policies, the 'charm offensive' conveyed to business leaders that they and the government spoke with one voice on such key objectives as economic growth, a strong export sector, and free trade. Business leaders would also have been reassured by Cullen's insistence on fiscal discipline, and the government's inclination to resist Alliance initiatives. This was not to be a profligate government.
By November, economic confidence was rebounding, partly thanks to the success of the government's efforts to mend fences and build bridges with the business community, partly in response to the published evidence of recent real growth in the economy (even though by now the rate of growth had slowed), and partly reflecting the benefit of burgeoning exports while the value of the dollar remained low. Along with economic confidence, other indices — assessment of government performance, Labour's party vote, and the Prime Minister's poll ratings — all began to move up. Unlike its predecessor (National-New Zealand First), the coalition government finished its first year in office where it had begun, in a strong position.
'I am stepping down, but not by choice'1
Throughout the government's term, one pillar of its electoral strength was the high personal standing of Helen Clark as 'preferred Prime Minister'. Perceptions of Clark as a strong, articulate, competent politician and potential Prime Minister had been sown during her highly successful campaign in 1996 (Vowles, Aimer, Banducci, Karp 1998, 70-2). As figure 1.3 shows, Clark's ratings continued to strengthen after the 1996 election, while those of Jim Bolger, who was leading an unpopular coalition with New Zealand First, declined. The trends were only checked and then reversed from November 1997, when National replaced the embattled Bolger with Jenny Shipley. Clark immediately lost ground as Shipley, the country's first woman Prime Minister, became the 'preferred Prime Minister'. Yet the gap between them was never large and twice it vanished, a portent of the election outcome. Becoming Prime Minister in December 1999, Clark added the advantages of incumbency to her already strong ratings as an opposition leader. Thereafter, Clark's graph line as 'preferred Prime Minister' strongly resembled the trend of Labour's electoral support, soaring immediately after the election, plunging during the 'winter of discontent', then rising steadily to a new peak by mid-2002. Clark's dominance and Labour's dominance were firmly linked.
Modern party leaders are surrounded by polls, and they either thrive in the light of favourable ratings or languish in the shadow of popular rejection of themselves or their party. Leaders do affect levels of party support. In 1997, National had reversed its downward slide by changing leaders. In 2001, it hoped to close the gap to Labour by the same means. In October, the majority of the National caucus decided that the party stood no chance of reclaiming lost electoral ground, and even less of winning the next election, if it remained led by Jenny Shipley. Stepping down, she was replaced by her deputy, Bill English. This time the tactic failed. While English, who for some time had been identified as a likely future party leader, lifted his own status as 'preferred Prime Minister' by becoming leader (figure 1.3), the party's poll ratings failed to respond (figure 1.1). Indeed, they worsened. Shipley, who had taken over the office of Prime Minister at a difficult time in 1997, and led the party into an election that at best would have been difficult to win, and at worst had been effectively lost by mid-1997, was ousted prematurely, and to no avail.
Electoral friends and allies
Under the old first-past-the-post electoral system (FPP), Labour's electoral dominance over National would have foreshadowed a landslide election resulting in a one-sided Parliament and an effete opposition. MMP produces very different outcomes by more closely equating the parties' seats in Parliament to their level of electoral support. Thus, at its peak of 53 per cent in the polls, Labour could expect to have won only a slim majority of seats. Yet even that hypothetical outcome was always unlikely. It is rare for any party in proportional systems to achieve an outright majority of either votes or parliamentary seats; and in New Zealand it was 50 years since a party (National in 1951) had won more than half the votes cast in a general election. Under MMP, in addition to National and Labour, the smaller parties must be considered, especially those able to win an electorate seat or reach the threshold of 5 per cent of the nationwide vote needed to qualify for a proportional share of the parliamentary seats.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Voters' Veto by Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, Jeffrey Karp, Raymond Miller. Copyright © 2004 Jack Vowles Peter Aimer Susan Banducci Jeffrey Karp Raymond Miller. Excerpted by permission of Auckland University Press.
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Table of Contents
Contents
Preface,1. Polls that Count: From One Election to the Next Peter Aimer,
2. What Happened at the 2002 Election? Peter Aimer and Jack Vowles,
3 Estimating Change During the Campaign Jack Vowles,
4 The Campaign on Television Joe Atkinson,
5 Strategic Voting André Blais, Peter Loewen and Marc-André Bodet,
6 Who Stood for Office, and Why? Raymond Miller,
7 Political Parties and Voter Mobilisation Jeffrey Karp and Susan Banducci,
8 Patterns of Public Opinion Jack Vowles,
9 A Vote for Coalition Government? Raymond Miller and Jeffrey Karp,
10 The 2002 Election in Comparative Context Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp,
11 Political Leadership, Representation and Trust Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer,
12 Conclusion Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer,
Appendix 1: The 2002 New Zealand Election Study,
Appendix 2: Methodology: Statistical Methods and Variable Coding,
Appendix 3: Chapter Appendices,
Appendix 4: The Questionnaires,
Bibliography,
Contributors,
Index,