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Venezuela's Bolivarian Democracy
Participation, Politics, and Culture under Chávez
Duke University Press
Copyright © 2011 Duke University Press
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8223-5024-8
Chapter One
Defying the Iron Law of Oligarchy I How Does "El Pueblo" Conceive Democracy?
Daniel Hellinger
The Venezuelan constitution declares in its preamble ("Exposition of Motives") that the Bolivarian Republic will have a government whose political organs "shall always be democratic, participatory, elective, decentralized, alternative, responsible and pluralist, with revocable mandates." In letter and spirit, the goal of the Constitutional Assembly of 1999 was to check the oligarchic tendencies that undermined the 1961 constitution and the regime of Punto Fijo (1958–1998). In liberal constitutions, a system of checks and balances is normally the mechanism intended to render inoperable the "iron law of oligarchy," as Robert Michels (1915) termed it, but the framers of the Venezuelan constitution regarded sole reliance on separation and division of powers to be inadequate to the task. The constitution depends instead on new participatory institutions to do the job. However, Bolivarian discourse is less than clear about whether participatory democracy is to supersede representative democracy, or if a balance is to be struck.
Most of this book consists of studies of innovative forms of participation in everyday life, with attention to how these practices may shape or be shaped by the public sphere. However, we know little about popular conceptions of democracy after the unhappy denouement of Punto Fijo. President Chávez often dismisses the Punto Fijo era entirely as just another episode in a pageant of oligarchic regimes that made up the "Fourth Republic" over nearly the entire history of Venezuela since independence. However, Punto Fijo was Venezuela's first extended experience with electoral democracy and constitutional alternation in government. While Punto Fijo might be in disrepute, can we say that this era left no imprint on Venezuelan political culture? Perhaps one reason why, as Chávez acknowledges, the Cuban model cannot be imported to Venezuela is that certain democratic principles associated with pluralist, representative democracy continue to influence popular conceptions of democracy today.
Are Venezuelans completely jaded about representative democracy, or is it more specifically the shortcomings of Punto Fijo that they reject? Do Venezuelans really understand democracy in the terms described in their constitution? To what extent are they practicing democracy as described therein? Here we look more closely at the way Venezuelans living in communities with a reputation for a high level of popular organization and participation view democracy today—in particular, how they conceive of democracy.
Many of the leaders of and participants in Bolivarian social movements and organizations are deeply mistrustful of politicians and of representative democracy (e.g., see chapter 8, my companion chapter on Chavista discourse on the Internet). They place their faith in the possibility of developing strong horizontal ties in civil society and the public sphere, in alternative economic development, and in a new political party (the Partido Socialista Unico de Venezuela—PSUV). They want institutions not merely to represent but more to reflect the popular will. In effect, they are challenging one of the most sacred notions about political life, Michel's "Iron Law of Oligarchy"—"Who says organization says oligarchy" (1915, 28). They are also challenging the pluralist response to Michels: elite competition waged within the boundaries of liberal constitutional rules (equal representation, checks and balances, civil liberties, periodic elections, etc.) alone makes democracy possible (e.g., Dahl 1971).
Given the experience with Punto Fijo (reviewed below) it would not surprise us that Venezuelans in general are skeptical about party competition as a sufficient guarantor of democracy. However, in placing more faith in horizontal networks and participation, they must overcome other well-known obstacles to achieving democracy without elites. Alternatively, at the least, they would have to create the kind of horizontal, participatory institutions by which an engaged citizenry can check elite power. The obstacles are formidable. Citizens in a large republic cannot assemble all in one location. Nor can all be heard at once, making access to media a crucial denominator of unequal power (as demonstrated in the chapters dealing with media, especially community broadcasting, in this book). Participatory democracy makes extraordinary demands on one's time. Chavistas hope that the networks of consejos comunales (communal councils), cooperatives, self-managed worker enterprises, popular media (e.g., community stations), and a new kind of democratic socialist party (the PSUV) can overcome these problems. Perhaps vertical systems of power cannot be abolished, but horizontal ties can be made to prevail over them.
I do not presume to judge the likelihood of success for the Bolivarian project. Certainly we would be foolish to underestimate the challenges involved in making such a system work. Were Venezuelans to accomplish these goals, even imperfectly, they would be making history much in the way that the founders of the American (U.S.) Republic did in experimenting with mixed government and democracy (however limited) in the late eighteenth century. The prospects of success in forging genuine and innovative democratic institutions in Venezuela in the end may depend not so much on the quality of leadership demonstrated by Chávez, but on the determination of Venezuelans engaged in political activism to reconcile the competing principles of participation and representation.
This study represents a first attempt at examining popular conceptions of democracy and participation among ordinary Venezuelans living in communities known for their political activism—areas where participatory democracy ought to find the most widespread and enthusiastic endorsement. The context of debate about democracy in Venezuela provides background for both of my chapters in this book, explaining why many Venezuelans look to participation rather than to traditional forms of representation as the remedy for the defects of Punto Fijo democracy.
The Context of Debate about Democracy in 2006 and 2007
The question of how to ensure the autonomy of civil society from the petro-state has never been far removed from democratic discourse in Venezuela, from the earliest days of the struggle for democracy during the presidency of Eleazar López Contreras (1936–1941). Already, in the era when political parties first emerged (1935–1948), organizers of unions, peasant federations, and various middle-class organizations jealously defended their autonomy from parties and the state—a defense that ultimately failed (Battaglini 1993; Hellinger 2005; Ramos Rollon 1995).
Even before the rise and fall of the oPeC oil bonanza, Venezuelans were skeptical about parties and politicians (Martz and Baloyra 1979). Rather than viewing the economic hardships and corruption of the 1980s as having eroded a well-established liberal democracy, it makes more sense to view the period between 1974 and 1983 as exceptional, a period in which an economic boom and optimism about the future submerged deeper skepticism about the key institutions of polyarchy—political parties. Long before the Caracazo (1989), ordinary Venezuelans already felt unrepresented within their pluralist political order.
As López Maya and Lander indicate in their chapter, the 1980s and 1990s saw the emergence of diverse movements promoting a more profound conception of democracy. Of course, a more profound democracy might simply mean a more representative one. A common critique associated with social movements in the 1990s has it that party cabals (cogollos) substituted themselves for authentic representation of civil society. In the 1990s, middle-class groups, such as Queremos Elegir, promoted constitutional reforms calling for single-member (uninominal) representation at the district level, which was seen as an antidote to the enormous distance opened between representatives and the people by the highly disciplined system of proportional representation embedded in the 1961 constitution.
Many representatives in national and state legislatures, and in many social organizations (professional associations and unions, for example), were called parachutists (paracaídas)—politicians from other regions or sectors, imposed upon electors by a system that might best be compared to the nomenklatura systems of Eastern European communism. Although the Punto Fijo elite accepted some political reforms (e.g., direct election of governors), they stopped short of changes that would have undermined the list system of representation that was crucial to party discipline. Not only did this system cement the control of party cogollos over legislative bodies and internal party affairs, it assured that these political elites retained control over key institutions in civil society—unions, business confederations, student organizations, neighborhood associations, professional organizations, and the like.
Chávez capitalized on frustration with highly limited reforms by making the convocation of a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution a central plank in his successful presidential campaign of 1998. The assembly would write a new Bolivarian constitution explicitly calling for a participatory and "protagonistic" democracy, but retaining many features of representative democracy. Always, however, there existed within Chavismo radical tendencies calling for the replacement of representative democracy with participatory democracy. Some of these calls came from radical Chavista politicians, such as Lina Ron, a National Assembly deputy, but others were from less prominent leaders of such organizations as peasant movements, neighborhood associations, and unions.
Decades of experience with stifling corporatist tendencies arising out of the nature of the petrostate experience (Karl 1997) opened Venezuelans to democratic innovation. This spirit animated debate and participation as the constituent assembly did its work of rewriting the national charter in 1999. The constitution established the trilogy of executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government commonly found in liberal systems. The protagonistic and participatory features were to be institutionalized in several other provisions. Some innovations, such as the recall mechanism and the ability to initiate and repeal legislation through referendum, bear a resemblance to the reforms enacted in many states in the U.S. during the progressive era. The Bolivarian Constitution goes even further, however, mandating participation of civil society in the selection of the judiciary and appointment of the National Electoral Council, established as a separate branch (poder electoral) of government in addition to the three traditional branches—executive, legislative, and judicial. The constitution also provides for a fifth branch, citizens' power (poder ciudadano), consisting of an ombudsman (defensor del pueblo), the general prosecutor (fiscal general), and the comptroller general (contralor general). These new institutions have in common the responsibility to represent and defend citizens in their relations with the Venezuelan state. The constitution seeks to institutionalize popular influence over the judiciary, the poder electoral, and the poder ciudadano by mandating consultation with and participation of social groups in making appointments in these areas.
A measure of the voters' dissatisfaction with pluralist democracy was the way that major presidential candidates in 1993 and 1998 eschewed the term party even as they engaged in classic party-building activity—that is, as they sought to organize their supporters to gain control over the state. Hence, although they fashioned themselves as anti-party, these so-called electoral movements still conformed to the classic definition of parties provided by Maurice Duverger (1968, 1–2): they have had "as their primary goal the conquest of power or a share in its exercise," and they have attempted "to draw their support from a broad base ... within the framework of society as a whole." Venezuelans may eschew parties, but so far they have not been able to do without them.
The MVR (Fifth Republic Movement) was originally founded as an electoral movement and assigned the task of generating votes for the December 1998 elections. It was to be a pragmatic vehicle for contesting an election; it was not to be the embodiment of protagonistic democracy. Much to Chávez's dismay, the MVr took on the characteristics of a traditional political party, attracting professional politicians and carrying out functions of political aggregation in place of the participatory and consultative processes specified in the Bolivarian Constitution. The president must himself bear some responsibility for this development. For example, he chose to accelerate the social and economic aspects of his agenda in November 2001 via decree powers granted by the National Assembly, not through popular discussion and consultation with civil society. The package of popular new laws decreed at the time was an example of democracy for rather than by the people, but in his view there is no contradiction.
Until the decision to accelerate the revolution in November 2001, the main accomplishment of the Chávez government had been to restructure Venezuela's political institutions. With the decrees of November, the political situation polarized further as the government moved into key economic and social areas for the first time. The most important and contentious changes were in oil policy, land reform, and rights to exploit coastal waters. The radicalization of the government's agenda brought about the departure of the head of the MVR, Luis Miquilena, a veteran leftist politician who had proved adept at playing the traditional political game in the new circumstances, but who was not eager at all to accelerate the revolutionary process. Under Miquilena, the MVR seemed to have fallen into emulating the politics of the despised Punto Fijo era. Chávez was so disgruntled with the state of the MVr and so determined to restore its vitality that he even briefly considered reestablishing the civic-military Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement (MBr) in place of MVR.
Miquilena's skills were well suited to winning elections and organizing support in the National Assembly, in which a formidable opposition bloc had emerged after the elections of July 2000. In fact, the government opted to go it alone without support from some of its coalition partners, making the decision to move forward without the adept Miquilena even more risky. The Chávez government came to rely mainly upon the support of several smaller leftist parties—most importantly Patria Para Todos (PPT), the Communist Party, and parts of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), eventually reconstituted as PODEMOS ("We can"; PODEMOS would ultimately leave the coalition in 2007).
A new stage in radicalization was in part an outgrowth of the massive spontaneous mobilization that helped restore Chávez to power after the brief coup of April 11, 2002, and the subsequent victory in the face of the opposition's three-month paro (strike), including the shutdown of the oil sector, which ended in February 2003. Beginning in March 2003, Chávez launched a series of civic-military missions in health, education, urban land reform, and nutrition. New policies not only sought to change budgetary priorities and expand welfare, they also sought to involve citizens (often in partnership with the military) in various committees and popular organizations linked to the spending programs. These initiatives were not just a reward to supporters; they were linked to a mobilization strategy in anticipation of a possible recall referendum, which did in fact occur in August 2004. Much as the coup of April 2002 had been defeated by popular mobilization at the grassroots, the recall was won by grassroots Electoral Battle Units (UBES), often led by community leaders with considerable disdain for all political parties. The MVR had failed to perform, and the tension between the grassroots base and political class only grew tauter as a result.
(Continues...)
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