U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat: Updated Edition

by Lawrence Freedman, Lawrence Freedman (Preface by)

Overview

The author examines in detail the organization of the U.S. intelligence community, its attempts to monitor and predict the development of Soviet forces from the early days of the cold war, and how these attempts affected American policy and weapons production.

Originally published in 1987.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691610054
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	07/14/2014
Series:	Princeton Legacy Library , #444
Edition description:	Updated Edition
Pages:	270
Product dimensions:	6.10(w) x 9.20(h) x 0.60(d)

Read an Excerpt

US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat

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By Lawrence Freedman

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 1986 Lawrence David Freedman
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-07696-6

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The term the 'Soviet Threat' is rather presumptuous, assuming as it does an adversary relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, and implying that this is based on the former's aggressive nature. The use of the term in this study indicates no 'blame' for the start of the cold war, no view about its continuation and no implication as to the effectiveness of détente. It is to be understood in a limited form, mainly as a reference point for US military planning in the field of strategic arms. The Soviet strategic threat represents the dangers to US national security identified as being present or evolving in the nuclear weapons programmes of the Soviet Union.

The strategic threat by no means exhausts the forms of menace that have been attributed to the Soviet Union. In the rhetoric of the cold war, the communist offensive has been seen to operate on a number of levels – ideological, economic and political. To many the cold war has been about much more than military strength and a determined foreign policy, and has also encompassed such things as the content of schoolbooks, loyalty oaths, the 'space race', central government and high public expenditure, and the prestige gained by gold medals in the Olympic Games. The use of the 'threat' as a planning device for determining military requirements is of a somewhat different nature. It is not necessarily about immediate dangers, and its definition is not particularly dependent on revealing the 'truth' concerning the plans of the Soviet Union. It is about the sort of military problems the Russians could conceivably pose in the future. At stake is not so much the general tenor of US foreign policy but future force levels, though the two are, of course, linked.

The importance of the Soviet strategic threat to US military policy has become a matter of some dispute. Some models of the arms race or of policy-making for defence make it the pivotal factor. Other models render it peripheral or irrelevant .The conventional wisdom on this matter has depended largely on the model of the arms race provided by the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, in September 1967. McNamara emphasised the extent to which each superpower plans its forces as a prudent, anticipatory reaction to the most menacing intelligence projections of the future force levels of the other. Each move, while defensive in intent, is perceived as being offensive and so stimulates a counter-reaction. 'The Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one another's plans', noted McNamara, 'it is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race.'

The form and content of official presentations of strategic arms policy in the United States reinforce the impression of the 'threat' as the prime determinant of the policy. A briefing on the current and projected state of Soviet military power is the standard hors d'oeuvre for any meeting on defence policy; the annual report to Congress from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has come to be almost wholly taken up with a comparison of Soviet and Chinese military forces with those of the United States and her allies. The 'threat' is invoked to prompt new weapons procurement or to encourage arms control negotiations. Challenges to policy are frequently phrased in terms of a critique of the official interpretation of the 'threat' — suggesting that either too much or too little military power has been attributed to the adversary. Thus, statements about the nature of the Soviet strategic threat give meaning to statements about strategic arms policy. Though there are differences about the quality of the input, the 'threat' is identified as the critical variable in policy formation. To quote two of McNamara's former aides: 'It is the size and character of the assumed threats that determine the kinds and levels of US forces'.

If this is the case, then the manner in which the 'threat' comes to be defined for policy-makers takes on critical importance. Inadequacies here will leave the United States either dangerously unprepared for a future conflict or expensively over-insured. Up till recently the tendency has been to assume that the inadequacies worked in the latter direction, towards inflated threats and, in consequence, inflated defence budgets. The explanation for this distortion has been found in the difficulty of forecasting the future Soviet force structure. In the absence of certain information defence planners have to assume the worst. Thus, 'uncertainty about adversary intentions and capabilities may well be the most powerful stimulant of the arms race'. McNamara spoke of how each superpower had reacted to the build-up of the other with 'very conservative calculations'. 'We have, that is, each built a greater arsenal than either of us needed for a second strike capability, simply because we each wanted to be able to cope with the "worst plausible case".' Both superpowers are seen to construct their forces on the basis of calculations of mutual threats which are habitually distorted because of the inherent problems of accurate prediction combined with a need for prudence where national security is at stake.

This model can be and has been subjected to major criticisms. The historical evidence does not support an interpretation of the arms interaction between the two superpowers in terms of a regular pattern of stimulus followed by response. Individual moves in the arms race need to be explained by a variety of factors, including budgetary constraints, the state of technological art, the cycle of weapons innovation and the interests in particular policy outcomes held by strong and influential groups within the defence establishment, as well as threat assessments. Nor is it obvious that the response to the most glaring and alarming adversary moves is always a commensurate strengthening of military capabilities. An exaggerated threat can also encourage defeatism.

If the 'threat' is not the dominant determinant of strategic arms policy why is so much attention afforded it in the formalities of policy-making? One explanation is that the threat has proved useful to the military as a marketing, rather than a planning, device. The dark warnings that emanate from the Pentagon around the time the defence budget comes before Congress are used to create support for new weapons programmes, favoured by the military but difficult to justify by reference to any pressing strategic needs. Another explanation is that the 'threat' serves as a rationalisation for policy decisions taken for reasons only remotely connected with current or projected Soviet activity.

The debate developed in this way until the early 1970s when a new argument started to be made with some force, challenging the assumption that exaggeration of the threat has been the norm rather than the exception. In a controversial series of articles in 1974 Albert Wohlstetter argued that the 'invariable overestimation of the threat' is a myth and that, in fact, in certain crucial cases there has been a systematic and substantial underestimation of Soviet capabilites. Wohlstetter's analysis has, in turn, been subjected to sharp criticism, mainly along the lines that he chose his case study to suit his argument.

The debate has raised some important questions concerning the quality of US intelligence estimates and the manner in which they are developed, as well as those concerning the influence of these projections on US policy. This study seeks to explore both these sets of questions. The course of this exploration will be explained presently. Before that it is necessary to elucidate how the term 'threat' is to be used, as a redefinition of this concept is basic to the methodology adopted in this study.

The literature on threats in international politics suggests two possible meanings to the statement 'A threatens B'. In the first the threat is a strategic move by A in which he undertakes to impose sanctions on B if B follows a specified course of action deemed hostile to A's interests. The second meaning is for the threat to represent a mental construct of B's, a sense of danger that may or may not reflect A's, intentions. Much of deterrence theory rests on the use of the first meaning. Schelling writes of deterrence being 'concerned with persuading a potential enemy that he should in his own interest avoid certain courses of activity'. By assuming an adversary that bases his own moves on a rational calculation of advantages, deterrence theorists seek to control this behaviour through clear and explicit threats. 'We can afford to make the threat only because we expect to have an influence on his choice'. The problems in the construction of threats lie at the source. Threats must be constructed so as to effectively convey intentions.

Those who see threats as mental constructs differ with deterrence theory in terms of their assessment of the problem of communication. The signals emanating from A are liable to be distorted or ambiguous when picked up by B. This can result in misperception which can, in turn, encourage B to make an exaggerated response. This is liable to induce an equally exaggerated response by A and so on. Writes J. David Singer: 'The circularity and self-generating nature of the arms-tension pattern is manifest, and threat perception is its prime ingredient'. He provides the following equation:

Threat perception = estimated capability × estimated intent. The source of the threat remains the same but our attention is focused on to the reception rather than the original communication. The differences with deterrence theory turn on this change of emphasis from the strategic calculations that lie behind A's, moves, to the calculations inferred by B from his perception of these moves.

This would suggest that the key to 'misperception' for a nation-state is to be found in the means by which adversary actions are monitored, understood and transmitted to the policy-makers. This can be described as the estimating process, and is normally considered to be the prerogative of the intelligence community, though of course the final perception is liable to be that of the policy-maker(s) himself (themselves). The problems of 'threat perception' is therefore assumed by many writers to be a consequence of inadequacies in the estimating process. For example, Ronald Tammen writes: 'The phenomenon of action-reaction is inextricably tied to the process of estimating threats'. We have already noted the similar formulation of the problem of threat perception by Robert McNamara and how the subsequent debate on the validity of this formulation has focused on two main questions. First, how sensitive is the policy-making process to the impact of external threats? Second, what are the means by which such threats are comprehended and interpreted?

Both of these questions assume, with the literature on threats, that when talking about threats, perceived or actual, we are talking about, to quote Colin Gray, 'triggers beyond the state in question'. However, absent from such a definition is any mention of the interests of B that are felt to be at risk. It is not simply the capabilities or intentions of the adversary that make him threatening. Without B sensing that some values are at stake, however hostile A's intent, no threat can be communicated. A definition of threat perception that does not include B's, perception of his own vulnerabilities is incomplete. A threatens B when B comes to feel that weaknesses in his strategic position are being, or could be, exposed by current, or postulated, strategic moves by A. Thus a strategic threat involves the meeting of A's actions, real, perceived or conceivable, with B's vulnerabilities.

It is therefore important to distinguish between threat assessments and intelligence estimates. It is certainly true that official briefers from the intelligence community will describe their accounts of current and projected Soviet strategic capabilities as 'threat assessments'. It is normally considered quite sufficient to describe Soviet military power as the 'threat' without specifying what it is that is being threatened. But all Soviet activity is not, to US policy-makers, indiscriminately threatening. It only becomes so if it weakens America's ability to fulfil her strategic objectives. If US fears do not match Soviet plans this will not be solely because of distortions in cognition but because the two sides are likely to be working from quite different premises. Soviet attempts to put pressure on the United States may fail because nothing is done that effectively worries the Americans; comparatively innocuous Soviet moves may seem to have devastating implications for the West. Similarly, differing assessments of American vulnerabilities can lead to fierce debates in the US over the 'threat' with both sides working from an agreed set of estimates.

From this a Soviet strategic threat to the United States can be defined as one of a set of conceivable changes in the Soviet force structure that would, in the absence of counter-measures, seriously diminish America's strategic strength. There are therefore two distinct stages in threat perception. There is a judgement on the conceivable changes in Soviet force structure and there is a judgement on the character and sources of American strategic strength and how that strength might be undermined. It is the intelligence community that is mainly responsible for the first of these judgements. The second judgement is made in the wider defence community and can be a contentious issue. Different groups in this community find different strategic perspectives congenial.

Some examples can be cited to illustrate the point that the definition of threats is, to some extent, dependent upon adoption of a particular strategic perspective. If it is held that the basic requirement for an effective nuclear deterrent is that the capacity to inflict massive destruction on the Soviet Union, even after absorbing a surprise first strike, is ensured then Soviet moves to strengthen its own second-strike capability will not appear particularly threatening. Any possibility that the Soviet Union might be able to deny the US this ability to retaliate by a surprise, disarming first strike would appear extremely threatening. If however it is considered both possible and desirable for the US to achieve a surprise, disarming first strike capability of its own then major concern will be felt at any attempt by the Soviet Union to protect itself against such a capability. Or else it might be believed that military forces have important political functions irrespective of how they would actually perform in a conflict. A recognised superiority in the quantity or quality of strategic arms can be translated into political advantages. In this sense any visible disparity in forces, where the Soviet Union appears to have 'more' or 'better' than the United States, can constitute a threat. As the force structures of the two superpowers are asymmetrical and as there are a number of alternative dimensions by which strategic forces can be measured, the threat can recede or grow depending upon which measure is preferred.

We can now reformulate the questions concerning the relationship of threat assessments to strategic arms policy. In addition to asking how intelligence estimates are constructed and how they are fed into the policymaking process, we need to examine the manner in which it is decided whether or not, and in what ways, the US would be vulnerable to specific developments in the Soviet force structure. In particular we need to examine how much the two stages in threat perception are independent of each other. Are potential vulnerabilities identified separately from the process by which estimates are made of the future capacity of the Soviet Union to exploit these vulnerabilities? Or are those anxious to promote or block a set of counter-measures appropriate to a particular vulnerability able to initiate a search within the intelligence community for estimates tailored to their political requirements? These questions focus attention on to the relationship between the intelligence community and the wider defence establishment, and in particular the capacity of members of the intelligence community to avoid involvement in the major policy debates within the defence establishment.

(Continues...)

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Excerpted from US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat by Lawrence Freedman. Copyright © 1986 Lawrence David Freedman. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents

• FrontMatter, pg. i
• Contents, pg. vii
• List of Tables and Figures, pg. ix
• Foreword to the Second Edition, pg. x
• Acknowledgements, pg. xxviii
• Sources, pg. xxx
• Abbreviations, pg. xxxii
• 1. Introduction, pg. 1
• 2. The Intelligence Community, pg. 8
• 3. The Estimating Process, pg. 30
• 4. The Missile Gap, pg. 62
• 5. Greater-Than-Expected Threats, pg. 81
• 6. An Invulnerable Deterrent, pg. 97
• 7. The Sentinel Decision, pg. 118
• 8. The Nixon Administration: Protecting Minuteman Through Safeguard, pg. 129
• 9. Protecting Minuteman Through SALT, pg. 153
• 10. Preparing for the Threat: 1972-6, pg. 169
• 11. US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, pg. 183
• Notes, pg. 199
• Bibliography, pg. 219
• Index, pg. 229