Urban Elites and Mass Transportation: The Dialectics of Power

by J. Allen Whitt

Overview

In an unusually systematic approach to the study of urban politics, this study compares three different models of political power to see which can best explain the development of the Bay Area Rapid Transit System in San Francisco and the attempts of Los Angeles to build a comparable system.

Originally published in 1982.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691614311
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	07/14/2014
Series:	Princeton Legacy Library , #526
Pages:	246
Product dimensions:	6.10(w) x 9.10(h) x 0.50(d)

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Urban Elites and Mass Transportation

The Dialectics of Power

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By J. Allen Whitt

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 1982 Princeton University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-09398-7

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CHAPTER 1

THE PLURALIST, ELITIST, AND DIALECTICAL MODELS

As one would expect, the intellectual and historical roots of the three political models considered here are quite varied. The pluralist model is rooted in classical liberalism, that philosophical doctrine stressing maximum individual freedom and limited and democratic government. The writings of James Madison and Alexis de Tocqueville are representative. Within the present century, the main shapers of pluralist thinking have included Arthur Bentley (1908), David Truman (1953), and V. 0. Key (1959). Elitist theory is grounded in the work of Italian scholars Vilfredo Pareto (1935) and Gaetano Mosca (1939), and German sociologists Max Weber and Robert Michels (1915). Drawing mainly from Weber, C. Wright Mills (1956) has been the leading early articulator of elite theory within the United States. The class-dialectic model is based largely on the work of Karl Marx, with later contributions by numerous theorists.

The discussion of these models represents a distillation of a large amount of literature. It is an abstract, brief way of highlighting the most salient similarities and differences among these three perspectives. The purpose is not to review fully the literature on which each of these models is based, nor to discuss subtle differences, ambiguous cases, and so on. Rather, the goal is to present the essential, defining characteristics in a clear and straightforward manner. Although it is possible to classify these perspectives in other ways and to emphasize somewhat different aspects of each, the categorization in Table 1 is the most useful one for our purposes. The table shows the theoretical characteristics of the pluralist, elitist, and class-dialectical models. In order to put flesh on the bones of this abstract categorization and to make the models more concrete and intelligible, each model will be illustrated by briefly discussing the works of two or three writers. The focus will be on United States' sociology and political science of the post-World War II era, for it was during this period that specific research methods for empirically testing each of the models within the United States context were first systematized and applied. Since the elitist model was the first to be fully spelled out in this regard, it is best to begin there.

The Elitist Model

The elitist model holds political power to be concentrated in the hands of elites who occupy the top position in large and increasingly centralized institutional hierarchies. Elites tend to be unified in purpose and outlook because of their similar social backgrounds and because of a convergence of interests arising from their positions within dominant social institutions. The goals of elites are reflected directly in the actions of the state which has little, if any, autonomy relative to elite goals and interests. Elites almost invariably get their way whenever important public decisions are made, and social conflicts, when they occur, are managed by elites in such a way as to produce outcomes favorable to their interests. As a consequence, there are no clearly identified limits to elite power and the distribution of power is essentially stable. Each of these points will be discussed in more detail.

The best-known commentator on the elite is C. Wright Mills. Mills (1956) argues that institutional elites in the United States — in this case those in business, the military, and politics — are increasingly able to exercise decisive power in the society. He writes:

The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women. ... For they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the state and claim its prerogatives. They direct the military establishment. They occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure in which are now centered the effective means of the power and the wealth and the celebrity which they enjoy. (Mills, 1956:3-4)

As our economic, political, and military institutions have grown they have become far more centralized and powerful according to Mills. This places enormous powers in the hands of those persons who happen to be at the top of each of the hierarchies, those positions that he calls the "command posts of modern society" (Mills, 1956:5). Other institutions are dwarfed by comparison: "No family is as directly powerful in national affairs as any major corporation; no church is as directly powerful in the external biographies of young men in America today as the military establishment; no college is as powerful in the shaping of momentous events as the National Security Council" (Mills, 1956:6).

Mills contends that power is even more centralized by the existence of shared political interests and personal similarities among the political, economic, and military elites. Their similar institutional positions place them in the same social and political group: "The people of the higher circles may also be conceived as members of a top social stratum, as a set of groups whose members know one another, see one another socially and at business, and so, in making decisions, take one another into account" (Mills, 1956:11). They have similar social backgrounds, having graduated from the same elite schools and holding memberships in the same exclusive social clubs. In these schools, clubs, and elite families they get to know one another and develop shared attitudes, tastes, and worldviews. They come to think of themselves as special.

This experiential and psychological resemblance is one basis, argues Mills, for social unity and positional interchangeability among these elites. They tend to think alike, to act alike, and to see other elites as being like themselves. They often move from one institutional hierarchy, such as the military, to another, such as business or politics.

Further, Mills contends that the three institutional hierarchies have many coinciding interests so that there are few checks and balances operating among business, military, and political elites.

The shape and meaning of the power elite today can be understood only when these three sets of structural trends [i.e., the decline of political democracy, the ascendancy of the military, and the rise of a permanent-war economy] are seen at their point of coincidence: the military capitalism of private corporations exists in a weakened and formal democratic system containing a military order already quite political in outlook and demeanor. Accordingly, at the top of this structure, the power elite has been shaped by the coincidence of interest between those who control the major means of production and those who control the newly enlarged means of violence; from the decline of the professional politician and the rise to explicit political command of the corporate chieftains and the professional warlords; from the absence of any genuine civil service of skill and integrity, independent of vested interests (Mills, 1956:276).

This set of structural coincidences has blurred the distinctions among the military, the state, and the economy, particularly so between the latter two institutions. The state and the corporate economy "cannot now be seen clearly as two distinct worlds," Mills writes (1956:274). Business and government have become so intertwined that "it has meant the ascendancy of the corporation's man as a political eminence" (Mills: 1956:274). Thus, the state does not act against the interests of the power elite because those interests are now the interests of the state: "the political directorate, the corporate rich, and the ascendant military have come together as the power elite, and the expanded and centralized hierarchies which they head have encroached upon the old balances and have now relegated them to the middle levels of power" (Mills: 1956:296).

It is a somber and pessimistic view of power that Mills sets forth. Most of us live a life far removed from the mighty institutional levels of power. According to the Millsian view, the state is in thrall to the corporate chieftains and the military warlords; their destructive rule is unopposed. It is a chilling picture that offers little hope, certainly, for the ideals of equality and democracy: "In so far as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them" (Mills, 1956:18). For Mills, the rest of us are subjects of power, not exercisers of power.

Mills' analysis concentrates mainly upon the national levels of power. A more local view of power — at the community level — had been set forth by Floyd Hunter (1953) a few years before Mills wrote. Hunter was more empirically oriented than Mills, devising a research strategy that later became known as the reputational method for studying power. Focusing on Atlanta, Georgia, he used four community organizations (i.e., the Community Council, the Chamber of Commerce, the League of Women Voters, and newspaper editors) as sources of names of top civic, business, political, and social leaders. A panel of judges who were knowledgeable about community affairs were then asked to rank the top ten leaders in each field. He found a high degree of consensus regarding who those top leaders were. Interviews were conducted with these leaders and sociometric studies were carried out to ascertain the extent to which they knew and interacted with each other (Hunter, 1953:262-71).

Hunter concludes that a relatively small group of elites decide most important matters in the community. He divides these leaders into four groups based on their relative power in local affairs. The "first-rate" leaders are "industrial, commercial, financial owners and top executives of large enterprises" (Hunter, 1953:109). Persons such as top public officials and small business owners occupy the second-rate level of power. In the third-rate level are found "selected organization executives" and newspaper columnists, for example. Small business managers and professionals, among others, are found in the fourth-rate (Hunter, 1953:109).

The top leaders tend to "interact among themselves on community projects and select one another as leaders" (Hunter, 1953:74). They are organized into several "crowds" or cliques and they tend to take active roles in community events affecting their interests (Hunter, 1953:78). Business leaders are the most powerful group, and government generally serves their interests: "It is true that there is no formal tie between the economic interests and government, but the structure of policy-determining committees and their tie-in with the other powerful institutions and organizations of the community make government subservient to the interests of these combined groups" (Hunter, 1953:102).

In a later work, Top Leadership, U.S.A., Hunter (1959) extends his research to the national level. Again, he arrives at similar conclusions about the elite:

Continuing to utilize the model of a community power structure in my interviews, I found certain common elements among the top leaders, whom I began to look upon as a national power structure, as they look upon themselves. I have already mentioned the facts that they knew each other, that they could rate each other in a status scale, and that they tended to include and exclude others from their company. ... They represented a cross-section of national civic life, and active recruiting into the circuit goes on continuously to fill vacancies, geographic and otherwise. For the most part they tended to know certain persons in Congress and other national government policy posts. ... Importantly, they knew the patterns of the. policy-making process and generally agreed on the content of such patterns (Hunter, 1959:175).

Hunter also sounds a new note here, pointing out the pivotal role played by the corporation in political life in the United States: "From empirical observation it seems reasonable to say that the corporate enterprises are the most potent single forces on the American scene. They reach into every cranny of American life, and their patterns of operations parallel and intertwine with every American institution. Through selected members they collectively control the political machinery at all levels of government, when control is necessary to their functioning" (Hunter, 1959:252).

Mills and Hunter, then, present the basic model of elite power. From their perspective, a relatively small elite, perched in the major institutions of American society, determine the major decisions at both the local and national levels. They hold the preponderant share of political and economic power. There is no reason to believe that they will be less powerful in the future or that the society will become more effectively democratic.

Recently elitist writers Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone (1973) have pointed out that while modern elitist theory generally shares all of the characteristics just discussed, there are two schools of thought concerning the normative aspects of elite rule. One school holds that "rulers exploit and manipulate the ruled for personal benefit." Such rule is socially repressive for the society and is therefore undesirable. On the other hand, the second school sees elites as performing necessary and socially beneficial tasks. They are the main source of organization and guidance for the society as a whole: "And if the rulers enjoy many special advantages, these are only the just rewards for the special skills they bring to the task of governing and for the efforts they expend on behalf of the entire society" (Prewitt and Stone, 1973:5).

The work of Prewitt and Stone also clearly shows why elite models assume that power is quite stable and why change, if it happens at all, is gradual. Elites are seen as inevitable in all societies. As Prewitt and Stone (1973:5) note, "every society can be divided into the small number who rule and the larger number who are ruled." Secondly, it is the character of the elite that determines the direction and character of the society. Social change comes about when elites change. This "circulation of elites" to use Mosca's and Pareto's phrase, happens slowly. "Most of history is not revolutions," say Prewitt and Stone (1973:22-23), "but rather the day-in, day-out performance of important tasks by elites and the modest but significant changes in the composition of the ruling groups."

Most recently, elite theorist Thomas Dye (1976) has produced an important volume devoted to an extensive analysis of the American institutional elite. The national elite, he argues, are "the individuals who occupy positions of authority in large institutions" (Dye, 1976:6). The institutional bases of elite power which Dye examines are industry, finance, utilities, government, the news media, law, foundations, civic organizations, and universities. Dye's work holds special interest for us because he directly addresses the issue of the degree of elite consensus within the elite stratum. Noting that those adopting a pluralist model contend that differences of opinion and interest divide elites, Dye states the elitist counterthesis that these differences tend to be over specific policy issues, that there is overarching agreement on fundamental values, that "the range of disagreement among elites is relatively narrow, and that disagreement is generally confined to means rather than ends" (Dye, 1976:169). Thus, elite theorists emphasize elite unity and consensus while pluralists emphasize fragmentation and conflict. This question of elite unity will be a central focus of this present study.

The Pluralist Model

The work of Mills and Hunter formed the basis for the model of elite power. As a response to this model, Robert Dahl (1961) was the first to formulate a systematic counter-view of power, the pluralist model. Dahl challenged many of the assumptions, methods and conclusions of researchers on the elite, arguing that political power is actually much more decentralized and democratic than elitists contend.

The pluralist model (Table 1) starts with interest groups as the basic feature of organized political life. The power (or influence as most pluralists prefer to call it) of private groups is based mainly on the effective political organization of voluntary associations, but also is a function of such individual qualities as the political strategies and leadership abilities of party and group leaders. A key concept is competition. Competitive relationships among the many diverse interest groups that make up society, along with the diverse allegiances held by group members, have the effect of dispersing power over a wide range of organized groups. This distribution of power is also essentially unstable since interests and alliances are typically short-lived, and new groups and coalitions are continually being created and organized as old ones decline. There are limits on the power of any one group. This is true by virtue of the necessity for compromises with other groups and because of the existence of a basic value consensus which stresses adherence to generally-accepted democratic norms and values. Although influenced by the demands of organized interest groups, the state is able to serve its own independent ends and to achieve substantial autonomy by operating as a broker or balancing agent among the competing groups.

(Continues...)

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Table of Contents

• FrontMatter, pg. i
• Contents, pg. vii
• List of Tables and Figures, pg. ix
• Acknowledgments, pg. x
• List of Abbreviations, pg. xi
• Introduction, pg. 1
• Chapter One. The Pluralist, Elitist, and Dialectical Models, pg. 8
• Chapter Two. Bart and the Gentlemen Engineers, pg. 40
• Chapter Three. Trying to Emulate Bart: The Los Angeles Campaigns, pg. 81
• Chapter Four. The California Highway Trust Fund: The Lobby Shows Its Hand, pg. 102
• Chapter Five. What These Campaigns Tell Us About Political Power: The Pluralist and Elitist Interpretations, pg. 133
• Chapter Six. The Dialectical Politics of Transit, pg. 174
• Bibliography, pg. 211
• Index, pg. 223