Unraveling the Gray Area Problem: The United States and the INF Treaty

by Luke Griffith

Overview

In Unraveling the Gray Area Problem, Luke Griffith examines the US role in why the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty took almost a decade to negotiate and then failed in just thirty years. The INF Treaty enhanced Western security by prohibiting US and Russian ground-based missiles with maximum ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Significantly, it eliminated hundreds of Soviet SS-20 missiles, which could annihilate targets throughout Eurasia in minutes. Through close scrutiny of US theater nuclear policy from 1977 to 1987, Griffith describes the Carter administration's masterminding of the dual-track decision of December 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) initiative that led to the INF Treaty. The Reagan administration, in turn, overcame bureaucratic infighting, Soviet intransigence, and political obstacles at home and abroad to achieve a satisfactory outcome in the INF negotiations.

Disagreements between the US and Russia undermined the INF Treaty and led to its dissolution in 2019. Meanwhile, the US is developing a new generation of ground-based, INF-type missiles that will have an operational value on the battlefield. Griffith urges policymakers to consider the utility of INF-type missiles in new arms control negotiations. Understanding the scope and consistency of US arms control policy across the Carter and Reagan administrations offers important lessons for policymakers in the twenty-first century.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781501773068
Publisher:	Cornell University Press
Publication date:	12/15/2023
Pages:	312
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x (d)

About the Author

Luke Griffith is Professor of Government and History at New Mexico Junior College.

Table of Contents

Introduction: Abolitionist Dreams
1. A Crisis of Confidence: Bungling the Neutron Bomb
2. Neither "Mad Dogs" nor "Reluctant Dragons": The Guadeloupe Summit
3. Carter in Command: Devising the Dual-Track Decision
4. Between "Green Cheese" and "the Moon": The Reagan Administration and the Zero Option
5. Engaging the "Defective Vending Machine": The Reagan Administration and the INF Negotiations
6. For Matrimony or Alimony? Reagan, Gorbachev, and the INF Endgame
7. Conclusion: "Trust but Verify"
Epilogue: From George H. W. Bush to Donald Trump

What People are Saying About This

Scott Kaufman

Through mining numerous archives and interviewing a number of key players, Griffith brings us a rich, informed history of the negotiations that led to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

James Wilson

A sophisticated, nuanced account of how Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan approached vexing problems of deterrence among NATO allies. Mobilizing a wealth of fresh evidence, Luke Griffith offers even readers familiar with the intricacies of late Cold War diplomacy something new.

Lieutenant General Frank Klotz

Luke Griffith sheds important, new light on Washington's decision to deploy intermediate-range, nuclear-capable missiles to NATO Europe in the 1980s; and, then to reduce them to zero in a landmark treaty with the Soviet Union. Given the troubled state of nuclear arms control today, this book is a "must read" for scholars and policymakers alike.

Ambassador Ken Adelman

Well-researched and heavily documented, Griffith's treatise should become a handbook for anyone interested in these critical arms negotiations. And most everyone should be interested.