From the Publisher
"Recommended. Advanced undergraduates through faculty; professionals." — J. Daley, CHOICE
". . . a narrative that unwinds less like a debate than a geopolitical thriller." — New York Times
"Recommended. Advanced undergraduates through faculty; professionals." — J. Daley, Pittsburg State University"Unconditional Surrender: Sounds like a tidy formula for ending a war. During America's war against Japan, it turned out to be anything but tidy. In this fascinating volume, Marc Gallicchio unpacks the diplomatic, political, bureaucratic, and civil-military complexities involved in translating a seemingly simple formula into an actual outcome. An illuminating book." —Andrew Bacevich, author of America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History"The superbly told and thoroughly researched story of how American politics shaped peace in the Pacific War. New Dealers, including Truman, insisted on unconditional surrender, while conservatives, who had never wanted to fight Japan, clamored for softer terms. Truman won the battle but the American left lost the war, as they eventually adopted the right's revisionist history." — Eric Rauchway, Distinguished Professor of History, University of California, Davis"A reasoned, researched, and persuasive voice in the debates over the use of the atomic bomb, the survival of the Japanese Emperor, and the end and aftermath of the Pacific War." — Michael Barnhart, Stony Brook University"Skillfully connecting the strands of war policy, military strategy, diplomacy, and the play of key personalities, Marc Gallicchio illuminates the seminal issue of Japan's unconditional surrender and reveals how our fraught politics today arise from what many have erroneously supposed to be the happier, consensual days of World War Two and its immediate aftermath." —Thomas Zeiler, University of Colorado, Boulder"Marc Gallicchio's Unconditional: the Japanese Surrender in World War II stands out as a well-researched glimpse of the last months of World War II, revealing the many layers of decision-making which escape most cursory discussions of the war's conclusion. It is not merely diplomatic or military history, as it considers other key aspects which impacted the decision such as public opinion, economic factors and coalition warfare." — Navy History
"The strength of Unconditional is Gallicchio’s exhaustive research of events and debate leading up to Japan’s surrender presented in a highly readable style and prose. It is simply hard to put down. This would be a fine complement to Implacable Foes and an excellent addition to the library of any historian or student with an interest on the subject. It is a must for foreign policy makers and military strategists." —Military Review
Library Journal
06/19/2020
In 1995, the Smithsonian opened an exhibit featuring the Enola Gay, the B-29 bomber that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The exhibit stoked controversy, as from its inception, the entire idea of unconditional surrender—a concept to which the decision to drop the atomic bomb was related—caused disagreement. Gallicchio (history, Villanova Univ., PA) examines the ideologies behind the premise of requiring Japan's unconditional surrender and its relation to Soviet entry into the war against Japan. The author does well in covering the differing points of view of various United States government officials, along with the competing factions in the Japanese leadership. He explains the arguments against using atomic bombs against Japan and the alternative approaches, including an invasion of the mainland. Gallicchio argues that forcing Japan's unconditional surrender was crucial to creating a more democratic and less stratified postwar society. VERDICT A scholarly work, this will appeal most to researchers and informed readers interested in the diplomatic history of World War II.—Matthew Wayman, Pennsylvania State Univ. Lib., Schuylkill Haven
Kirkus Reviews
2020-04-28
The tortuous history behind America’s decision to insist on Japan’s unconditional surrender.
In this tightly focused narrative, history professor Gallicchio writes that when Franklin Roosevelt announced in 1943 that the war would end when Germany and Japan surrendered unconditionally, few objected. It became a controversy in 1945 when Japan’s defeat seemed inevitable to everyone except Japanese leaders, who maintained that all their countrymen would die before surrendering. Two administration camps existed. Secretary of War Henry Stimson led those convinced that Japanese leaders were more likely to surrender if assured that the emperor would keep his throne. Dean Acheson, who would become secretary of state in 1949, led those who argued that this would prolong the war by convincing the enemy that America was weakening. Harry Truman listened but did nothing, and the Navy was lukewarm to any assurance. Having annihilated enemy naval and air defenses, Navy leaders were certain that a blockade would starve Japan into submission. Army leaders, led by Gen. George Marshall, argued that this would take years and that war-weary Americans would lose heart. In any case, public opinion supported unconditional surrender. The Army argued for an invasion of the home island, an immense project. In the end, a second atomic bomb and the Soviet invasion persuaded Japan to give in. Its offer to surrender included a clause protecting the emperor, which the U.S. rejected, returning a softened version that Japanese leaders, after heated debate, accepted. But as the author points out, the controversy persisted. During the war and until the 1960s, advocates of modifying unconditional surrender were conservatives who proclaimed this would save American lives while liberals protested that “the real aim of the ‘emperor worshippers’…was to maintain Japan as a bulwark against Russia and revolution.” After the ’60s, matters reversed when liberal “revisionist” histories claimed that Japan was on the verge of surrendering and that Truman brushed off the evidence and insisted on dropping the bombs to intimidate Russia.
A definitive account of complex political maneuvering that accomplished little.
