'Thomas Cawkwell provides a fine-grained examination of the evolution of UK strategy and civil-military relations during the war in Afghanistan, as well as a detailed insight into the wider evolution of defence and security policy making during this period, and the workings of the Blair, Brown and Cameron governments in Whitehall. His book develops a powerful critique of British strategy making in the Afghan context between 2001-14.'
Timothy Edmunds, Bristol University, UK
'A well-informed and thoughtful response to British strategic dilemmas over Afghanistan, focussing on the issues raised by having to devise a coherent defence of strategy in the context of difficult international and domestic contexts. A significant contribution to the debate over current British strategy.'
Jeremy Black, University of Exeter, UK
'This important and closely argued work clearly shows how the constraints of transnational alliances and internal dissonance are at the heart of current problems within British strategy. In detailing how the UK’s strategic narrative in Afghanistan shifted and morphed in response to both these constraints and operational realities, Cawkwell fascinatingly highlights the inconsistencies, not only in the message, but also in the strategy such messages were meant to support. It is a must read for those interested in British policy, strategy, or communications.'
Patrick Bury, University of Exeter, UK
"Cawkwell offers here a forensic analysis of changing narratives of British propaganda strategies in Afghanistan from the invasion until the war ended. It further adds to a body of evidence and scholarship critiquing the role the centrality of the United States plays in British foreign policy. Argument focuses on how the 'transnational dilemma' (King, 2010) between appealing to the public about the benefits of collective security makes acknowledging realistic costs of delivery difficult in strategic narratives."
Emma L. Briant, University of Essex, UK
