Truman and MacArthur offers an objective and comprehensive account of the very public confrontation between a sitting president and a well-known general over the military's role in the conduct of foreign policy. In November 1950, with the army of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea mostly destroyed, Chinese military forces crossed the Yalu River. They routed the combined United Nations forces and pushed them on a long retreat down the Korean peninsula. Hoping to strike a decisive blow that would collapse the Chinese communist regime in Beijing, General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the Far East Theater, pressed the administration of President Harry S. Truman for authorization to launch an invasion of China across the Taiwan straits. Truman refused; MacArthur began to argue his case in the press, a challenge to the tradition of civilian control of the military. He moved his protest into the partisan political arena by supporting the Republican opposition to Truman in Congress. This violated the President's fundamental tenet that war and warriors should be kept separate from politicians and electioneering. On April 11, 1951 he finally removed MacArthur from command.Viewing these events through the eyes of the participants, this book explores partisan politics in Washington and addresses the issues of the political power of military officers in an administration too weak to carry national policy on its own accord. It also discusses America's relations with European allies and its position toward Formosa (Taiwan), the long-standing root of the dispute between Truman and MacArthur.
Michael D. Pearlman retired in 2006 as a professor of history at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. He is author of Warmaking and American Democracy: The Struggle over Military Strategy, 1700 to the Present and To Make Democracy Safe for America: Patricians and Preparedness in the Progressive Era. He lives in Lawrence, Kansas.
Table of Contents
ContentsAcknowledgmentsIntroductionList of Abbreviations1. Truman and MacArthur, before Korea2. Defense Policy on the Eve of the Korean War3. The War against North Korea: From Commitment to the Pusan Perimeter4. The War against North Korea: From Inchon to the Yalu River5. The War against China: Winter 1950 to Spring 19516. Truman Fires MacArthur7. Public Verdict and Consequences: Military and Political, Home and Abroad8. Ending the War without Truman or MacArthur9. Truman and MacArthur: Summary, Conclusion, and PostscriptNotesSelected BibliographyIndex
What People are Saying About This
A. Theoharis]]>
Retired history professor Pearlman (US Army Command and General Staff College) revisits the history of President Harry Truman's relationship with General Douglas MacArthur during the critical years 1945-51, culminating in Truman's controversial decision to fire MacArthur in April 1951. Pearlman's thoughtful, comprehensive survey of the intertwined relationship of "policy, politics, and personality" offers fresh insights into US military strategy, Truman's controversial Far Eastern policy, the politics of McCarthyism, and the internal and public debate over Truman's Korean War policy. Based on extensive research into accessible primary sources and the relevant secondary literature, this skillful if densely written monograph is a welcome addition to the burgeoning literature on Truman's presidency and, as importantly, on the bitter political debate over Truman's limited war strategy in the conduct of the Korean War. Fleshing out the differing personalities of these two prominent national leaders, Pearlman recounts how both men shaped and were shaped by the evolving crisis in US-Soviet and US-Chinese relations during the early Cold War years. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above. —Choice
A. Theoharis
Retired history professor Pearlman (US Army Command and General Staff College) revisits the history of President Harry Truman's relationship with General Douglas MacArthur during the critical years 1945-51, culminating in Truman's controversial decision to fire MacArthur in April 1951. Pearlman's thoughtful, comprehensive survey of the intertwined relationship of "policy, politics, and personality" offers fresh insights into US military strategy, Truman's controversial Far Eastern policy, the politics of McCarthyism, and the internal and public debate over Truman's Korean War policy. Based on extensive research into accessible primary sources and the relevant secondary literature, this skillful if densely written monograph is a welcome addition to the burgeoning literature on Truman's presidency and, as importantly, on the bitter political debate over Truman's limited war strategy in the conduct of the Korean War. Fleshing out the differing personalities of these two prominent national leaders, Pearlman recounts how both men shaped and were shaped by the evolving crisis in US-Soviet and US-Chinese relations during the early Cold War years. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above. —Choice
Director, Center for the Study of the Korean War - Paul Edwards
Pearlman understands far better than most the underlying and widespread consequences of the clash between two highly motivated and somewhat egotistical giants. He rightly places the debate between MacArthur and Truman into the larger context . . . of the questions of civilian and constitutional authority, much like those being raised now about the war in Iraq.
Colonel (Retired)Donald W. Boose
Drawing on a lifetime of study and research, Michael Pearlman expertly analyzes the relationship between President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War, demonstrating how policies, politics, and personalities entwined to shape their confrontation. He deftly places that confrontation within the context of grand strategy, military operations, history, culture, and domestic politics, portraying with verve and color the panorama of conflict in East Asia during a critical period of American history.
