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CHAPTER 1
Introduction to Political Philosophy
Leo Strauss on the Relation of Theory to Practice
Nathan Tarcov
Leo Strauss wrote "What Can We Learn from Political Theory?" for delivery at the General Seminar of the Summer Course at the New School on July 17, 1942. The theme of the course was "Social Science and Political Action in Relation to the Present Situation." Strauss's lecture includes what may be his fullest statement about the relation of political philosophy to political action as well as rare statements about what he considered would be reasonable political action in the then-current situation. The lecture was evidently carefully considered, composed, and corrected, though Strauss did not attempt to publish it. He may have had second thoughts about some of the arguments he advanced in it, or he may merely have chosen to concentrate his literary efforts in other directions.
Theory and Practice in Natural Right and History
The question of the relation of theory to practice, specifically the relation of political philosophy, that is, of what Strauss called classical political philosophy, to political action, only occasionally rises to the surface of Natural Right and History. The introduction to the book argues negatively that the rejection of natural right seems to lead to "disastrous consequences," and that its contemporary social scientific rejection leads to nihilism, but it does not promise that a recovery of natural right would provide positive concrete guidance for political action. At the end of the first chapter, "Natural Right and the Historical Approach," Strauss laments that in modernity "philosophy as such had become thoroughly politicized," that it had become a weapon and an instrument. He contrasts that with the original character of philosophy as "the humanizing quest for the eternal order" and "a pure source of humane inspiration and aspiration." This contrast leaves open whether before its modern politicization philosophy actually "humanized" political practice, rendering it more humane, or merely rendered the practitioners of philosophy and those affected by it more fully human. In the fourth chapter, "Classic Natural Right," Strauss goes so far as to identify prudence with obedience to the law of the cosmos ruled by God rather than with wise political action in any actual political community ruled by human beings.
One should not hastily conclude from this fantastic statement, however, that the argument of Natural Right and History renders philosophy or classic natural right irrelevant to prudent political action. Toward the end of that chapter on classic natural right, Strauss attributes to both Plato and Aristotle the view that "there is a universally valid hierarchy of ends, but there are no universally valid rules of action." As a result, in deciding what to do "here and now," one has to consider not only which end is "higher in rank, but also which is most urgent in the circumstances." Thus it appears that theory or philosophy provides the hierarchy of ends but that is "insufficient for guiding our actions," which must depend on prudence to judge urgency in particular circumstances. The chapter concludes by indicating that the classics shared with Montesquieu a concern for maintaining the latitude for statesmanship not unduly trammeled by supposedly universal rules.
Strauss returns to the issue of the relation between theory and practice or prudence toward the end of Natural Right and History. Strauss warns there that the distinction between theory and practice is blurred if one understands all theory as essentially in the service of practice. Although science may be concerned with "truth as such, regardless of its utility," political theory is concerned not only with understanding the actual but with "the quest for what ought to be," and is "'theoretically practical' (i.e., deliberative at a second remove)." I take this obscure statement to refer to the sort of theory he attributed to the classics that elaborated a hierarchy of ends but left to prudence the practical guidance of our actions. Still Strauss insists, however paradoxically, that prudence cannot be seen properly without genuine theoria. Genuine practice entails the possibility of "a human life which has a significant and undetermined future," denied by the historicism that also denies the possibility of theory.
The Situation, Title, and Form
Since Strauss wrote this lecture with an eye to the contemporary situation as required by the theme of the summer seminar, it may be helpful to remind ourselves that he composed it at a time when Allied victory in World War II was by no means assured. Axis armies were continuing to advance into the Soviet Union and in North Africa, and Japanese gains in Asia still overshadowed the recent American victory at Midway.
Strauss makes clear at the start of "What Can We Learn from Political Theory?" that the title was at least in part assigned rather than of his own choosing. He would have preferred to speak of political philosophy rather than political theory. The term political theory implicitly denies the traditional division of the sciences, according to which political science is practical not theoretical, implying instead that all science is ultimately practical or that pure theory is the basis and safest guide for reasonable political practice. Strauss's terminological preference therefore points directly to the question of the practical bearing of political philosophy. For Strauss takes the question "What can we learn from political philosophy?" to mean, in line with the overall title of the summer course, what can we learn from political philosophy that can serve to guide political action?
Strauss gives a definition of political philosophy that might lead one to expect it to provide guidance to political practice: "the coherent reflection carried on by politically minded people concerning the essentials of political life as such, and the attempt to establish, on the basis of such reflection, the right standards of judgment concerning political institutions and actions ... to discover the political truth." Strauss's preliminary remarks conclude by distinguishing political philosophy from political thought, which is coeval with the human race.
The deliberately scholastic form of Strauss's lecture is striking. As in Aquinas's Summa Theologica, Strauss first presents the negative arguments (that we can learn nothing from political philosophy), followed by an argument "to the contrary" taken from "authority" (Plato), and then the positive arguments (what we can learn from ancient political philosophy).
The Case against Learning from Political Philosophy
Strauss argues the negative case on three grounds: (1) there are many contradictory political philosophies, so political philosophy can be at best clear knowledge of the problems or questions, not of the solutions or answers, and so cannot be a safe guide for action; (2) practical wisdom, shrewd estimation of the situation, rather than political philosophy is needed for reasonable political action; and (3) political philosophy is ineffectual, merely reflecting rather than guiding political practice, since all significant political ideas come from statesmen, lawyers, and prophets rather than from political philosophers.
In the second negative argument, that practical wisdom rather than political philosophy is needed to guide action, Strauss avers the following:
I have not the slightest doubt as to the possibility of devising an intelligent international policy, for example, without having any recourse to political philosophy: that this war has to be won, that the only guarantee for a somewhat longer peace period after the war is won is a sincere Anglo-Saxon–Russian entente, that the Anglo-Saxon nations and the other nations interested in, or dependent on, Anglo-Saxon preponderance must not disarm nor relax in their armed vigilance, that you cannot throw power out of the window without facing the danger of the first gangster coming along taking it up, that the existence of civil liberties all over the world depends on Anglo-Saxon preponderance — to know these broad essentials of the situation, one does not need a single lesson in political philosophy. In fact, people adhering to fundamentally different political philosophies have reached these same conclusions.
Having first sketched the negative case, Strauss then in good scholastic fashion presents an argument "from authority": "quite a few men of superior intelligence were convinced that political philosophy is the necessary condition of the right order of civil society." He quotes "the most superior and the most famous of these men, that evils will not cease in the cities until the philosophers have become kings or the kings have become philosophers," referring, of course, to The Republic of Plato. He goes on to quote Pascal to the effect that for Plato and Aristotle political philosophy is of some practical use in minimizing the harm done by the madmen who rule us.
The Case for Learning from Political Philosophy
In the third, longest, and final part of the lecture Strauss makes his positive argument for the practical utility of what turns out to be classical political philosophy. This positive argument turns out to be not a refutation but a modification of the negative arguments. It concedes the force of the first two negative claims, that political philosophy is knowledge of the problems, not of the solutions, and that common sense or practical wisdom, not political philosophy, is the guide for reasonable political action. Thus the scholastic form of Strauss's lecture brings out the peculiar character of his view of the relation of theory to practice or of political philosophy to political action: his case for the relevance of political philosophy to political action rests on views of political philosophy and the role of prudence that share common ground with the case against the relevance of political philosophy to political action. Strauss's positive argument adds, however, that although reasonable political action is discovered by prudent statesmen without the need for political philosophy, political philosophy is needed to defend such action when it is challenged by erroneous political teachings. This may be related to what Strauss means near the end of Natural Right and History when he calls political theory "deliberative at a second remove."
Strauss illustrates this role for political philosophy with reference to what he characterized in the negative section as an intelligent international policy that could be arrived at without any recourse to political philosophy. He restates this policy as follows:
human relations cannot become good if the human beings themselves do not become good first, and hence it would be a great achievement indeed if foundations for a peace lasting two generations could be laid, and hence the choice is not between imperialism and abolition of imperialism, but between the tolerably decent imperialism of the Anglo-Saxon brand and the intolerably indecent imperialism of the Axis brand.
Strauss's point here seems to be that since human beings are not going to become good, we cannot expect international relations to become simply good and must accept tolerably decent imperialism (perhaps the British Empire or American administration of the Philippines). For the same reason, his first statement requires armed vigilance and even preponderance of power by Britain and the United States to maintain civil liberties around the world after the war.
Strauss notes that such a policy is attacked not only by those who would shirk the burdens of "a decent hegemony," but also by "infinitely more generous political thinkers" with utopian views of human nature that render power irrelevant and hegemony dispensable. (This particular danger is explained further in Strauss's succeeding contrast between ancient and modern utopianism.) Such prudent policy arrived at without the aid of political philosophy needs to be protected against such utopian illusions by "a genuine political philosophy reminding us of the limits set to all human hopes and wishes." Strauss further illustrates the role of political philosophy in protecting prudence against erroneous teachings by asserting: "If the sophists had not undermined the basic principles of political life, Plato might not have been compelled to elaborate his Republic." (I take this remarkable statement to refer to the defense of political justice rather than that of the philosophic life in The Republic.) Similarly, Strauss claims that the policy of religious toleration inaugurated by reasonable statesmen in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries would not have been accepted if political philosophers had not enlightened public opinion and convinced people that it was not their religious or moral duty to rebel against heretical governments. (It should not be but is nonetheless necessary to note that Strauss here characterizes religious toleration as a reasonable policy.)
Although Strauss's positive argument accepts and modifies the second negative argument, that prudent policy is derived from practical wisdom not political philosophy, his positive argument denies the third negative claim, that all significant political concepts are the work of political men rather than philosophers. One fundamental political concept, the concept of natural law or natural right, is of philosophic origin. Natural right is the standard by which classical political philosophers judged all actual political orders and is their guide for reform and improvement. In contrast to natural right, all actual orders are imperfect. This contrast is what Strauss here calls "the legitimate utopianism" of Plato and Aristotle's political philosophy. They did not believe that the perfect condition could be brought about by political action. Strauss admits that we do not need lessons from the tradition of political philosophy to discern the soundness of Churchill's approach, but he adds that "the cause which Churchill's policy is meant to defend would not exist but for the influence" of this tradition. The liberal democratic polities that protect civil liberties would be unthinkable without the tradition of political philosophy and the concept of natural right.
Utopianism Ancient and Modern
In a foreshadowing of a claim made famous in Natural Right and History, in "What Can We Learn from Political Theory?" Strauss identifies Machiavelli as the great turning point in the replacement of the traditional utopianism by a new, modern utopianism. More broadly, this contrast between ancient and modern utopianism anticipates the contrast between ancient and modern political philosophy given prominence in that work, though with a distinctive emphasis. Strauss claims here that modern utopianism lowered the standards of conduct to guarantee their realization, but here he attributes this attempt not to Machiavelli himself but to a reaction to his teaching that effected "a compromise between Machiavellianism and the tradition." Modern utopianism reduced virtue to enlightened self-interest, and eventually assumed that enlightenment would gradually make the use of force superfluous. Strauss contrasts modern utopianism's assumption that social harmony would follow if all men were interested in raising their standard of living with the view of older philosophers who held that enlightened self-interest would lead to social harmony only if all men could be satisfied with the truly necessary things.
Strauss argues against modern utopianism on several grounds. The appeal to enlightened self-interest weakens the moral fiber that enables men to make sacrifices. Furthermore, enlightened self-interest is in conflict with the desires of at least some people for power, precedence, and dominion. Modern utopianism forgets the existence of evil, as if "all wickedness, nastiness, malevolence, aggressiveness were the outcome of want" and could be cured by satisfying men's wants. Strauss therefore rejects the economism, whether in its liberal or its Marxist form, that he regards as inseparable from modern utopianism. He predicts that "the withering away of the State ... will still be a matter of pious or impious hope [a] long time after the withering away of Marxism." Strauss concludes that the ancient philosophers' insistence that the realization of the ideal is a matter of chance and the theologians' insistence that providence is inscrutable were more realistic than the modern utopian assumption that the realization of the ideal is necessary.
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "Toward Natural Right and History"
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