Theories of the Bargaining Process
A tour de force of theoretical reasoning, this book presents the most advanced analytical model of the bargaining process so far conceived. Focused essentially on the dynamics of the bargaining process, Coddington's model employs elements of several conceptual constructs-individual decision-making, theories of expectations and their adjustment, and environment concepts-to explain the nature of consistency in a bargainer's system of expectations and intentions.

The book begins with a description of the bargaining process in an economic context and establishes an analytical framework. There follows a critical survey of bargaining theory in which the author selects those concepts, which he finds most valid and most applicable to his decision-making/expectation/adjustment model. The Internal consistency of a wide class of bargaining models is then examined in a chapter on the relationship between decision-making and expectations. Since the theory of games has been used as a basis for bargaining process theory, the author devotes a chapter to an examination of the game-theoretic approach and an assessment of its value relative to his own approach.

The author concludes with a study of the specific capabilities of his own analytical model, with discussion of the possible combinations of assumptions with which the investigator may work. Although stemming from a problem in economic theory and of immediate intent to economists, the book's contribution to the general theory of conflict process and interdependent decision-making make it an important study for students of politics and international affairs as well as management and labor relations specialists.

About theAuthor:
Alan Coddington is lecturer in economics, Queen Mary College, London

1120042628
Theories of the Bargaining Process
A tour de force of theoretical reasoning, this book presents the most advanced analytical model of the bargaining process so far conceived. Focused essentially on the dynamics of the bargaining process, Coddington's model employs elements of several conceptual constructs-individual decision-making, theories of expectations and their adjustment, and environment concepts-to explain the nature of consistency in a bargainer's system of expectations and intentions.

The book begins with a description of the bargaining process in an economic context and establishes an analytical framework. There follows a critical survey of bargaining theory in which the author selects those concepts, which he finds most valid and most applicable to his decision-making/expectation/adjustment model. The Internal consistency of a wide class of bargaining models is then examined in a chapter on the relationship between decision-making and expectations. Since the theory of games has been used as a basis for bargaining process theory, the author devotes a chapter to an examination of the game-theoretic approach and an assessment of its value relative to his own approach.

The author concludes with a study of the specific capabilities of his own analytical model, with discussion of the possible combinations of assumptions with which the investigator may work. Although stemming from a problem in economic theory and of immediate intent to economists, the book's contribution to the general theory of conflict process and interdependent decision-making make it an important study for students of politics and international affairs as well as management and labor relations specialists.

About theAuthor:
Alan Coddington is lecturer in economics, Queen Mary College, London

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Theories of the Bargaining Process

Theories of the Bargaining Process

by Alan Coddington
Theories of the Bargaining Process

Theories of the Bargaining Process

by Alan Coddington

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Overview

A tour de force of theoretical reasoning, this book presents the most advanced analytical model of the bargaining process so far conceived. Focused essentially on the dynamics of the bargaining process, Coddington's model employs elements of several conceptual constructs-individual decision-making, theories of expectations and their adjustment, and environment concepts-to explain the nature of consistency in a bargainer's system of expectations and intentions.

The book begins with a description of the bargaining process in an economic context and establishes an analytical framework. There follows a critical survey of bargaining theory in which the author selects those concepts, which he finds most valid and most applicable to his decision-making/expectation/adjustment model. The Internal consistency of a wide class of bargaining models is then examined in a chapter on the relationship between decision-making and expectations. Since the theory of games has been used as a basis for bargaining process theory, the author devotes a chapter to an examination of the game-theoretic approach and an assessment of its value relative to his own approach.

The author concludes with a study of the specific capabilities of his own analytical model, with discussion of the possible combinations of assumptions with which the investigator may work. Although stemming from a problem in economic theory and of immediate intent to economists, the book's contribution to the general theory of conflict process and interdependent decision-making make it an important study for students of politics and international affairs as well as management and labor relations specialists.

About theAuthor:
Alan Coddington is lecturer in economics, Queen Mary College, London


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781351472265
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Publication date: 07/05/2017
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 126
File size: 4 MB

About the Author

Alan Coddington, G. L. S. Shackle

Table of Contents


Foreward   Professor G.L.S. Shackle     vii
Preface     xiii
The General Framework
Introduction     1
The Concept of an Economic Environment     2
A Bargaining Situation     4
Formalisation     6
Indeterminacy     10
Expectations     12
General Workings of the Model     13
Mathematical Appendix
Notation     17
Utility Maximisation     18
Dynamics     20
A Brief Survey of Bargaining Theory
Introduction     24
Existing Theories     25
Closed Loops
Cross's Assumptions     49
Representation of the Model     52
Closed Loop Models     54
The Relationship Between Decision-Making and Expectations
Introduction     58
The Question of Consistency     58
Decision-Making and Expectations in Theories of Bargaining     60
Decision-Making and Expectations in a Game Theory Model     67
Limitations of the Environment Concept     69
Different Approaches to a Theory of Bargaining
Introduction     71
Game Theory as a Basis for a Theory of Bargaining     71
The Decision/Expectation/Adjustment Approach     77
Further Developments
Introduction     81
A Non-linear Assumption     81
The Adjustment Process     86
Direct Interdependence and the Consistency of Decisions     91
An Illustrative Model     94
Bibliography     99
Index     103
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