The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority
In this original and challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a new thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the center of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold.
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The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority
In this original and challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a new thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the center of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold.
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The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority

The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority

by André Gallois
The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority

The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority

by André Gallois

Hardcover

$120.00 
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Overview

In this original and challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a new thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the center of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780521560931
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 12/12/1996
Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Pages: 228
Product dimensions: 5.75(w) x 8.78(h) x 0.75(d)

Table of Contents

Preface; Introduction; Part I. First-Person Authority: 1. The problem; 2. Scepticism about first-person authority; Part II. The Basic and Extended Accounts: 3. A preliminary account; 4. Defending the basic account; 5. Extending the basic account; 6. Objections; 7. The problem of scope; Part III. Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism: 8. Arguments from content externalism; 9. Deflationary self-knowledge: Davidson and Burge; 10. Externalism and first-person authority; 11. Psychological properties as secondary; Bibliography; Index.
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