The War after the War: The Struggle for Credibility during America's Exit from Vietnam

In The War after the War, Johannes Kadura offers a fresh interpretation of American strategy in the wake of the cease-fire that began in Vietnam on January 28, 1973. The U.S. exit from Vietnam continues to be important in discussions of present-day U.S. foreign policy, so it is crucial that it be interpreted correctly. In challenging the prevailing version of the history of the events, Kadura provides interesting correctives to the different accounts, including the ones of the key actors themselves, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger foremost among them. In so doing, Kadura aims to forge a synthesis between orthodox and revisionist interpretations of this important period.Kadura finds that the strategy employed by Nixon and Kissinger centered on the concepts of "equilibrium strategy" and "insurance policy." That approach allowed them to follow a twofold strategy of making a major effort to uphold South Vietnam while at the same time maintaining a fallback strategy of downplaying the overall significance of Vietnam. Whether they won or lost on their primary bet to secure South Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger expected to come through the crisis in a viable strategic position.

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The War after the War: The Struggle for Credibility during America's Exit from Vietnam

In The War after the War, Johannes Kadura offers a fresh interpretation of American strategy in the wake of the cease-fire that began in Vietnam on January 28, 1973. The U.S. exit from Vietnam continues to be important in discussions of present-day U.S. foreign policy, so it is crucial that it be interpreted correctly. In challenging the prevailing version of the history of the events, Kadura provides interesting correctives to the different accounts, including the ones of the key actors themselves, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger foremost among them. In so doing, Kadura aims to forge a synthesis between orthodox and revisionist interpretations of this important period.Kadura finds that the strategy employed by Nixon and Kissinger centered on the concepts of "equilibrium strategy" and "insurance policy." That approach allowed them to follow a twofold strategy of making a major effort to uphold South Vietnam while at the same time maintaining a fallback strategy of downplaying the overall significance of Vietnam. Whether they won or lost on their primary bet to secure South Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger expected to come through the crisis in a viable strategic position.

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The War after the War: The Struggle for Credibility during America's Exit from Vietnam

The War after the War: The Struggle for Credibility during America's Exit from Vietnam

by Johannes Kadura
The War after the War: The Struggle for Credibility during America's Exit from Vietnam

The War after the War: The Struggle for Credibility during America's Exit from Vietnam

by Johannes Kadura

eBook

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Overview

In The War after the War, Johannes Kadura offers a fresh interpretation of American strategy in the wake of the cease-fire that began in Vietnam on January 28, 1973. The U.S. exit from Vietnam continues to be important in discussions of present-day U.S. foreign policy, so it is crucial that it be interpreted correctly. In challenging the prevailing version of the history of the events, Kadura provides interesting correctives to the different accounts, including the ones of the key actors themselves, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger foremost among them. In so doing, Kadura aims to forge a synthesis between orthodox and revisionist interpretations of this important period.Kadura finds that the strategy employed by Nixon and Kissinger centered on the concepts of "equilibrium strategy" and "insurance policy." That approach allowed them to follow a twofold strategy of making a major effort to uphold South Vietnam while at the same time maintaining a fallback strategy of downplaying the overall significance of Vietnam. Whether they won or lost on their primary bet to secure South Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger expected to come through the crisis in a viable strategic position.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781501703782
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Publication date: 02/01/2016
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 248
File size: 2 MB
Age Range: 18 Years

About the Author

Johannes Kadura is founding partner and managing director of Think Asia Group. He is also an Associate Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations and an Adjunct Professor at Peking University.

Table of Contents

Introduction. Contingency Planning in Turbulent Times
1. The Strategy of the Cease-fire
2. The X Plus 60 Period
3. The Collapse of the Equilibrium Strategy
4. Going Down with Colors Flying
5. Ford and the Fall of Saigon
6. Beyond Defeat in Indochina
Conclusion. A Mixed Record

What People are Saying About This

Jussi M. Hanhimäki

Johannes Kadura's book is a welcome addition to the literature on the United States’ tortuous exit from Vietnam. Meticulously researched and engagingly written, it provides a fresh look at and perceptive analysis of the last stages of America’s longest war.

Jussi M. Hanhimäki

"Johannes Kadura's book is a welcome addition to the literature on the United States’ tortuous exit from Vietnam. Meticulously researched and engagingly written, it provides a fresh look at and perceptive analysis of the last stages of America’s longest war."

David F. Schmitz

In The War after the War, Johannes Kadura draws on excellent research at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and the Gerald Ford Presidential Library to fill in a gap in our knowledge of the policy and goals regarding the Paris Peace Agreement. In so doing, he forges a synthesis between orthodox and revisionist interpretations of the period between 1973 and 1976. Kadura's argument that Nixon and Kissinger followed a twofold strategy is made all the more persuasive because he includes Cambodia and Laos in his analysis along with Vietnam. He notably provides a convincing explanation of how Kissinger, in particular, used the concept of a decent interval.

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