The Third Reich's Celluloid War: Propaganda in Nazi Feature Films, Documentaries and Television
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The Third Reich's Celluloid War: Propaganda in Nazi Feature Films, Documentaries and Television
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Overview
This book exposes the myths surrounding the propaganda films produced during the Third Reich. One, that the Nazis were infallible masters in the use of film propaganda. Two, that everything the Nazis said was a lie. Three, that only the Riefenstahl documentaries are significant to the modern viewer. It reveals the truth, lies, successes and failures of key films designed to arouse hostility against the Nazis’ enemies, including Ohm Krüger - the most anti-British film ever produced; their 1943 anti-capitalist version of Titanic; anti-English films about Ireland and Scotland; and anti-American films like The Emperor of California and The Prodigal Son. Including an objective analysis of all the key films produced by the Nazi regime and a wealth of film stills, Ian C. Garden takes the reader on a journey through the Nazi propaganda machine. In today’s turbulent world the book serves as a poignant reminder of the levels to which powerful regimes will stoop to achieve power and control.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780752477879 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | The History Press |
| Publication date: | 11/30/2011 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 128 |
| File size: | 39 MB |
| Note: | This product may take a few minutes to download. |
| Age Range: | 12 Years |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
The Third Reich's Celluloid War
Propaganda in Nazi Feature Films, Documentaries and Television
By Ian Garden
The History Press
Copyright © 2012 Ian GardenAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-7524-7787-9
CHAPTER 1
Propaganda And Its Significance For Hitler
... in every great revolutionary movement that is of world importance, the idea of this movement must always be spread abroad through the operation of propaganda.
– Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf
What Is Propaganda?
The noun propaganda derives from the Latin verb 'propagare' and came to refer to the pre-cutting process employed in the propagation of plants. Early reference to the word is found in the mechanism of the Catholic Church in the seventeenth century with the 'Congregatio de propaganda fide' (literally, the 'Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith') and, there-after, the term tended to be applied to any device used for the promotion of a particular cause.
There are numerous elaborate definitions of what is meant by propaganda today but, in its simplest form, these can best be summarised as follows:
The presentation of information on a particular subject in such a manner as to seek to guide the recipient towards a certain way of thinking or course of action.
Propaganda was initially intended as a positive concept, and it is really only its persistent misuse, primarily in a political context, which has served to devalue its meaning. Consequently, the concept of propaganda nowadays invariably tends to be associated with information which is, at best, misleading or, in the worst case, entirely fallacious.
In order to explore what is actually meant by propaganda in practical terms, it is necessary to begin by dispelling a number of myths as to its nature. Above all, propaganda does not necessitate telling lies, although it can undoubtedly include such methods. Nor does propaganda necessarily involve distorting the truth, although this is a common occurrence. In fact, propaganda frequently involves making statements which might be absolutely true, but where only selected facts are reported and in the most negative or positive manner, so as to evoke a specific response from the reader or viewer.
The following is a non-political example of negative propaganda. Let us assume that a particular newspaper has been undertaking a concerted campaign with the specific aim of discrediting a football coach. When his team is heavily beaten, the newspaper heaps abuse on the unfortunate coach for poor team selection, poor tactics and a lack of leadership, and includes quotes from fans supporting this view. The fact that half of the regular team was ill with influenza and that the manager was in hospital with appendicitis on the day of the match is simply not reported. Therefore, while the newspaper was factually correct, it plainly failed to provide a balanced report as to the reasons for the defeat. In a free society, another newspaper should be able to give the whole story, allowing the general public to reach its own objective conclusions. However, in a society where there is absolute control over media production, then the true facts might well be successfully concealed.
In a political context, during the Falklands War in 1982 between Britain and Argentina, the British government decreed that only a limited number of journalists would be permitted to travel on-board the British aircraft carrier accompanying the task-force and to participate in the official press briefings. The Ministry of Defence tightly controlled the flow of information, and the journalists were largely dependent on access to the satellite communications controlled by the military for the submission of reports back to the UK. Journalists' reports were pre-censored and they were occasionally fed false information by the British authorities, designed to mislead the Argentineans as to their true intentions. The journalists were often prevented from witnessing the actual fighting and it was fifty-four days before any photographs of the conflict emerged. When HMS Coventry was sunk, it took more than twelve hours for the information to be released in the House of Commons. If anyone tried to gain an unbiased impression of the true situation by listening to news reports from foreign radio or TV stations, then they were going to be sadly disillusioned, since the same reports were often translated word for word from the original accounts in English. Consequently, the rest of the world could never be certain that it was being provided with an objective assessment of the progress of that war.
Even today, propaganda is still at the forefront of almost every aspect of modern existence, be it from the reporting of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or in government election broadcasts in America or Britain, and all despite the widespread use of the internet and satellite technology for the dissemination of information. One can only imagine how much easier it was for the Nazis to dictate propaganda output in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s, often for far more sinister purposes, and when there were far greater limitations on the types of media to which the masses could turn for information and entertainment.
What did the concept of propaganda mean for Hitler?
Quite simply, if it had not been for his generally effective use of propaganda, it is doubtful whether Hitler would ever have been able to gain power in Germany, let alone achieve and retain support for another war.
Propaganda meant everything to the Nazis and, when it came to war, was considered by Hitler to be a weapon of the first order, playing just as important a role as more traditional weapons of destruction. It was such an important concept in the mind of Hitler that two chapters of his book, Mein Kampf (My Struggle), contain the word in their title, and passing reference is also made to its importance in other sections of the book.
As a disillusioned veteran, Hitler is quick to highlight the importance of Allied propaganda in the defeat of Germany in the First World War and, conversely, Germany's complete naïvety in the employment of such an important weapon in support of its own cause.
He complains how the British and French had been far more effective in using propaganda to blame Germany for the Great War, depicting the Germans as barbarians with terrible weapons of destruction, while making no reference to their own such weapons. The English propaganda war against German soldiers, which began in 1915, had swollen into a storm flood by 1918. Hitler explains how, at first, the Germans had laughed at the content of the enemy leaflets, but gradually they became more influential, and, by the end, the Germans believed that anything they heard from their own side was untrue. The position was not helped by negative letters from home, criticism from their own press and the outbreak of a number of damaging strikes when the German nation could least afford them. He firmly believed that the strikes encouraged the enemy and indirectly led to the deaths of many thousands of German soldiers.
Hitler also blames Germany's downfall on much of the information pedalled by the press and is obsessed by the fact that, with only a rare exception, the press was controlled by Marxists and Jews.
By far the most effective branch of political education, which in this connection is best expressed by the word 'propaganda', is carried on by the press.
Ironically, such was his perception of the influence of the press that, once he came to power, Hitler simply sought to ensure that all the media were subsequently controlled by the Nazis for expounding their own messages.
Hitler's Views On Effective Propaganda
The art of propaganda consists in putting a matter so clearly and forcibly before the minds of the people as to create a general conviction regarding the reality of a certain fact, the necessity of certain things and the just character of something that is essential.
Hitler clearly recognised that propaganda was simply a means to an end, and its success could only be judged by the end it was intended to serve. His war experiences did lead him to deduce that the first condition of propaganda is that it should not be objective, but rather that it display a systematically one-sided attitude towards every problem that has to be handled.
He compares the exercise to a poster for soap, whereby the onlooker would naturally shake his head if an advert for some new brand of soap insisted on highlighting the excellent qualities of competitive brands. He concludes that the aim of propaganda is not to try to pass judgement on conflicting rights, but rather to emphasise exclusively the right which your side is asserting.
Accordingly, he felt that the sole responsibility for the First World War should have been attributed to England, rather than tacitly accepting that Germany shared some responsibility for the war. Whereas English propaganda prevented any comment which might have raised doubt as to who was to blame for the war, he was conscious that the Germans became hesitant and distrustful when they were led to believe by their own people that the enemy might have some right on his side.
Much of Hitler's views on propaganda also arose from his sneaking admiration for the masterly way the Marxist Socialists employed propaganda, and he accepted that the correct use of propaganda is an art in itself. He had been mesmerised by their hour-long processions through the city and the impassioned speeches, and was determined that his movement could learn from their example.
This also taught him the importance of audience differentiation. While it was quite appropriate to employ logical, reasoned propaganda to persuade intellectuals to a certain way of thinking, he realised that, for the masses, cruder methods had to be adopted, whereby only constant repetition succeeds in imprinting an idea on the memory of the general populace.
Hitler's many insightful reflections on propaganda provide a fascinating background to the propaganda films which will be reviewed later in this book and, in summary, his key observations are:
• Propaganda should be focussed
• Propaganda has to be consistent and persistent
• Propaganda should never be weakened through objective analysis
• Propaganda should be limited to a few simple themes or slogans, and these should be repeated time and again
It is worth noting how confident Hitler had been when he entered the German Labour Party in 1921, as he had immediately taken charge of their propaganda campaign and evidently had tremendous belief in his own ability to utilise propaganda effectively.
... I was tormented more than once by the thought that if Providence had put the conduct of German propaganda into my hands, instead of into the hands of incompetent and even criminal ignoramuses and weaklings, the outcome of the struggle [i.e. the Great War] might well have been different.
It was a shortcoming which he was absolutely determined would not be repeated in 1939.
CHAPTER 2The Control of Film Propaganda Under the Nazis
The Reich's Ministry For Public Enlightenment And Propaganda
Given the importance which Hitler placed on the value of propaganda, it comes as no surprise that when the Nazis did gain power in January 1933, one of their top priorities was to establish the Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (Reich's Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda).
Headed by Dr Joseph Goebbels, the ministry was responsible for controlling all media and culture, with the intention of manipulating the 'spiritual' direction of Germany according to Nazi ideology and beliefs. From fairly humble beginnings, the ministry was to employ more than 2,000 employees in seventeen different departments by the outbreak of war, and its budget was to increase to 187 million Reichsmarks by 1941.
The ministry wielded direct power over every aspect of media and culture through which the general populace might be influenced, including the German and foreign press, literature, art, music, theatre, films, radio and television. While Goebbels had always considered the radio to be the most effective means of reaching and influencing the masses, he did recognise the propaganda potential of large-screen cinema, as it was easy to comprehend and had more appeal to the emotions.
Within the ministry, the Reichsfilmkammer (Reich's Film Chamber) was charged with exercising control over the whole film industry across Germany. As Hitler had argued in Mein Kampf that it was the Jewish control of media which was largely to blame for Germany's defeat in the First World War, the Nazis were determined to remove their 'treacherous influence' this time round. Therefore, by stipulating that only those of German descent and nationality were allowed to become members of the chamber, such a restriction ensured the indirect removal of the vast majority of Jews from the film industry either as producers, directors or actors.
Control was absolute. Scripts had to be submitted prior to the commencement of filming, and nothing could be released for public consumption without the prior approval of the Propaganda Ministry. Notwithstanding, more than thirty feature films were actually well into production or actually completed before the decision was taken for them to be banned – either because of the quality and content of the films or because they were at odds with Nazi ideology. The press coverage of feature films was also strictly controlled. Since Goebbels had banned film criticism, reviews tended simply to guide readers as to what to expect from a film and psychologically prepared them for how they might respond to the content.
Not only would Goebbels indicate to the film companies the sort of films he was seeking at any moment in time, such as more anti-British films during the early war years, but he also frequently intervened in the selection of directors and actors for these films. Indeed, he blatantly abused his position of authority in respect of the choice of actresses for key roles, where a refusal to succumb to his advances could ensure an actress's subsequent failure as a film star.
In an early speech of guidance to film producers, Goebbels demanded that films should capture the spirit of the times while avoiding endless military parades. This was undoubtedly a reference to earlier documentary-type films, with which presumably both the ordinary civilians and the Nazi hierarchy had had their fill.
Having worked as a journalist and bank clerk, and having had his early novels rejected by publishers, it is somewhat ironic that Goebbels should now take an active role in determining the nature and content of films which would be screened in Germany, often personally rewriting scripts and demanding scenes be edited or even re-shot. He even established the German Film Academy in 1938 to ensure that future film directors would recognise what was expected of them by the Nazi regime, and to meet the shortfall of personnel resulting from the increasing exclusion of Jewish employees.
The Reorganisation Of The German Film Industry Under The Nazis
The German film industry had been in financial difficulty for some time, not helped by the cost of introducing talking movies and subsequent strikes by live musicians concerned that sound films would make them redundant. Consequently, in order to assist the film industry, a Filmkreditbank was established on 1 June 1933 to lend money to production companies at competitive rates. Finance was generally available if the producer could raise at least 30% of the production costs elsewhere and could present a good business case as to why the film would enjoy box office success. Of course, such dependence by the industry on state finance also had a direct influence on each film's content and subject matter.
New cinema laws were gradually passed for the positive encouragement of acceptable films through the introduction of a more rigorous censorship regime. Such censorship controls required the pre-submission of scripts, introduced an increased number of film ratings and widened the circumstances according to which a film could be banned. In practice, a film could now be banned for the most spurious of reasons if it could be said to endanger public order, the interests of the state or offend National Socialist, religious, moral or artistic feeling. Such rules did not leave much room for manoeuvre. Apart from the kudos brought by the award of the highest film ratings known as Prädikate, such ratings also carried varying financial incentives for the producers in terms of reduced entertainment taxes and an increased share of profits. The highest rating which could be awarded to a film was defined, rather clumsily, as 'politically valuable and artistically especially valuable' and, by 1938, there was a requirement that any film which enjoyed a 'politically valuable' rating had to be screened by cinemas.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Third Reich's Celluloid War by Ian Garden. Copyright © 2012 Ian Garden. Excerpted by permission of The History Press.
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Table of Contents
Contents
Acknowledgements,Author's Note,
Introduction,
I. Propaganda and its Significance for Hitler,
II. The Control of Film Propaganda under the Nazis,
III. Anti-British Propaganda,
IV. Anti-Semitic Propaganda,
V. Anti-American Propaganda,
VI. Anti-Eastern Europe Propaganda,
VII. Nationalistic and Pro-Nazi Propaganda,
VIII. Films for Entertainment,
IX. Comparative Anti-Nazi Propaganda in the Allies' Feature Films (1938–45),
X. Nazi Documentaries (1933–45),
XI. Television as a Propaganda Weapon for the Nazis (1934–44),
XII. Conclusion,
Bibliography,