The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-39: A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War

by J. Maiolo

Overview

This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. It combines a narrative of diplomatic events and Whitehall policy-making with the thematic analysis of naval intelligence and war planning. Drawing on the wide range of sources, the author argues that the Admiralty's enthusiasm for naval armaments diplomacy with Nazi Germany was far more rational and more complex than previous studies would suggest.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781349404445
Publisher:	Palgrave Macmillan UK
Publication date:	08/11/1998
Series:	Studies in Military and Strategic History
Edition description:	1st ed. 1998
Pages:	259
Product dimensions:	8.27(w) x 11.69(h) x 0.02(d)

About the Author

JOSEPH A. MAIOLO completed his first degree in history and philosophy at the University of Toronto and graduated with a PhD from the University of London. He has been a Tutorial Fellow in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and is now a Lecturer in International History at the University of Leeds.

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures Preface and Acknowledgements Abbreviations Introduction The Naval Staff and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935 Anglo-German Naval Relations, June 1935 to July 1937 Naval Staff Perceptions of German Naval Strategy, 1934-39 Admiralty Technical Intelligence and the German Navy, 1936-39 The Naval Staff, British Strategy, and the German Menace, 1934-38 The Naval Staff and Defence and Foreign Policy, 1937-38 The End of Appeasement and the Bid to Transform Admiralty Strategy, 1938-39 Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

Editorial Reviews

A study of the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the context of the ongoing debate about Anglo- German relations and the origins of WWII. Casts new light on the diplomacy leading to the Anglo-German naval Agreements of June 1935 and July 1937, and explores the crucial connections between naval intelligence, war planning, and Admiralty policy. Argues that the Admiralty's response to the Nazi menace was more rational and complex than previous studies would suggest. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

Booknews

'Joseph Maiolo's first book is the product of imaginative and diligent archival research, intelligent command of recent revisionist scholarship and robust conceptualisation...Maiolo has come up with a different answer by posing fundamentally different questions.' - Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Military History

'Joe Maiolo's work on Anglo-German naval relations in the late 1930s is a readable and worthwhile addition to the recent literature which, for the last 20 years, has attempted to re-evaluate what exactly Britain's interwar foreign and defence policy really was...Without a doubt the book is well worth the purchase price and should be read by anyone studying British strategic defence policy in the 1930s.' - Greg Kennedy, Diplomacy & Statecraft

'...worthwhile reading for anyone interested in naval and related diplomatic affairs during the interwar period.' - Paul G. Halpern, International Journal of Maritime History

From the Publisher