In The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Mortgage and Credit Markets, James Barth, with the assistance of his colleagues at the Milken Institute, analyzes in detail the mortgage meltdown and the resulting worldwide financial crisis. He explains how Main Street and Wall Street alike took on too much risk and too much debt in their quest for gains, setting the crisis in motion.
In straightforward terms, he tells what subprime mortgages are, who subprime borrowers are, and how securitization—packaging loans into complex securities and selling them in the secondary market—expanded the mortgage market, but also opened the door to a shifting of risk. Barth also assesses what went wrong in every other critical area, including loan origination practices, regulation and supervision, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, leverage and accounting practices, and, of course, the rating agencies.
The author explains the steps the government has taken thus far and suggests that those actions have been piecemeal—and largely reactive, rather than proactive. He argues that we have yet to address the bigger and more long-term issue of how to reform the structure of regulation and supervision to prevent a similar crisis from happening again. Barth also offers his own thoughts on the factors that should drive reform and explores several important issues that policymakers must address in any future reshaping of financial market regulations.
In The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Mortgage and Credit Markets, James Barth, with the assistance of his colleagues at the Milken Institute, analyzes in detail the mortgage meltdown and the resulting worldwide financial crisis. He explains how Main Street and Wall Street alike took on too much risk and too much debt in their quest for gains, setting the crisis in motion.
In straightforward terms, he tells what subprime mortgages are, who subprime borrowers are, and how securitization—packaging loans into complex securities and selling them in the secondary market—expanded the mortgage market, but also opened the door to a shifting of risk. Barth also assesses what went wrong in every other critical area, including loan origination practices, regulation and supervision, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, leverage and accounting practices, and, of course, the rating agencies.
The author explains the steps the government has taken thus far and suggests that those actions have been piecemeal—and largely reactive, rather than proactive. He argues that we have yet to address the bigger and more long-term issue of how to reform the structure of regulation and supervision to prevent a similar crisis from happening again. Barth also offers his own thoughts on the factors that should drive reform and explores several important issues that policymakers must address in any future reshaping of financial market regulations.
The Rise and Fall of the US Mortgage and Credit Markets: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Market Meltdown
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The Rise and Fall of the US Mortgage and Credit Markets: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Market Meltdown
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