The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation
Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however, challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation, she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big influence.


Gerber bases her findings on extensive surveys of the activities and motivations of interest groups and on close examination of campaign finance records from 168 direct legislation campaigns in eight states. Her research confirms what such wealthy interests as the insurance industry, trial lawyer associations, and tobacco companies have learned by defeats at the ballot box: if citizens do not like a proposed new law, even an expensive, high-profile campaign will not make them change their mind. She demonstrates, however, that these economic interest groups have considerable success in using direct legislation to block initiatives that others are proposing and to exert pressure on politicians. By contrast, citizen interest groups with broad-based support and significant organizational resources have proven to be extremely effective in using direct legislation to pass new laws. Clearly written and argued, this is a major theoretical and empirical contribution to our understanding of the role of citizens and organized interests in the American legislative process.

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The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation
Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however, challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation, she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big influence.


Gerber bases her findings on extensive surveys of the activities and motivations of interest groups and on close examination of campaign finance records from 168 direct legislation campaigns in eight states. Her research confirms what such wealthy interests as the insurance industry, trial lawyer associations, and tobacco companies have learned by defeats at the ballot box: if citizens do not like a proposed new law, even an expensive, high-profile campaign will not make them change their mind. She demonstrates, however, that these economic interest groups have considerable success in using direct legislation to block initiatives that others are proposing and to exert pressure on politicians. By contrast, citizen interest groups with broad-based support and significant organizational resources have proven to be extremely effective in using direct legislation to pass new laws. Clearly written and argued, this is a major theoretical and empirical contribution to our understanding of the role of citizens and organized interests in the American legislative process.

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The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation

The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation

by Elisabeth R. Gerber
The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation

The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation

by Elisabeth R. Gerber

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Overview

Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however, challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation, she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big influence.


Gerber bases her findings on extensive surveys of the activities and motivations of interest groups and on close examination of campaign finance records from 168 direct legislation campaigns in eight states. Her research confirms what such wealthy interests as the insurance industry, trial lawyer associations, and tobacco companies have learned by defeats at the ballot box: if citizens do not like a proposed new law, even an expensive, high-profile campaign will not make them change their mind. She demonstrates, however, that these economic interest groups have considerable success in using direct legislation to block initiatives that others are proposing and to exert pressure on politicians. By contrast, citizen interest groups with broad-based support and significant organizational resources have proven to be extremely effective in using direct legislation to pass new laws. Clearly written and argued, this is a major theoretical and empirical contribution to our understanding of the role of citizens and organized interests in the American legislative process.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780691002675
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Publication date: 07/21/1999
Pages: 176
Product dimensions: 7.75(w) x 10.00(h) x (d)

About the Author

Elisabeth R. Gerber, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, studies the consequences of U.S. election laws on interest representation. She is currently working on a major study of primary election laws in the American states.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables xi

Acknowledgments xiii

1. What Is the Populist Paradox? 3

A Theory of Interest Group Influence 6

Motivation: The Study of Interest Group Influence 10

Justification: Why Study Direct Legislation? 15

Plan of the Book 19

2. Interest Group Choice 21

Forms of Influence 21

Interest Group Choice 27

Achieving Influence 30

Summary and Conclusions 36

3. Direct Legislation Hurdles 37

Achieving Direct Modifying Influence 38

Achieving Direct Preserving Influence

Achieving Indirect Modifying Influence 50

Achieving Indirect Preserving Influence: Opposing an Initiative to Signal the Legislature 52

Behavioral Hurdles 52

Summary and Conclusions 58

4. Group Characteristics and Resources 59

Monetary and Personnel Resources 59

Using Resources to Overcome Hurdles 60

Membership Characteristics 65

Classifying Groups and Their Resources 69

Hypotheses about Motivations and Forms of Influence 71

Summary 75

5. Motivations and Strategies 76

Methodology 76

What Do Groups Say They Do? 80

What Do Groups Actually Do? 93

Summary and Conclusions 100

6.Direct Policy Consequences 101

Direct Policy Consequences 101

Summary and Conclusions 119

7. Indirect Policy Consequences 121

State Policy Differences 122

Summary and Conclusions 136

8.The Populist Paradox: Reality Or Illusion? 137

Economic Group Limitations 137

Citizen Group Dominance 140

Implications for the Study of Direct Legislation 140

Implications for the Study Of Interest Group Influence 141

Positive versus Normative Implications 142

A Final Assessment 146

Appendixes 147

A. Direct Legislation Institutions 147

B. Survey Of Organizations 152

References 159

Index 165

What People are Saying About This

Baumgartner

The questions raised in The Populist Paradox are fundamental to our understanding of elections and representation and to the roles of citizens, organized interests, and elected officials. The book is well written and extremely well organized.
Frank R. Baumgartner, Pennsylvania State University

Frank R. Baumgartner

The questions raised in The Populist Paradox are fundamental to our understanding of elections and representation and to the roles of citizens, organized interests, and elected officials. The book is well written and extremely well organized.

From the Publisher

"Gerber's key finding—that citizen interest groups are more effective in using the initiative to alter the status quo, and that economic groups are more effective at preserving it—is an important amendment to the popular perception that interest groups now control the initiative process."—Bruce E. Cain, University of California, Berkeley

"The questions raised in The Populist Paradox are fundamental to our understanding of elections and representation and to the roles of citizens, organized interests, and elected officials. The book is well written and extremely well organized."—Frank R. Baumgartner, Pennsylvania State University

Cain

Gerber's key finding—that citizen interest groups are more effective in using the initiative to alter the status quo, and that economic groups are more effective at preserving it—is an important amendment to the popular perception that interest groups now control the initiative process.
Bruce E. Cain, University of California, Berkeley

Bruce E. Cain

Gerber's key finding--that citizen interest groups are more effective in using the initiative to alter the status quo, and that economic groups are more effective at preserving it--is an important amendment to the popular perception that interest groups now control the initiative process.

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