The Political Economy of Brexit

The UK’s vote to leave the European Union is a pivotal moment in British history. Over the past forty years, the UK’s economy has become increasingly intertwined and dependent on its relationship with the other EU member states with both the EU and the UK’s economic landscape irrevocably fashioned by its membership. Brexit takes both parties into unchartered territory. At such a time of uncertainty, what can we say for certain about the UK’s economic relationship with the EU and what might be the likely flashpoints for negotiations and the unintended consequences of Brexit?

This collection of essays explores the ramifications of the Brexit decision for the UK and European economies. The contributors, who all draw on long experience of policy-oriented research on the British economy within the European Union, consider the impact, at least in the short term, of a weaker and less influential UK economy. Questions addressed include: What is the likely impact on our already weak manufacturing industries? How will the withdrawal of EU funding for regional development impact on growth and future economic development outside of London and the South East? What is the likely impact on wages and labour regulations? How are relations with our closest EU neighbours likely to develop, critically for Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland, and with the biggest economic player, Germany? What of the Scottish question? How will the City, the engine of UK growth in the past decade, maintain its position as Europe’s financial centre? And finally, whither the EU? How will it fare without its second largest economy within the Union?

With the UK’s withdrawal negotiations likely to last for at least the next two years, and the potential for other calls for referendums in other member states, the economic consequences of leaving the European Union are set to dominate politics in the UK and Europe well in to the future. These essays provide an important first step in assessing the threats and challenges that a Brexit poses for the UK and wider EU economy and will be welcome reading for anyone in search of some rigour and clarity amid the hyperbole of recent months.

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The Political Economy of Brexit

The UK’s vote to leave the European Union is a pivotal moment in British history. Over the past forty years, the UK’s economy has become increasingly intertwined and dependent on its relationship with the other EU member states with both the EU and the UK’s economic landscape irrevocably fashioned by its membership. Brexit takes both parties into unchartered territory. At such a time of uncertainty, what can we say for certain about the UK’s economic relationship with the EU and what might be the likely flashpoints for negotiations and the unintended consequences of Brexit?

This collection of essays explores the ramifications of the Brexit decision for the UK and European economies. The contributors, who all draw on long experience of policy-oriented research on the British economy within the European Union, consider the impact, at least in the short term, of a weaker and less influential UK economy. Questions addressed include: What is the likely impact on our already weak manufacturing industries? How will the withdrawal of EU funding for regional development impact on growth and future economic development outside of London and the South East? What is the likely impact on wages and labour regulations? How are relations with our closest EU neighbours likely to develop, critically for Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland, and with the biggest economic player, Germany? What of the Scottish question? How will the City, the engine of UK growth in the past decade, maintain its position as Europe’s financial centre? And finally, whither the EU? How will it fare without its second largest economy within the Union?

With the UK’s withdrawal negotiations likely to last for at least the next two years, and the potential for other calls for referendums in other member states, the economic consequences of leaving the European Union are set to dominate politics in the UK and Europe well in to the future. These essays provide an important first step in assessing the threats and challenges that a Brexit poses for the UK and wider EU economy and will be welcome reading for anyone in search of some rigour and clarity amid the hyperbole of recent months.

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The Political Economy of Brexit

The Political Economy of Brexit

The Political Economy of Brexit

The Political Economy of Brexit

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Overview

The UK’s vote to leave the European Union is a pivotal moment in British history. Over the past forty years, the UK’s economy has become increasingly intertwined and dependent on its relationship with the other EU member states with both the EU and the UK’s economic landscape irrevocably fashioned by its membership. Brexit takes both parties into unchartered territory. At such a time of uncertainty, what can we say for certain about the UK’s economic relationship with the EU and what might be the likely flashpoints for negotiations and the unintended consequences of Brexit?

This collection of essays explores the ramifications of the Brexit decision for the UK and European economies. The contributors, who all draw on long experience of policy-oriented research on the British economy within the European Union, consider the impact, at least in the short term, of a weaker and less influential UK economy. Questions addressed include: What is the likely impact on our already weak manufacturing industries? How will the withdrawal of EU funding for regional development impact on growth and future economic development outside of London and the South East? What is the likely impact on wages and labour regulations? How are relations with our closest EU neighbours likely to develop, critically for Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland, and with the biggest economic player, Germany? What of the Scottish question? How will the City, the engine of UK growth in the past decade, maintain its position as Europe’s financial centre? And finally, whither the EU? How will it fare without its second largest economy within the Union?

With the UK’s withdrawal negotiations likely to last for at least the next two years, and the potential for other calls for referendums in other member states, the economic consequences of leaving the European Union are set to dominate politics in the UK and Europe well in to the future. These essays provide an important first step in assessing the threats and challenges that a Brexit poses for the UK and wider EU economy and will be welcome reading for anyone in search of some rigour and clarity amid the hyperbole of recent months.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781788210201
Publisher: Agenda Publishing
Publication date: 03/30/2017
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 192
File size: 3 MB

About the Author

David Bailey is Professor of Industrial Strategy at Aston Business School. He has written widely on economic restructuring, industrial and regional policy.

Leslie Budd is Reader in Social Enterprise in the Centre for Public Leadership and Social Enterprise (PULSE) at The Open University Business School.


David Bailey is Professor of Industrial Strategy at Aston Business School. He has written widely on economic restructuring, industrial and regional policy. He has twice chaired the Regional Studies Association, and has acted as a Special Advisor to the House of Commons Select Committee on the West Midlands region.


Leslie Budd is Reader in Social Enterprise in the Centre for Public Leadership and Social Enterprise (PULSE) at The Open University Business School. He is also a member of the cross-faculty research centre, The Centre for Innovation Knowledge and Development (IKD). He has been Chair of the Regional Studies Association (2003–06) and was elected an Academician of the Academy of Social Sciences in 2004. He has authored and edited several books, including most recently, eGovernance: Managing or Governing? (co-editor) and e-Economy: Rhetoric or Business Reality? (co-editor).

Read an Excerpt

The Political Economy of Brexit


By David Bailey, Leslie Budd

Agenda Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2017 David Bailey and Leslie Budd
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-78821-020-1



CHAPTER 1

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BREXIT: AN INTRODUCTION

David Bailey and Leslie Budd


In his famous essay The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, published in 1852, Karl Marx noted that history repeats itself, "once as tragedy, and again as farce". He was referring to Napoleon I and his nephew Napoleon III, with respect to the latter seizing power and implementing a dictatorship in France in 1851. For many the tragedy of Brexit in the UK was followed by the farce of the election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States. The same aphorism could be applied to the Italian Referendum, in which the No vote prevailing led to the resignation of the prime minister, Matteo Renzi. How tragedy and farce will play out in the forthcoming elections in other European countries, especially France and Germany in 2017, is, at the time of writing, anybody's guess, although the defeat of a far-right candidate in the Austrian presidential election may be a cause for some optimism. Some commentators have suggested that the rising nationalist populism in the US and Europe is a sign of the end of the liberal order. Yet this liberal order has brought us increasing inequality, austerity and growing poverty for those people and places early in the twenty-first century. They have been left behind within the great unravelling of the global economy since the global financial crisis that began in late 2007.

But these moments and intervals of shock and fracture are nothing new, especially in Europe. In his masterly study The Shock of the New: Art and the Century of Change the Australian art historian Robert Hughes wrote:

In 1913, the French writer Charles Péguy remarked that "the world has changed less since the time of Jesus Christ than it has in the last thirty years." He was speaking of all the conditions of Western capitalist society its idea of itself, its sense of history, its beliefs, pieties, and modes of production – and its art.

... After 1914, machinery was turned on its inventors and their children. After forty years of continuous peace in Europe, the worst war in history cancelled faith in good technology, the benevolent machine. The myth of the Future went into shock. And European art moved into years of irony, disgust, and protest. (Hughes 1991: 9, 56)


It is this context that the decision to leave the EU following the Referendum of June 2016 can be used to exemplify this "shock" to the polity and economy of the UK. A similar line of argument has been used to examine the reasons for the election of Donald Trump in the US and the possible election of far-right leaders and much larger electoral representation for their parties in France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands: in 2017 the "new" in Europe is looking increasingly like some atavistic shock.

Brexit appears to be treated as a mono-causal event in which the process of leaving should be straightforward enough, given political will and authority. By the same token, the Leave vote result was merely a factor of xenophobia combining with the dissatisfaction of people and places left behind by the EU's globalizing modernity. Yet the electoral geography was more complex as were the occupational, gender and age differences (Dorling 2016). From this analysis, it was apparent that large swathes of the population voted against something that has increased their economic welfare in the past or their current economic self-interest. So were these citizens unintelligent or stupid, falling into the insulting Clinton classification of "the deplorables"? Clearly not, but the EU may have been crystallized as the emblem of the status quo of out-of-touch political elites who imposed lower real wages and worse socio-economic welfare through austerity. In this light, Leave voters were protesting against the decline in the quality of their lives: a rational and certainly not deplorable response, but possibly hitting the wrong target.

This volume seeks to take a multi-dimensional and multi-scalar approach to the political economy of Brexit. Each of the chapters is set within a wider context to open discussions on a number of the issues in order to attempt to make sense of the complexity. The collection does not attempt to cover all the issues, as there are and will be too many of them, replete with layers of complexity. It is divided into two parts. The first concentrates on some key economic dimensions, while the second examines the territorial conundrums thrown up by the challenges of managing and stabilizing the processes of Brexit. Readers will note that there is no chapter on the impact on Wales. This was deliberate on the part of the editors since the impact of the Referendum for Scottish Independence and the contiguous land border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland make Scotland and Northern Ireland special cases. It is, however, important to recognize the importance of all the devolved nations as the trajectory of Brexit proceeds, to which Wales is also likely to play an important role.

We now turn to the first part of the volume.


ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF BREXIT

It was clear that during the Referendum campaign both sides displayed considerable ignorance about how modern economies and trade work. The "fear versus fact" discourse meant that a measured analysis of the economic benefits and costs for all UK citizens got lost in this simple dialectic. The claims that there would be an immediate economic catastrophe or that the UK would move immediately into the global economic uplands was expressed by no reasonable economist. Fortunately all the contributors to this volume start from the point of measured expertise. Our first contributor, Edgar Morgenroth, applies his forensic analytical skills in analysing the trade implications of Brexit.

Morgenroth starts "Examining Consequences for Trade: Integration and Disintegration Effects" (Chapter 2) with the proposition that although there is a large literature on the integration effects of trade, there is very little on the disintegration effects. In the opening part of his chapter, Morgenroth uses Algeria and Greenland as examples of disintegration effects following the independence of the former in 1962 and the referendum vote to leave the EU by the latter in 1985. The evidence shows that trade intensity lessens following disintegration, and this is reinforced when the break-up of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is observed. Of closer interest here is the observation that trade intensity lessened by a half following the break-up of Czechoslovakia in to the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. Both became member states of the EU in 2004, with unimpeded tariffs since signing their respective Accession Agreements. A similar pattern emerges for Slovenia and the other former constituent territories of the former Yugoslavia.

In reviewing the evidence of the impact of trade intensity within the wider EU, Morgenroth suggests we should expect to find a positive correlation with greater integration as the Union expands. This is a reasonable assumption but globalization increases trade with non-EU members so there may be a countervailing tendency. As trade became more globalized, the core EU member states reached a peak in terms of the share of intra-EU trade and then experienced a gradual decline.

In providing a detailed analysis of the impacts of trade in regard to integration and disintegration of EU membership, Morgenroth uses a novel methodology in exploring the potential impact of Brexit in assuming that leaving the EU is symmetric to that of becoming a member. Although there is considerable heterogeneity within the different regions of the UK and within the whole of the EU, Morgenroth concludes that the net impact of Brexit on UK exports to the rest of the EU would be larger by a ratio of nearly eight to one compared to the opposite direction. Furthermore, international trade is closely linked to foreign direct investment (FDI) with the UK having the second largest stock of inward FDI from the EU, after the USA. If the estimates on trade are realized then there may be displacement of FDI from the UK to other parts of the EU.

Jan Toporowski explores the role of finance and the City of London in "Brexit and the Discreet Charm of Haute Finance" (Chapter 3). The title relates to the film directed by the Spanish surreal film-maker, Luis Buñuel, The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie. One could be forgiven for thinking that the role of finance in the British economy in the past 40 years has been a surreal experience. This is especially the case in its heartland, the City of London, becoming a global offshore finance entrepôt that often does not touch but has distorted the real economy. Toporowski uses the work of Karl Polanyi, who identified the relationship between finance and politics in his analysis of the Concert of Europe, a loose coalition of European powers from 1815 until 1823. In seeking to stabilize peace, an anonymous factor began to prevail that dominated the last two-thirds of the nineteenth century and first third of the twentieth: haute finance. It functioned as the main link between the political and economic organization of the world during this period.

Toporowski uses a quote from Polanyi to summarize the rise of the Concert of Europe and then asks the reader to replace it with the European Union or the United Nations in respect of the role of global financial markets that are no longer mediated by government or inter-lending global financial governmental agencies. He provides evidence on UK industrial production, showing it to be flat since 1997 with a sharp drop since the global financial crisis of 2008. This decline has created a growing dependence on other sectors to provide employment in the UK. This has not, however reduced the demand for manufactured products and equipment by consumers and businesses. Consequently, there is a growing trade deficit in industrial products reflecting the decline in industrial production while finance has flourished. The decline in industrial production that Toporowski provides evidence for shows the failure of the British government to use haute finance as a means of economic revival.

In his view haute finance displays discreet charm in that it turns over capital without turning over social structures that were a central consequence of the development of industrial capitalism. This leads him to suggest that the main result of the so-called Thatcher revolution was to hand over the City of London to American interests following "Big Bang" in 1986. Toporowski concludes on the paradox of the UK being a protectorate of US financial interests with low regulatory cost that are a result of the UK's membership of the EU. Thus in promising UK citizens a new place in the world but outside the EU, these US interests may move to other locations within the EU. Doing this would compound the British political elites' failed attempts to address economic decline.

The centrality of industrial decline and restructuring is starting to emerge as the key issue in analysing the impact on the UK economy. Much was made by the Leave campaigners that German car makers will still need to sell their vehicles to buyers in the UK. While this truism is accurate, it hides a lack of understanding of how the automotive sector operates in terms of modern trade. In Chapter 4, "What Does Brexit Mean for UK Automotive Industrial Policy?", David Bailey and Lisa De Propris give an expert account that uncovers the complexity beneath this truism.

Bailey and De Propris begin their chapter by reviewing the star performance of the automotive sector within the UK economy in the last decade. They also point out the benefits for the sector from the UK's membership of the EU in the form of the Single European Market (SEM) access, trade deals with the rest of the world, regulatory influence and access to R&D networks and a skilled labour pool. The key question they address is what Brexit will mean for the sector and its impact upon UK industrial policy.

The short term impacts of Brexit have so far centred on the depreciation of sterling against a number of currencies, especially the euro and the US dollar. This may boost exports of automotive assemblers through cheaper overseas prices but only 40 per cent of UK vehicles' components are locally sourced. Since the depreciation of sterling in late June 2016, imported inflation has risen, increasing the price of foreign-sourced parts and energy costs: the latter priced in US dollars. The resultant lower margins vary across UK-based firms depending upon the scale and scope of local sourcing.

Bailey and De Propris then analyse the impact of Brexit on FDI from two perspectives. First, like many other international trading sectors, vehicle production is fragmented within regionally based global production networks. Coordinating the underlying supply chains and conforming to regulations covering the complex of different components will be more costly after Brexit. Second, much of UK inward FDI is a function of access to the SEM benefiting from a larger market and lower trade costs of being part of a customs union. If the terms of trade are redrawn post-Brexit this may have a detrimental effect on FDI inflows, creating further uncertainty for an already vulnerable global economy in which real investment is at an historic low. Uncertainty undermines investment intentions of all firms, especially those at the heart of cross-border trade and FDI.

The key issue in all this as Bailey and De Propris note is that modern trade is based upon the model of global value chains (GVCs). Within this model a large proportion of trade is intra-firm that incorporates inputs from multiple locations across the globe with each stage creating different levels of value added. Consequently, the critical question is what kind of trade relationship will the UK have post-Brexit? They review a number of alternative scenarios all of which are unsatisfactory for the UK automotive sector. In reviewing firm-specific and other impacts, they observe that upping sticks to another EU location would be costly in the short term due to the problems of double running costs, retooling and logistics.

The turning point occurs with the introduction of new models when factors such as relative UK/EU costs and profits, the volume of imported components and what are alternative production locations in the EU can all be considered by assemblers. Given the uncertainty of what the post-Brexit tariff environment will be then there is a potential risk to UK-based production. The much publicized but opaque deal between the UK government and Nissan over the production of two models remaining in the UK adds to this uncertainty as it is unclear whether such conditions will be extended to other producers, and whether the government will (or indeed can, under World Trade Organization rules) underwrite any costs of changing trade conditions. Other impacts equally apply to other UK sectors, including the loss of influence on regulation; a possible smaller pool of skilled labour due to the ending of free movement within the EU; more limited access to research funds for universities and industry; and the possible ending of European Investment Bank funding to promote low carbon technologies.

In their concluding part, Bailey and De Propris cut to the chase with regard to the role of industrial policy. They review the evidence of successive governments as their attempts to create or undermine a coherent industrial strategy have littered the policy environment. The post-Referendum government led by Theresa May has made a welcome change of tone on industrial strategy; something that is likely to be crucial in the transition from EU membership. The degree to which this becomes successful will depend upon creating a sustainable institutional base. As Bailey and De Propris argue, there is a strong case for "UK industrial strategy to be afforded an institutional status similar to both UK monetary and fiscal policies". In doing so a strong signal would be sent to British industry and foreign investors facing the uncertainties of Brexit.


(Continues...)

Excerpted from The Political Economy of Brexit by David Bailey, Leslie Budd. Copyright © 2017 David Bailey and Leslie Budd. Excerpted by permission of Agenda Publishing Limited.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction: The Political Economy of Brexit
David Bailey and Leslie Budd

2. Examining Consequences for Trade: Integration and Disintegration Effects
Edgar Morgenroth, Economic and Social Research Institute

3. Brexit and the Discreet Charm of Haute Finance
Jan Toporowski, SOAS, University of London

4. What Does Brexit Mean for UK Automotive and Industrial Policy?
David Bailey and Lisa De Propris, University of Birmingham

5. Future Regulation of the UK Workforce
Sukhwinder Salh, Birmingham City University, Margarita Nyfoudi, Birmingham City University and Alex De Ruyter, Glasgow Caledonian University

6. The Exit Connection: Europe’s New Polanyian Moment
Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos, The Open University and John Milios, National Technical University of Athens

7. A Scottish Perspective: Charting a Path Through the Rubble
Jim Gallagher, University of Oxford

8. Stalling or Breaking? Northern Ireland's Economy in the Balance
Leslie Budd

9. Brexit and Regional Development in the UK: What Future for Regional Policy after Structural Funds?
John Bachtler, University of Strathclyde

10. What Brexit Means for Europe
Tim Oliver, London School of Economics

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