The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure

The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure

by John H. Maurer
ISBN-10:
0275949982
ISBN-13:
9780275949983
Pub. Date:
10/18/1995
Publisher:
Bloomsbury Academic
ISBN-10:
0275949982
ISBN-13:
9780275949983
Pub. Date:
10/18/1995
Publisher:
Bloomsbury Academic
The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure

The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure

by John H. Maurer

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Overview

This study examines what led the leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany to launch major military offensives at the beginning of the First World War. The focus is on understanding why these two countries adopted high-risk offensive strategies during an international confrontation rather than a defensive military stance. The decision to attack or defend did not occur in a political vacuum. The leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany adopted offensive strategies as a way to achieve their political ambitions. The offensives undertaken by Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914 thus reflected their political goals as well as the strategic doctrines of war planners. The concluding chapter of this study explores why deterrence failed in 1914.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780275949983
Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
Publication date: 10/18/1995
Series: Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought
Pages: 168
Product dimensions: 6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.44(d)

About the Author

JOHN H. MAURER is Associate Professor in the Strategy Department of the U.S. Naval War College where he lectures on naval history and strategy, international history, and strategic studies. He is also the assistant editor of the jourbanal Diplomacy and Statecraft.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
War Planning
The Short War Dogma
Austria-Hungary's War Plans
Prewar Military Collaboration between Austria-Hungary and Germany
The July Crisis
A Terrorist Attack in Sarajevo; Austria-Hungary and Germany Decide for War
Russia's Decision for War
Vienna and Berlin Order General Mobilization
East or West in Germany's Deployment
Britain's Decision for War
Conclusion: Why Deterrence Failed in 1914
Appendix I: Austria-Hungary's Mobilization Calendar
Appendix II: Tabular Overview of the Movement of the "B"-Staffel in 1914
Appendix III: Staabs' Deployment East
Bibliography
Index

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