The Not-So-Special Interests: Interest Groups, Public Representation, and American Governance / Edition 1

by Matt Grossmann

Overview

"Lobbyist" tends to be used as a dirty word in politics. Indeed, during the 2008 presidential primary campaign, Hillary Clinton was derided for even suggesting that some lobbyists represent "real Americans." But although many popular commentators position interest groups as representatives of special—not "public"—interests, much organized advocacy is designed to advance public interests and ideas.

Advocacy organizations—more than 1,600 of them—are now an important component of national political institutions. This book uses original data to explain why certain public groups, such as Jews, lawyers, and gun-owners, develop substantially more representation than others, and why certain organizations become the presumed spokespersons for these groups in government and media. In contrast to established theory and conventional wisdom, this book demonstrates that groups of all sizes and types generate advocates to speak on their behalf, though with varying levels of success. Matt Grossmann finds that the advantages of organized representation accrue to those public groups that are the most politically motivated and involved in their communities. Organizations that mobilize members and create a long-lasting presence in Washington become, in the minds of policymakers and reporters, the taken-for-granted surrogates for these public groups. In the face of perennial debates about the relative power of the people and the special interests, Grossmann offers an informed and nuanced view of the role of organizations in public representation and American governance.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780804781169
Publisher:	Stanford University Press
Publication date:	04/11/2012
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	248
Product dimensions:	5.90(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.60(d)

About the Author

Matt Grossmann is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. He directs the Michigan Policy Network and is a coauthor of Campaigns & Elections: Rules, Reality, Strategy, Choice. More information on The Not-So-Special Interests and his other work can be found online at http://www.mattg.org.

Read an Excerpt

THE NOT-SO-SPECIAL INTERESTS

Interest Groups, Public Representation, and American Governance

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By Matt Grossmann

Stanford University Press

Copyright © 2012 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-8116-9

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Chapter One

Interest Groups That Speak for You and Me

When investigating which groups generate the most representation, the first question is, "Who is represented at all?" What public groups generate organized advocates to speak on their behalf? Scholarship on interest group mobilization originally regarded this as a central question. The founding text of modern interest group research, David Truman's The Governmental Process (1951), was concerned with whether social diversity is reflected in organized representation. For a theory that takes groups as its basic unit of analysis, it is quite important to identify the groups. Current research, however, has rarely revisited this question.

Interest-group researchers no longer use public groups as the starting point for their studies. Instead, according to Allan Cigler (1991, 107), adjustments to the theories of collective action initiated by Mancur Olson dominate interest-group-mobilization research: "By the late 1980s, a loosely integrated body of 'incentive theory' literature had largely supplanted the pluralist model as the subfield's main paradigm to explain group mobilization and development." Because Olson's The Logic of Collective Action (1965) gave scholars less reason to expect public-group mobilization, the focus moved to the way organizations mobilize members and away from which public constituencies generate representation. Meanwhile, however, scholars found that many nonmembership groups represent public interests (Berry 1999). Investigating the dynamics of membership mobilization is not the same as studying public-group representation. Scholars need to ask which public groups generate political spokespersons.

The Concept of Public Constituencies

The assumption that political leaders represent public constituencies is central to American governance. As Robert Salisbury (1992) explains, most political actors see themselves as representatives of societal segments and act in accordance with this social role:

The most important concept in the American political system is constituency. It dominates the behavior of virtually every political actor and institution. Its corollary concept is representation ... [In the American system,] political actors more or less consciously "look to" particular segments of the society as their primary reference points, as having by right first call over them, and see themselves as dependent on constituency approval, in this segmented sense rather than in the more general terms of "the people" or "the public interest," for their political survival. (149)

Legislators and political candidates make decisions by predicting how these public constituencies are likely to respond (Arnold 1992; Bishin 2009). Elizabeth Clemens (1997, 325) traces the development of this perspective on political leadership to the rise of advocacy groups: "In the place of a contest between 'the People' and 'the Interests,' American politics was rearranged as a contest of ever-multiplying 'partial interests' making demands on the state." Like elected officials, advocacy organizations claim to represent public constituencies. Because of the importance of this representative role, they are unlikely to arise and succeed independently of their claimed constituencies.

Political constituencies, in this book's analysis, are subpopulations of the public with a shared characteristic used by an organized leadership as the basis for representation. Constituencies vary along many dimensions, including whether their shared characteristic is an ethnic or religious tie, an occupation, a political viewpoint, or some other social quality. As examples, the NAACP claims to represent African Americans, and the Sierra Club claims to represent environmentalists. Instead of treating these types of constituencies as categorically distinct, both African Americans and environmentalists can be seen as examples of political factions; they serve as political constituencies for organized representatives.

Numerous interest organizations claim to represent social groups or public political perspectives. To capture the way these interest organizations relate to their constituencies, one can use an analogy to V. O. Key's famous tripartite division of the political party. Key (1964) sought to distinguish three of the following interrelated aspects of political parties: the party in the electorate, the party as organization, and the party in government. This theoretical frame still structures the study of political parties and the debate over their potential decline. It has the advantage of relating research on political parties to research agendas in the study of political institutions and mass behavior. It also clarifies the role of party organizations in relationship to other political actors. Interest groups can similarly be thought of as having three components, namely: (1) social, economic, or opinion groups with shared interests or concerns; (2) sectors of organizations that seek to represent those interests before government; and (3) factions within government that seek to advance the same agenda. This book focuses on the first two components, constituencies and the organizations that represent them.

The constituencies of concern here are subgroups within the American public. Scholars normally view "the public" as one unified entity or as disaggregated individuals with distinct interests and ideas. Similarly, the advocacy community is analyzed as individual organizations or one large community. The first step in this analysis is to move toward collective concepts by identifying public groups that correspond to sectors of organizations that claim to represent these groups, such as liberals, teachers, and Latinos. Te second step is to redirect analysis to the group level, describing constituencies based on their aggregate characteristics and linking their group attributes to the success of the organizational sector that represents them. Some overlap occurs among these public groups and among these sectors of advocacy organizations. Nevertheless, the focus of this analysis is the potential for political mobilization associated with each group rather than the individuals belonging to multiple groups or the organizations representing multiple constituencies.

Identifying Organizations and Their Constituencies

The primary problem associated with assessing public group representation has been the lack of a population list of all potential political constituencies. This analysis circumvents the problem by looking first at the claims made by advocacy organizations for public representation. Without a complete population list of all potential political constituencies, one cannot analyze the factors that influence whether groups mobilize at all but can describe the breadth of representation.

The subpopulation of interest groups called "advocacy organizations" is the starting point. Many interest organizations act primarily as constituency representatives, behaving in a manner suggested by this function. Advocacy organizations are the subset of interest organizations that are intermediaries between public constituencies and government institutions. Te constituencies may be social or occupational groups or groups with shared ideologies or issue perspectives. In their review of the division between research on interest representation in political science and sociology, Kenneth Andrews and Bob Edwards (2004) suggest the term "advocacy organizations" to include all organizations that "make public interest claims either promoting or resisting social change that, if implemented, would conflict with the social, cultural, political, or economic interests or values of other constituencies or groups" (481). This definition would include all of the organizations in this study's population.

Rather than assuming that mass membership mobilization is the process by which these constituencies become represented by interest organizations, this study outlines the distribution of organized representation among public constituencies and the structure of the organizations that seek to represent different groups. Because advocacy organizations seek to represent categories of people or public ideas, this study relies on claims of representation to link organizations with constituencies rather than membership affiliation. Dara Strolovitch (2007) also locates public-group advocates by relying on their claims of representation, even though she argues that group leaders do not satisfactorily represent all of their claimed constituents.

This study compiles information about all organizations with a presence in Washington aspiring to represent a section of the public broader than their own institution and staff. Te names, reference-text descriptions, and websites of the organizations in the population indicate that they seek to represent American public constituencies in national politics. This analysis combines the study of the organized representation of ethnic, religious, demographic, and occupational groups with the study of the organized representation of particular political perspectives (including both ideological and single-issue groups). Te advocacy-organization population includes each of the organizations that Jeffrey Berry (1999) identifies as "citizen action groups," including those that others call "public interest groups" or "social movement organizations." This population is more expansive than the one used in the vast majority of interest-group analyses. Of the major lobbyists identified in the most comprehensive recent study of lobbying (Baumgartner et al. 2009), the population here includes 56 percent of the participants, including those commonly classified as citizen groups, professional associations, issue coalitions, unions, and think tanks.

Not all interest organizations fall into this population of public advocates. Individual business policy offices, trade associations of companies, and governmental units are not included in this study. The population analyzed here thus excludes organizations of concern to other scholars, including most of those commonly considered "institutions." Salisbury (1984) argues that institutions are subject to different constraints in their mobilization and are unlikely to interact with policymakers as representatives of public constituencies. Even policy offices of nonprofit corporations like universities and hospitals operate like business policy offices; they primarily represent the interests of the institution, which has a nonpolitical primary orientation. As a result, this study does not use tax status to draw a line between for-profit and nonprofit organizations; many groups with the same tax status, such as a 501(c)3 designation, have very different purposes. This study's population includes organizations that primarily represent public constituencies independent of the institution itself. Some organizations that Salisbury classifies as institutions, however, do claim to represent a particular social group or public issue perspective in national politics, especially church groups and ideological "think tanks," which are included in the analysis. Using the same distinction, based on organizational purposes rather than tax status, Strolovitch (2007) also combines the study of membership groups with the study of some non-membership advocacy organizations that Salisbury labels institutions.

In terms of the population of all interest organizations in Washington, the most important omissions from this analysis are individual business policy offices and business associations. Business policy offices and trade associations, according to David Hart (2004), mobilize and achieve influence through economic processes different from those used by organizations seeking to represent public groups or political perspectives. Hart recommends that scholars of business political activity use theories of the firm devised in economics, rather than theories created in interest-group studies. Corporations are excluded from this analysis because their mobilization process is driven by different factors than those analyzed here, not because they lack influence. Excluding businesses and their associations from the analysis means that this study cannot offer a complete picture of the interest-group universe.

Some scholars also separate professional associations and unions from advocacy organizations. Berry (1999), for example, analyzes "citizens' groups" independently of any group with an economic base for its political activities. The population of advocacy groups in this study is more expansive, including unions and professional associations because they seek to represent broad occupational categories rather than specific institutions. For example, many professional associations, such as the AMA, claim to speak on behalf of physicians as a whole, rather than only those who join the group. Others, such as the National Medical Association (a group of African American doctors), represent ethnic and occupational subpopulations.

It is sometimes hard to draw the line between advocacy organizations and other interest groups, especially the line between occupational representatives and business associations. For example, the corn growers' association claims to represent all corn farmers, but the dry cleaners' association claims to be a business trade association, even though both represent primarily small business owners and gain disproportionate support from large members. There is some difference in their mobilization histories and public images, but it may not be of great importance. This study is generally inclusive in defining the borders of the advocacy community, even including representatives of entrepreneurs as a whole rather than industries. Nevertheless, it excludes interest groups that are associations of businesses because they do not mobilize via constituencies of individual citizens and do not gain legitimacy as a representative of a public group. Whereas this distinction is less clear in marginal cases like that of corn growers and dry cleaners, it likely makes a difference in comparing associations of nurses and pharmaceutical companies or associations of professors and universities.

Methodologically, the lines drawn here raise two important considerations. First, the results of this study's findings cannot be generalized to all interest groups, only to those that claim to represent public groups or issue perspectives. Care must be taken in comparing this study's conclusions with those of research on all interest groups or on different subsets of the group universe. Second, the wide borders of the advocacy community defined here necessitate regular checks to ascertain whether subsets of the community have distinct characteristics that affect their mobilization or success. Notwithstanding these concerns, definitional decisions should be evaluated based on their usefulness rather than appeals to intrinsic meaning. Readers who prefer some other boundaries for defining the advocacy community are free to take note of divisions within the community as outlined here and to assume that organizations that are not included might operate differently. Alternate definitions or boundaries, however, would not invalidate any conclusions for the community of organizations studied here.

(Continues...)

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Excerpted from THE NOT-SO-SPECIAL INTERESTS by Matt Grossmann Copyright © 2012 by Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University . Excerpted by permission of Stanford University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Table of Contents

Contents

Acknowedgments....................ix
Introduction: Public Factions and Organized Interests....................1
1 Interest Groups That Speak for You and Me....................21
2 One Person, One Lobbyist?....................40
3 The Skew and Diversity of Organized Advocacy....................76
4 Institutionalized Pluralism....................99
5 The Supply Side of Media Bias....................125
6 The Usual Suspects in National Policymaking....................144
Conclusion: Listening to Everyone....................169
Appendix: Data Sources and Methods....................187
Notes....................205
References....................213
Index....................223

Editorial Reviews

Tea Partyers and Occupiers alike think of “special interests” as shadowy cabals that subvert the people’s will, but this stimulating academic study finds them a faithful mirror of the body politic. Michigan State University political scientist Grossman (coauthor of Campaigns & Elections: Rules, Reality, Strategy, Choice) compiles data on thousands of advocacy organizations—from the NRA to the AARP—to explain why some groups, like gun owners and seniors, develop effective representation in Washington while others do not. He advances a rich theory of “Behavioral Pluralism” based on “civic and political capacity”: constituencies that are more engaged with public affairs and their communities, he contends, make their voices heard better through organized representation. His companion theory of “Institutionalized Pluralism” argues that some advocacy groups grow more prominent than others, not because of PAC funding or media bias, but because of longevity, expert staffs, well-shaped sound bites, and legislative proposals. Though this lucid but bone-dry treatment wallows in statistics, the numbers generate an illuminating discussion of the centrality of factions in representative government. Grossman’s clear-eyed analysis of who gets a seat at the table suggests that democracy’s faults lie not in our lobbyists but in ourselves. (May)

Publishers Weekly

"The Not-So-Special Interests is an elegant and well-grounded study."—Edward Ashbee, Journal of American Studies

"This book is one of the more-impressive theoretically constructed and empirically executed studies of the aggregation and mobilization of interests available. It is conscientiously grounded in the available research, and the database, most of it self-generated, provides comprehensiveness in relation to the universe studied, public advocacy groups in Washington, DC. This allows for an intensity of analysis that results in an original, well-executed, and significant contribution to our understanding."—William Crotty, Political Science Quarterly

"The Not-So-Special Interests provides a refreshingly clear-eyed assessment of the landscape of interest group politics in Washington. . .Cutting through the folklore about interest groups is no small task, but The Not-So-Special Interests blazes and impressive trail. It dispassionately devises sensible theories. It mingles real-world insights with heaps of illuminating quantitative data, most of which the author created from scratch using techniques that combin methodological rigor and common sense. The end result is a book that has important implications for the study of interest groups and for other questions in the field."—Nicholas Carnes, American Review of Politics

"In The Not-So-Special Interests, Matt Grossmann's focus is resolutely on the bigger picture of organized interests in Washington, D.C., and is rigorously empirical . . . This is an extremely useful book, one that will spur debate, discussion, and certainly subsequent research."—David S. Meyer, American Journal of Sociology

"Grossmann's contributions of behavioral pluralism and individual pluralism should become staples for those seeking to understand organized interest behavior and influence . . . Recommended."—R. M. Alexander, CHOICE

From the Publisher

"Grossmann's work is a major contribution—breathtaking in its scope and innovative in its theories of American pluralism at the dawn of the twenty first century. The book should be read by everyone concerned about whose voices really count in Washington."

Duke University - Kristin A. Goss

"The Not-So-Special Interests is an elegant and well-grounded study."

Journal of American Studies - Edward Ashbee

"Offering an insightful explanation of why some interests are better represented than others, Matt Grossmann's The Not-So-Special Interests is destined to become one of the most important books on interest groups in this decade. His impressive collection and analysis of original data supports a conceptual framework rooted in the tradition of Truman but thoroughly modernized to engage contemporary questions. Not only does the book make a powerful argument, it's a pleasure to read as well."

Marquette University - McGee Young

"Grossmann's contributions of behavioral pluralism and individual pluralism should become staples for those seeking to understand organized interest behavior and influence . . . Recommended."

CHOICE - R. M. Alexander

"In The Not-So-Special Interests, Matthew Grossmann sheds new light on one of the central questions in democratic theory and politics—who is represented? Skillfully combining information about the political attitudes and behavior of a wide range of social groups with original data about the organizations that claim to speak for them in Washington, he explains why some advocacy organizations succeed while others fail. His analyses offer new and often surprising insights about the sources and consequences of cumulative inequalities produced by interest group mobilization, power, and access."

Associate Professor, University of Minnesota and author of Affirmative Advocacy: Race, Class, and Gender in Interest - Dara Z. Strolovitch

"With new ideas, new perspectives, and new data, Matt Grossmann revisits an old idea. He offers a fresh view of how major societal interests promote their ideas, seek policy advantage, and fit within the overall mosaic of American political life. Drawing upon an impressive new dataset of 1,600 advocacy organizations, Grossmann lays out how pluralism can and does become institutionalized across many venues. The Not-So-Special Interests presents an important addition to how we understand the politics of faction in the United States."

University of Kansas - Burdett Loomis

"This book is one of the more-impressive theoretically constructed and empirically executed studies of the aggregation and mobilization of interests available. It is conscientiously grounded in the available research, and the database, most of it self-generated, provides comprehensiveness in relation to the universe studied, public advocacy groups in Washington, DC. This allows for an intensity of analysis that results in an original, well-executed, and significant contribution to our understanding."

Political Science Quarterly - William Crotty

"In The Not-So-Special Interests, Matt Grossmann's focus is resolutely on the bigger picture of organized interests in Washington, D.C., and is rigorously empirical . . . This is an extremely useful book, one that will spur debate, discussion, and certainly subsequent research."

American Journal of Sociology - David S. Meyer