WE are in the habit of thinking of ourselves as a young nation, yet in comparison with almost all other constitutions in force in the world today ours is hoary with age. In seniority it yields to that "subtle organism which has proceeded from the womb and the long gestation of progressive history" known as the English constitution, though, as Walter Bagehot pointed out, the efficient parts of that constitution, as distinguished from its dignified parts, are comparatively modern. To Mr. MacDonald the antiquity of our Constitution is ground for questioning its suitability for present-day conditions, not for perpetuating it; the burden of proof, he evidently believes, is on those who would preserve it unaltered. He asks, in effect, not why should we change our form of government, but why should we not do so. That is to say, he writes as a radical critic of the Constitution. In reporting this fact one must hasten to add that he frequently pays his respects to legalism, he would not disregard any moral obligation embodied in the Constitution, and the means which he would employ for effecting his reforms are less revolutionary in form than was the adoption of the Constitution itself; indeed he is at pains to show that they are not revolutionary at all.
The principal constitutional change advocated by Mr. MacDonald is the introduction of the parliamentary system of responsible government, to the lack of which he attributes most of our political ills. Ever since Bagehot's day writers on government have been comparing the presidential system with the cabinet system, generally to the disadvantage of the former, but it cannot be said that their opinions have made much impression on the American public. A great deal of fault has been found, it is true, with the working of our Constitution, but the blame has been laid on the politicians rather than on the Constitution. Mr. MacDonald insists that the evils from which we suffer are inherent in the Constitution itself and cannot be remedied without fundamental revision of the document. Thus he dismisses as futile the proposal that has been made several times during the last forty years to give the members of the President's Cabinet seats in Congress; it would not in his opinion be even a first step in introducing responsible government. What he proposes is to vest control of executive and legislative policy in a premier and cabinet sitting in Congress and holding office at its pleasure. He is not unaware that the parliamentary system is the object of much adverse criticism in countries where it exists, but he holds that most of this criticism is unwarranted. His defense of cabinet government may seem radical to some Americans, but it would seem very conservative in England; it would surely not silence the critics who are proclaiming in season and out of season that the parliamentary system has broken down.
The author would not be content with the introduction of responsible government and such other changes as are involved in its establishment. He would give to Congress a number of additional powers, among them the power to acquire or control any industry or national resource. He would subject senators and representatives to popular recall on the ground that majority rule is tyrannical and an incitement to revolution unless the people have direct and continuous control of their representatives....
—The Nation, Volume 114 [1922]
