The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan

by David Kilcullen, Greg Mills, Rory Stewart (Foreword by)

Overview

'These things happened. They were glorious and they changed the world,' said Charlie Wilson, of America's role backing the anti-Soviet mujahideen. 'And then we fucked up the endgame.' With no support for Afghanistan after that war, the vacuum was filled by the Taliban and bin Laden. The Ledger assesses the West's similarly failed approach to Afghanistan after 9/11-in military, diplomatic, political and developmental terms.

Dr David Kilcullen and Dr Greg Mills are uniquely placed to reflect backwards and forwards on the Afghan conflict: they worked with the international mission both as advisers and within the Arg, and they have considerable experience of counterinsurgency and stabilization operations elsewhere in the world. Here these two experts show that there is plenty of blame to go around when explaining the failure to bring peace to Afghanistan after 9/11.

The signs of collapse were conveniently ignored, in favor of political narratives of progress and success. Yet for Afghans, the war and its geopolitical effects are not over because NATO is gone-Afghanistan remains globally connected through digital communications and networks. This vital book explains why and where failings in Afghanistan happened, warning against exceptionalist approaches to future peacebuilding missions around the globe.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781787386952
Publisher:	Hurst
Publication date:	01/15/2022
Pages:	368
Sales rank:	320,470
Product dimensions:	5.00(w) x 7.40(h) x 1.30(d)

About the Author

David Kilcullen is a bestselling author, a leading researcher in the field of unconventional and guerrilla warfare, and a former professional soldier and diplomat. He is President and CEO of Cordillera Applications Group, a research and development firm in Colorado. A senior counterinsurgency adviser during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, his books The Dragons and the Snakes; The Accidental Guerrilla; Out of the Mountains; and Blood Year are all published by Oxford University Press. Greg Mills is director of the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation. He has advised many African governments and also served in Afghanistan with COMISAF (Commander International Security Assistance Force). His books include Making Africa Work and Why States Recover, both available from Oxford University Press.

Table of Contents

Foreword Rory Stewart xi

Preface and Acknowledgements xix

About the Authors xxiii

Introduction: The New Sympathisers 1

1 An Evolving Campaign 49

Confusion, Compression and Echoes of the Past 72

A Question of Politics 80

2 Echoes of Campaigns Past 85

Déjà vu All Over Again? 92

Trying Everything 99

Similarities 103

Differences 105

Five Common Lessons 109

3 Assessing Four Failures 123

The Failure of Politics 124

The Failure of Policy on Pakistan 134

The Corruption of Recovery 151

The Failure of Economic Development 166

4 Endgame 193

Slow Disintegration after 2015 196

The Selection-Destruction Cycle 202

The Collapse of2021 209

Why the Afghan Military Collapsed 216

Why the Civil Government Collapsed 222

What Could Have Been Done Differently? 225

5 The Ball Keeps Bouncing 235

Assessing the Wider Cost and Implications 243

From Afghanistan to Africa? 248

Reinforcing Success, Rewarding Failure? 255

Changing Outside Strategy 259

All Peace Missions are Local? 265

Conclusion: The Ledger-Lessons from Failure in Afghanistan 275

All for Nothing? 304

Notes 313

Index 331

Editorial Reviews

"In accounting for success and failure in Afghanistan, The Ledger provides crystal-clear do's and don't's for future, similar missions."— General Richard B. Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; President, Kansas State University

"This explanation of the failure of the international mission and fall of Kabul contains salient lessons for us all, now and in the future."— General Mohammad Yasin Zia, former Chief of the General Staff, Afghanistan

"The Ledger explains the reasons for yesterday's failure in Afghanistan. It also clarifies the imperative for tomorrow's international engagement." — Commander Ahmad Massoud

"Based on years of courageous fieldwork, The Ledger's careful analysis is a timely reminder of what happens when internal and external state-building efforts are misaligned."— Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Nobel Peace Laureate, former President of Liberia

"What went wrong and what went right in Afghanistan? This brilliant analysis by two people who were there has many of the answers."— General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the Defence Staff, United Kingdom

"Clear-minded, and closely involved for many years in the West's Afghan project, the authors of this passionate and important book are determined that we do not repeat elsewhere the shameful way it ended."— Sir Rodric Braithwaite, author of Afgantsy

"The Ledger makes vividly clear the do's and don't's of foreign intervention — key lessons applicable beyond Afghanistan."— General Sergio Mantilla, former Chief of the Colombian Army

"Based on the authors' extensive first-hand experience in Afghanistan and peace missions elsewhere, The Ledger goes to the heart of why the Afghan mission failed and what we must do to avoid future, similar disasters. Read it, and learn."— Karin von Hippel, Director-General, Royal United Services Institute

"The authors had their boots on the ground and it shows in this searing account of what went wrong in Afghanistan."— Ambassador Juan-Carlos Pinzon, former Minister of Defence, Colombia

"An analytical tour de force."— Ambassador Barry Desker, Distinguished Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

"With immense elegance, empathy, respect for Afghans, and deep understanding of the local terrain and context, Kilcullen and Mills explain something otherwise very difficult to understand: how a comparatively small Taliban force was able to achieve such a stunning and rapid victory over a large, conventional army."— Rory Stewart, former UK Secretary of State for International Development

"Few have enjoyed the access and experience of Kilcullen and Mills in Afghanistan this century, evident in the richness of their critique of Western attempts to, first, stabilise the country and, later, rebuild it. The Ledger brings to life the dilemmas and bitter lessons of the policy-maker, diplomat and military professional alike, and lays out a workable strategy for building peace."— Swaran Singh, Professor for Diplomacy and Disarmament, Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University

"[The Ledger] is a clear-eyed analysis made with the surgical precision of two insiders who saw, firsthand, the legion of small ways that the war was lost when it could have been won."— The Sunday Times

"A failure to understand the ties that bind Afghanistan and its people underpins the west's 20-year struggle there, a history whose first draft is masterfully captured in The Ledger."— Financial Times

"Probably the best insider account yet on why the mission failed, written by two of the coalition's most experienced advisers. . . . A well-written and timely inquest into the West's Afghanistan fiasco."—The Telegraph

"The Ledger is not a book of dread and sensationalism. It is a cool and forensic dissection of what a disaster the search for Al-Qaeda following the attack on their Afghan hosts, the Taliban, was to become. . . More than a mere polemic, this is a fine book."— The Scotsman

"[Written] by authors with deep knowledge and great expertise in their subjects, The Ledger [is] very useful in understanding how we got where we are."—The Independent

"Important and brilliant."—Business Day

"The Ledger is authoritative and relevant for senior members of the defense community in the United States and worldwide. It is one of the first attempts to explain America's longest war... Hopefully, this book and others that follow will serve as a cautionary tale for future policymakers." — Parameters

From the Publisher