Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
FROM MUKDEN TO PEARL HARBOUR
The object of this introductory chapter is to trace briefly the struggle for political power in Japan during the ten years immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbour, to outline the development of Japanese foreign policy, describe the preparations made for an aggressive war and the roles which some of Japan's 'major war criminals' played in these events.
During those fateful years, step by step, the Army gained the ascendancy. Though it met with temporary setbacks from time to time, it was able eventually to ride roughshod over both Cabinet and Diet while even the Emperor's advisers could not restrain the military faction.
It is ironical that two admirable principles of Japanese conduct dating, according to Japanese historians, from the time of the foundation of the Empire of Japan over 2600 years ago, should have been responsible for the militaristic expansionist policy of Japan in the twentieth century, but so it would appear. These are the principles of 'Hakko Ichiu' and 'Kodo'. The former meant simply, making the world one big family. The second meant that the first could be obtained solely through loyalty to the Emperor.
These two estimable concepts, harmless in themselves, have been exploited and misused, again and again, in recent times by those who most urged, in Japan, a policy of territorial expansion. Those who made military aggression the national policy of Japan turned it into a moral issue by invoking the names of Hakko Ichiu and Kodo.
Hakko Ichiu was the moral goal, and loyalty to the Emperor was the road which led to it.
Dr Okawa, who was one of the major war criminals originally brought before the Tokyo Tribunal, but was later declared unfit to stand his trial because of insanity, published a book in 1924 on the very same subject. His argument was that as Japan had been the first State in existence it was her Divine Mission to rule the world, and during the years immediately following the publication of this book he frequently lectured to students at Japanese Military and Staff Colleges on the importance of having a nationalist spirit with a capital 'N'.
The Sino-Japanese War of 1931 — 45 cannot be understood without some knowledge of the events which occurred in Japan prior to its outbreak culminating in the infamous 'Mukden Incident'.
By certain treaties and other agreements Japan had assumed an important and unusual position in Manchuria.
She governed the Leased Territory with practically full rights of sovereignty. Through the South Manchurian Railway she administered the railway areas including several towns and large sections of such populous cities as Mukden and Changchun; and in these areas she controlled the police, taxation, education and public utilities. She maintained armed forces in many parts of the country; the Kwantung Army in the Leased Territory, Railway Guards in the railway areas and Consular Police throughout the various districts.
This very brief summary of the long list of Japan's rights in Manchuria shows clearly the exceptional character of the political, economic and legal relations created between her and China in Manchuria.
There is probably nowhere in the world an exact parallel to this situation, no example of a country enjoying in the territory of a neighbouring State such extensive administrative privileges. A situation of this kind could conceivably be maintained, without leading to incessant complications and disputes, if it were freely desired or accepted by both sides, and if it were the sign and embodiment of a well considered policy of close collaboration in the economic and political spheres. But, in the absence of such conditions, it could only lead to friction and conflict.
There was, however, no such freely desired acceptance on both sides and Japan, no longer satisfied with the extensive rights which she already possessed, sought an enlargement of them which could only be acquired by military conquest.
This became known as the 'Positive Policy' towards China, and a number of political Societies, like the Black Dragon, and political writers like Dr Okawa, worked unceasingly for Japanese expansion. In his writings, Okawa maintained that the sole existence of the League of Nations was to 'preserve the status quo and further the domination of the world by the Anglo-Saxons ... a war between East and West was inevitable. ... Japan would strive to fulfil her predestined role of champion of Asia'.
The 'Positive Policy', nevertheless, had its ups and downs, and when the Cabinet of Prime Minister Tanaka fell in 1929 the new Government resumed the 'Friendship Policy' which the new Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara, always a thorn in the side of the military faction, had consistently favoured. This was based on goodwill and friendship in all dealings with China.
It was at this juncture that the Army and its political supporters decided to consolidate their position. Lieutenant-Colonel Hashimoto, who had recently returned from a three-year tour of duty as military attaché in Istanbul, had definite ideas on 'how to reform Japan'.
He called a meeting at the Tokyo Army Club of newly graduated officers from the Staff College and with them founded the 'Sakura-Kai', or Cherry Society, whose aim was to bring about national reorganization, by armed force if necessary, in order amongst other things to effect a settlement of the 'Manchurian problem'.
Manchuria, the members of the Society maintained, was Japan's life-line. It should be under absolute Japanese control and become a land founded on the 'Kingly Way'.
This 'Kingly Way' was the concept of Kodo and was thus described by Hashimoto in one of his books:
It is necessary to have politics, economics, culture, national defence and everything else, all focused on one being, the Emperor, and the whole force of the nation concentrated and displayed from a single point ... reorganized according to the principle of oneness in the Imperial Way. This system is the strongest and the grandest of all ... there is no nation that can compare with our national blood solidarity which makes possible a unification like ours with the Emperor in the centre.
After Manchuria had been set up in its 'Kingly Way' Japan could then assume leadership of the Asian peoples.
Two months after the formation of the Cherry Society the Japanese Prime Minister, Hamaguchi, was assassinated, though it took him nine months to succumb from his wounds, but this did not further the designs of Hashimoto and his friends as Foreign Secretary Shidehara became Prime Minister in Hamaguchi's place, and Shidehara had been a long standing opponent of the policy of warlike aggression.
But more trouble was not far off. A plot hatched by Okawa and Hashimoto to bring about the fall of the Government and the creation of a military Cabinet under martial law, only failed because Ugaki, the War Minister, who had been selected by the conspirators as the new Prime Minister, would have nothing to do with the projected coup d'état. Consequently, the 'March Incident', as it was called, came to naught, but the struggle between the Government and the Army was not to end there.
Nevertheless, the incident hastened the Government's fall; and another took its place under a new Prime Minister, Wakatsuki, but as Shidehara remained in the post of Foreign Secretary the military faction could make little headway.
The new Cabinet pursued a policy of retrenchment while Okawa and Hashimoto continued to whip up resistance to it, and to advocate the occupation of Manchuria by force. The Black Dragon Society held mass meetings, there was a crescendo of propaganda, and it was then that the idea of the 'Mukden Incident' was conceived.
Meanwhile, a conference between Shigemitzu and the Finance Minister of the Republic of China had been arranged to open in Mukden on 20th September 1931 in an attempt to settle 'all outstanding differences between Japan and Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang'. But it was destined never to assemble for on the night of 18th September the 'Mukden Incident' took place.
At about 9 p.m. a Chinese officer named Lin, belonging to the 7th Chinese Brigade and stationed in Mukden Barracks, reported to his superiors that a train consisting of four coaches, but drawn by an unusual looking engine, had stopped on the railway line opposite the barracks. At precisely 10 p.m. a loud explosion was heard, followed by rifle fire. According to the Japanese version, which was proved later to be wholly untrue, a patrol was engaged on night operations on the railway track when an explosion occurred about two hundred yards behind them. On investigating, the patrol leader found that a portion of the track had been blown away. The patrol was then fired upon simultaneously from both flanks.
About 11.30 p.m. that same night, after receiving considerable reinforcements, the Japanese attacked the barracks, which were in complete quiet and blazing with electric light, employing artillery in the assault as well as machine-gun and rifle fire. Most of the Chinese soldiers got away but the Japanese claimed casualties of 320 Chinese killed and twenty captured and wounded. At the same time another Japanese regiment attacked the walled city of Mukden, where no resistance was offered and the only casualties incurred were in a brush with the police of whom about seventy-five were killed.
At 7.30 a.m. on the following morning (19th September) the arsenal and aerodrome were captured. In this assault use was made of heavy guns which the senior staff officer at Mukden, Colonel Itagaki, later admitted had been secretly installed in the Japanese infantry compound a week before the 'Incident'.
Meanwhile, the Japanese Consul-General had been informed by telephone that an explosion had taken place on the South Manchurian Railway and that the presence of a member of the Consular Staff was required immediately at Special Service Headquarters. Arriving there, the representative, named Morishima, found Colonel Itagaki and Major Hanaya already present. Itagaki told Morishima that the Chinese had blown up the permanent way and that orders had been issued that appropriate military action should be taken. Morishima pressed for calm thinking and moderation. He was sure that the whole affair could be amicably settled.
Was the Consul-General, the colonel asked, questioning the right of the military commander to take what action he thought fit? Morishima said 'No', but remained obdurate; he was certain that the matter could be satisfactorily adjusted through the normal diplomatic channels.
At this point in the conference Major Hanaya, who had hitherto taken no part in the conversation, could contain himself no longer. Drawing his sword, the gallant major made a threatening pass at this tiresome civilian, who was doing his best to upset the whole applecart, and shouted that he would kill anyone who tried to interfere. The conference then ended.
During the night ceaseless attempts were made by Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang's headquarters to get the Japanese Consul-General to persuade the Army to call off their attacks, but with no avail.
As no impression could be made on Colonel Itagaki, the Consul-General himself, on the morning of 19th September, cabled the Japanese Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara, in the following terms:
In view of the fact that it was proposed several times from the Chinese side that this matter be settled in a peaceful way I phoned staff officer Itagaki and said that since Japan and China had not yet formally entered into a state of war and, moreover, as China had declared that she would act absolutely upon the principle of non-resistance, it was necessary for us at this time to endeavour to prevent the aggravation of the 'incident' unnecessarily and I urged that the matter be handled through diplomatic channels, but the above mentioned staff officer replied that since the matter concerned the prestige of the State and the Army it was the Army's intention to see it through thoroughly.
The Government, however, took no action.
There is overwhelming evidence that the Mukden Incident was carefully planned by officers of the Army General Staff, officers of the Kwantung Army, members of the Cherry Society and others, with the object of affording a pretext for the occupation of Manchuria by that Army, and the setting up of a new State as a satellite of Japan. Although designed on a grander scale, it was similar to 'Operation Himmler' which was carried out by the SS nine years later at the radio station of Gleiwitz on the German-Polish frontier. The object of that exercise was to make it appear that a raid had been made on the station by the Poles. Several of those who were tried by the Tokyo Tribunal as major war criminals were implicated, and many of them have since admitted participation. Their defence was that the Japanese operations were in the nature of a reprisal, that the Chinese Army in superior force had made a surprise attack on the Japanese troops at Mukden, and that the latter had then counter-attacked, routed the Chinese and captured the city.
In fact, the Japanese troops were never attacked on that night. The Chinese were taken completely by surprise. When their barracks were attacked the Chinese were all inside, unarmed, and the building was brilliantly lit up by electricity. There was virtually no resistance.
There is also ample evidence that the existence of this plot was quite well known in Japan, and known to the Japanese Consul-General in Mukden as early as 8th September. This well meaning official had received information that within a week 'a big incident would break out and that units of the Kwantung Army from Fushan would move to Mukden on the night of 18th September and carry out night exercises'.
Putting two and two together, the Consul-General got in touch with the Japanese War Minister Minami who agreed to send a general, named Tatekawa, to Manchuria in order to 'stop the plot'. As General Tatekawa was himself one of the chief conspirators it was unlikely that he would take any effective action to circumvent his own plans. He arrived in Mukden at 1 p.m. on D day. He was met, in the absence on duty of the Army Commander General Honjo, by Colonel Itagaki and was taken straight to the Shinyokan Inn where they dined together. The general said that he was very tired after his trip, and declined to talk 'shop'.
After dinner Itagaki departed, and left the general behind, promising to call for him in the morning. According to his own story General Tatekawa had no intention whatsoever of calling off the plans which were to be put into operation that night, and had allowed himself to be decoyed to the inn. 'There,' he said later, 'I was entertained by Geisha girls while listening to the sound of firing in the distance. I retired later and slept soundly until called in the morning.'
So much for the 'Mukden Incident' which very shortly became the 'Manchurian Incident'.
The Army Commander returned to Mukden on 19th September and declared his intention of waging a 'punitive war'. Three days later China lodged a protest with the League of Nations, but on the Council receiving an assurance from the Japanese representative that all Japanese troops were in the course of being withdrawn to the 'railway zone' it adjourned for three weeks.
The assurance thus given by the Japanese Government was not at all popular with the Army, and the extremists began plotting again to overthrow the party system of government by a military coup d'état, and set up a new Government which would pursue a militarist policy.
The conspiracy, which later became known as the 'October Incident', was planned by Hashimoto and his fellow members of the Cherry Society. Unknown to themselves, however, they harboured among them a traitor who informed the police, and the War Minister had the leaders arrested.
The plot, therefore, came to nothing, but military operations continued in Manchuria in defiance of Cabinet policy and in less than two months the Prime Minister, realizing that his Cabinet had no hold over the Army, resigned. He and his Cabinet had tried hard to limit, if not to suppress, the 'Manchurian Incident' but they found that they were no match for the Army.
As the Tokyo Tribunal stated in its judgment, 'the Army had achieved its goal of a war of conquest in Manchuria and had shown itself more powerful than the Japanese Cabinet.' The next Government, with Inukai at its head, fared no better. The new Prime Minister even opened up negotiations with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek but they had to be abandoned when their existence came to the knowledge of Mori, the leader of a powerful pro-military faction within the Prime Minister's own political party.
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "Knights of Bushido"
by .
Copyright © 2008 Skyhorse Publishing, Inc..
Excerpted by permission of Skyhorse Publishing.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
