Table of Contents
PART 1: Perspectives on Grossman and Hart 1986 (1) Introductory Remarks on Grossman and Hart, JPE, 1986 John Moore (University of Edinburgh) (2) Grossman-Hart (1986) as a Theory of Markets Bengt Holmstr?m (MIT) (3) Remarks on Incomplete Contracting Jean Tirole (Toulouse School of Economics) (4) Property Rights and Transaction Cost Theories Steven Tadelis (University of California-Berkeley and eBay Research Labs) (5) Grossman and Hart (1986) and Applied Theory Thomas Hubbard (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) PART 2: Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries (6) Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions Wouter Dessein (Columbia University) (7) Discussion of Wouter Dessein's ?Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions? Francine Lafontaine (University of Michigan) (8) Comment on ?Incomplete contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions? by Wouter Dessein Michael D. Whinston (MIT) PART 3: Incomplete Contracts and Internal Organization (9) Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms Phillipe Aghion (Harvard University), Nicholas Bloom (Stanford University), John Van Reenen (London School of Economics) (10) Comments on Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen ?Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms,? P. John Roberts (Stanford University) (11) The Empirical Implications of the Grossman-Hart Model: Comments on ?Incomplete Contracts an the Internal Organization of Firms,? by P. Aghion, N. Bloom and J. Van Reenen W. Bentley McLeod (Columbia University) PART 4: Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Finance (12) Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control Patrick Bolton (Columbia University) (13) Discussion of Patrick Bolton's ?Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control? Efraim Benmelech (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) (14) Why Incomplete Contract is Important for Finance Luigi Zingales (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business) PART 5: Incomplete Contracts and Business Firms (15) Oliver Hart's Contributions to the Understanding of Strategic Alliances and Technology Licensing Josh Lerner (Harvard University) (16) Incomplete Contracts and Venture Capital Steve Kaplan (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business) (17) Incomplete Contracts and the Role of Small Firms Jeremy C. Stein (Harvard University) PART 6: Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization (18) Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future Patrick Legros (Universit? libre de Bruxelles) and Andrew F. Newman (Boston University) (19) Discussion of ?Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future?, by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman Mathias Dewatripont (Universit? libre de Bruxelles and National Bank of Belgium) (20) Discussion of ?Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future?, by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman Kai-Uwe K?hn (University of Michigan) PART 7: Incomplete Contracts and International Trade (21) Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production Pol Antr's (Harvard University) (22) Comment on Pol Antr?s: ?Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production? Elhanan Helpman (Harvard University) (23) The Theory of the Firm Goes Global Dalia Marin (University of Munich) PART 8: Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership (24) Incomplete Contracts and Not for Profit Firms Paul Grout (University of Bristol) (25) Firm Ownership: The Legacy of Grossman and Hart Henry Hansmann (Yale Law School) (26) Ex-Ante Anonymity and Government Allocation of Property Rights Rohan Pitchford (Australian National University) PART 9: Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy (27) International Treaties as Incomplete Contracts B?rd Harstad (University of Oslo) (28) Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy Gerard Roland (University of Berkeley) (29) Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Constitutions Guido Tabellini (Bocconi University) PART 10: Incomplete Contracts, Mechanism Design and Complexity (30) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts Eric Maskin (Harvard University) (31) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts John Moore (University of Edinburgh) (32) Incomplete Contracts and Mechanism Design Richard Holden (University of New South Wales) (33) Complexity and Undescribability Nabil I. Al-Najjar (Nothwestern University), Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), and Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics) PART 11: Incomplete Contracts, Reference Points and Communication (34) New Directions of Incomplete Contracts: Reference Points, Communication, and Renegotiation Christian Zehnder (University of Lausanne) (35) Some Recent Experimental Evidence on Contracts as Reference Points Klaus Schmidt (University of Munich) (36) Incomplete Contracting in the Field Antoinette Schoar (Harvard University)
