The New York Times Book Review - Gary J. Bass
In The Future of War, Lawrence Freedman offers a field manual to how past generations of Americans and Britons envisioned their conflicts to come. Again and again, they were blindsided by the conflagrations that upended their societies and wrecked their orderly lives—much as people today would be dumbfounded by an armageddon exploding from the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, the Persian Gulf or the Baltics. "History," he writes, "is made by people who do not know what is going to happen next"…Insightful and opinionated, Freedman charges from the interstate wars of the 19th century to the Cold War to attempts to make sense of civil strife in the 1990s, ending with current fears about clashes with great powers like Russia or China using high-tech weaponry. He expertly covers centuries of evolving mayhem, from brutal European colonial wars to present-day counterterrorism, cyberwar and urban gang violence.
Publishers Weekly
01/01/2018
Freedman (Strategy), professor emeritus of war studies at King’s College London, takes aim at how generations of historians, military analysts, politicians, and journalists have tried to anticipate the unknowable: the contours of the next major conflict involving political superpowers or regional actors. In the annals of crystal ball gazing, Freedman points out, most soothsayers have been way off. Prior to WWI, instead of massive armies coming to blows, European nations engaged in colonial exploits in undeveloped lands. Some asserted that growing economic prosperity meant that countries would have little need to fight over resources. But after WWII, an apocalyptic view of future warfare took hold; the development of nuclear weapons merely dialed up this tendency, even as some parties asserted that the bombs would serve as deterrents. More recently, 21st-century prognosticators are predicting cyberwar; robot and drone fighting forces; potential clashes between the U.S., China, or Russia; and conflicts sparked by climate change–fueled events such as drought and famine. As chroniclers catalog the myriad ways that the next war could explode, Freedman unsurprisingly concludes that war “has a future.” Freedman’s work makes for well-informed, if dire, reading, and the book’s audience is probably limited to hardcore conflict enthusiasts. (Oct.)
From the Publisher
Praise for Lawrence Freedman's Strategy: A History
"[Freedman's] books manage to delight the experts yet are still comprehensible to the general reader, a rare skill in this genre. On this occasion, he has produced what is arguably the best book ever written on strategy." --Washington Post
"Magisterial... wide-ranging erudition and densely packed argument."
--The Economist
"This is a book of startling scope, erudition and, more than anything, wisdom." --Financial Times
"Lawrence Freedman shows here why he is justly renowned as one of the world's leading thinkers about strategy, which he defines as the central art of getting more out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest." --Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Harvard University and author of The Future of Power
"This substantial, comprehensive, hermeneutic work examines the various dimensions and history of "strategy," which Freedman defines as "the art of creating power"...this very ambitious exploration provides readers with a useful introduction to the field of strategic studies." --CHOICE
"Freedman consistently brings the discussion down to real cases, covering a wide range of history and geography. The final section, which considers the place of gang warfare and civil unrest in many parts of the world and the likely role of China in future conflicts, is especially thought-provoking. The author's lively style adds to the interest for general readers. A valuable book for anyone interested in international affairs."—Kirkus Reviews, starred review
"The one thing that Sir Lawrence is sure of is that predictions of future war rarely get it right. His message to policymakers is to beware those who tout 'the ease and speed with which victory can be achieved while underestimating the resourcefulness of adversaries'. Anybody who thinks otherwise should read this book."—The Economist
"[An] engaging survey of how and why historians and writers--of nonfiction, fiction and film--bravely prognosticate. The theme is scholarly, but the tone is refreshingly popular: Tom Clancy makes the index, but von Clausewitz does not."—Army Times
"The work is extremely well written and an erudite product produced by a renowned military theorist. It should, without reservation, be considered a welcome addition to both the personal library of the more seasoned scholar as well as that of the senior level officer."—Parameters
"Innovative... Readers who spend their time with either tech-driven science fiction or RAND analyses should put them aside for a while and read this thought-provoking book on the power of ideas in shaping the future of grand strategy."—Lawfare
Library Journal
★ 09/15/2017
For those who favor simple answers to complex issues, this work by Freedman (emeritus professor, war studies, King's Coll. London; Strategy: A History) comes as a historic warning that there are none. Here, the author focuses on government predictions before, during, and after military conflicts; when diplomacy ends the politics of war begins and opposition is a consistent factor. Freedman surveys international conflicts and their predicted outcomes, those both "scientific" and normative, as well as those speculated by others such as novelists. The narrative spans the end of the 19th through the 20th century, from colonial wars to both World Wars, the Cold War, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. The author makes a convincing case that the military, defense industries, government think tanks, academia, politicians, and the media are not much better than creators of fiction when it comes to predictions of future war. VERDICT Although a sometimes monotonous read, Freedman's latest work delivers an important message. It will most appeal to military historians and political scientists.—William D. Pederson, Louisiana State Univ., Shreveport
Kirkus Reviews
★ 2017-08-07
Nations are constantly preparing for war, and a major part of that preparation is predicting what the next war will be like. An expert in military strategy provides a detailed look at how that process has evolved.Freedman (Emeritus, War Studies/Kings Coll. London; Strategy: A History, 2013, etc.) focuses primarily on British and American approaches, beginning in the mid-19th century, when a consensus arose that wars were decided in decisive battle, on the model of Waterloo. This encouraged military planners to aim for a knockout blow, preferably at the beginning of hostilities. Despite ample evidence of its flaws, this doctrine held sway for more than a century. With the arrival of the Cold War and its persistent theme of nuclear stalemate, Great Power wars became unthinkable. New technology that would avoid nuclear involvement became the holy grail of military thinkers. Then, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, local civil wars began to dominate the landscape. Western involvement—e.g., in Kosovo—became common, with results that often disappointed. Especially after 9/11, it became clear that traditional military methods were inadequate to win the new kind of conflict. The importance of cyberwar and the introduction of remote ways of killing—drones, in particular—came to the forefront, while grinding civil wars and terrorist action dominated the landscape. To show how contemporaries viewed future war in various eras, Freedman cites novels such as H.G. Wells' War of the Worlds and Nevil Shute's On the Beach along with more official military texts to show how the brass was thinking. More often than not, everybody guessed wrong, especially as they fell under the "decisive battle" illusion. Freedman consistently brings the discussion down to real cases, covering a wide range of history and geography. The final section, which considers the place of gang warfare and civil unrest in many parts of the world and the likely role of China in future conflicts, is especially thought-provoking. The author's lively style adds to the interest for general readers. A valuable book for anyone interested in international affairs.
