The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice
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The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice
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Overview
Since the end of the Cold War, and especially following the US decision to invade Iraq, the once strong partnership between the US, Canada, and the European allies has faced the serious possibility of significant change, or even dissolution. At the very least, fundamental differences have emerged in the ways that many of the partners, perceive the issues that are most important to them—from perceptions of the threat of terrorism and attitudes to the use of force, to expectation about the future nature of the NATO Alliance—and in the ways in which those perceptions have become translated into policy decisions.
In this book, experts from both sides of the Atlantic seek to explain why there has been so much divergence in the approach the various countries have taken. And it seeks to raise questions about what those divergent paths might mean for the future of transatlantic relations.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780804777452 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Stanford Security Studies |
| Publication date: | 11/29/2010 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 336 |
| File size: | 1 MB |
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THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
Perceptions, Policy and PracticeStanford University Press
Copyright © 2011 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior UniversityAll right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-7197-9
Chapter One
Transatlantic Relations A Theoretical Framework Serena Simoni
Introduction
For many years international relations practitioners and policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic have tended to dismiss potentially poisonous crises in transatlantic relations (e.g., the Suez crisis, the Gaullist challenge, criticism of the Vietnam War, the clashes caused by Reagan's policies of the early 1980s) that could lead to a significant change in transatlantic relations. These disagreements were considered "little family spats", rather than indicating a major or long-term problem. For, as the Latin locution goes, ubi maior minor cessat.
Indeed, during the Cold War, the Euro-Atlantic partnership seemed almost unbreakable; as long as the US and Europe had a common enemy in the USSR, it was generally assumed that their alliance would endure. The East-West rivalry did not seem to offer any other alternative for America and Europe but that of collaboration to counter the Soviet Union. As it was initially conceived, this relationship was predominantly focused on the military dimension, but it soon broadened to include economic and political elements where differences were resolved and discrepancies settled.
However, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, this once-strong partnership had its foundations shaken. The consequences of the removal of the Soviet threat for the future of transatlantic relations have been much debated amongst practitioners and scholars in the light of changing priorities and the loss of the Cold War "glue". The nature and dynamic of this evolving debate were epitomized by the US's decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and the open opposition of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg to that decision, as well as the opposition of public opinion in the United Kingdom and Italy, two Western European governments that did accommodate the Bush doctrine.
The invasion of Iraq magnified concerns over the future of the Atlantic community. America appeared to be out of sync with its Western European partners, and major divisions amongst the Europeans seemed to further reiterate the possibility of transatlantic separation. Was the conflict over Iraq the validation of John Mearsheimer's argument that the absence of a common threat would lead the US to withdraw from Europe, and that, as a result, Europe would return to power politics? Or was it just another "family spat," leaving unaltered the prospect of continued transatlantic cooperation, even in the absence of a common threat?
This chapter examines the growing body of literature focusing on the policy disputes between the United States and Europe and constitutes an attempt to clarify, synthesize and rationalize the central argumentative positions taken in the debate on the future of the transatlantic relations. It does so by offering an overview of how studies concerning transatlantic relations are framed and by identifying the underlying assumptions of such positions. Rather than setting forth any set of specific hypothesis to be tested, this chapter constitutes the analytical framework that synthesizes the various approaches to thinking and writing about transatlantic relations and serves as a foundation for the analysis that follows in the book. Moreover, countering those scholars who tend to consider Atlantic relations as less theoretical, this chapter puts forward the argument that indeed there is no shortage of theoretical vibrancy in the study of the relationship between the US and Europe. To that extent, the chapter also argues that the theories used, mainly neorealism and neo-liberalism, are less equipped than others such as constructivism to account for an ever-evolving transatlantic relationship. Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part introduces the primary analytical frameworks that have been used to inscribe and transcribe transatlantic relations, neo-realism and neo-liberalism, and shows what each of those theoretical accounts expect with regard to transatlantic relations, given the end of the Cold War. Part two then offers a comparison of the contending Neo-Realist and Neo-Liberal arguments. Finally, part three draws upon the shortcomings of the neo-realist and neo-liberal arguments, to reflect on the usefulness of other theories such as constructivism to explain the development of transatlantic relations.
The Debate: Neo-Realist Account
In the two decades since the end of the Cold War, the debate on the likely future of transatlantic relations has continued to thrive. Articles and books have generally stressed that transatlantic relations are in a state of inevitable decline, although there is some dissent among those who hold this view. An analysis of the debates in the decade that followed the end of the East-West rivalry reveals that the debates are theoretically grounded and that such theoretical understandings permeate the various discourses about the future of the Atlantic community. Moreover, questions about the future of the transatlantic relations were not triggered by the Iraq War in 2003 exclusively; as stated before, the trigger was in fact the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Against this backdrop, this chapter sets out to take a look at the proliferation of scholarly works on transatlantic relations prior to the political storm of 2003 to explicitly uncover some of the theoretical assumptions underlying the discussion of transatlantic relations in a decade not defined by a perceived common threat that could drive the US and Europe into a military-political-economic partnership. Details about specific countries and their policies towards transatlantic relations, especially in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, can be found in the national case study chapters, which follow this chapter.
In public and academic circles, experts have tended to rely on two well-established theories in attempting to understand the dynamics and realities of international relations: neo-realism and neo-liberalism. An analysis of the debates on the future of transatlantic relations in the interim period between the end of the Cold War and 9/11 reveals that international relations scholars were sharply divided on the likely future of the Euro-American partnership. Neo-realists, in fealty to their belief that balance-of-power politics is the main determinant of international relations, expected a worsening of Euro-American relations, while neo-liberals, following their core belief in the power of institutions, maintained a more optimistic outlook.
As stated earlier, neo-realist academics such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have contended that the end of the Cold War removed the ideological "glue" that made for unity in transatlantic relations. Most of those who ratify Mearsheimer's contention share a common set of basic assumptions associated with the realist position, namely that states are the main actors in international relations and their actions are motivated toward their own survival. In addition, the realist world view also suggests that states can harm or even destroy one another. Furthermore, the realist position contends that the principle that governs relations between states is anarchy (i.e., the absence of a central authority that regulates their interactions and therefore protects them if another state threatens or attacks them). Finally, neo-realists share the belief that states live in an uncertain realm wherein they do not know the intentions and capabilities of other states. Therefore, they claim that states are constantly insecure and war is always possible. Consequently, these scholars believe that security is one of the primary and continual concerns of the state. Within the neo-realist literature, one set of arguments largely employs the balance of power theory to offer an explanation of transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the end of the Cold War. These theorists claim that states seek to balance the power of threatening states.
Such acts of balancing can take the form of unilateral action or military cooperation, but they can also lead to other forms of cooperation, such as economic cooperation, because when states combine their economic advantages, they ultimately enhance their power overall. Correspondingly, the demise of a common external threat can undermine the types of cooperation, including military and economic, as described above. Within the dynamics of the latter scenario, neither military nor economic cooperation would be of overriding interest, and either one could possibly be perceived as risky, since such a partnership could enhance the relative military power of either partner, as a result of the economic gains achieved through the partnership.
As I stated earlier, the underlying premise behind neo-realist explanations of the future of transatlantic relations, in particular their cooperative efforts, is the perception of, and reaction to, a commonly perceived threat. Historically, theorists argue, the fear of the Soviet Union induced the United States and Europe to form a powerful military alliance, NATO. The economic cooperation between the core transatlantic states, they claim, was a consequence of the military collaboration. In short, NATO augmented their combined power. These theorists seem to agree that the overriding security interest kept the transatlantic core states together in a political alliance. In essence, during the Cold War, security interests superseded ideological divergences, which did indeed exist at the time. Thus the presence of the Soviet threat was seen as the leading cause for political unity. Some have conceptualized transatlantic relations within a bipolar system and further conceive the threat that had been constituted by the Soviet Union as the most important factor.
It is worth noticing that the neo-realist argument has been used very consistently over the years. All these scholars tend to agree that the end of the Cold War should have attenuated Euro-American military and economic cooperation. For example, John Mearsheimer, in his often-cited article "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," argued that NATO would, at best, become an empty shell. He went on to argue that if the Cold War came to a complete end, the United States would abandon Europe completely, provoking the end of a stable bipolar order. Mearsheimer has claimed that the stability of bipolarity would be replaced by the instability of a multi-polar structure. He has maintained this pessimistic argument over the subsequent decade, suggesting that without the US, or the American pacifier, Europe would revert to power politics, with Germany as its military fulcrum. This prediction of separation and rivalry is commonly shared within neo-realist scholarship. Owen Harries, for example, in his article "The Collapse of the West," reinforced this point by arguing that the West could not endure the collapse of the Soviet Union, because the concept of the West was constructed out of "desperation and fear," not "natural affinities." In addition to the anticipated split of the military alliance, other neo-realists such as Stephen Walt have argued that given the absence of a common threat, there could also be an end to economic cooperation. Like other neo-realists, Walt recognizes that the US and Europe were brought together by the fear of the Soviet threat; however, he further underlines that it was economic ties during the Cold War which reinforced the military cooperation. In other words, the common threat induced economic cooperation, which produced economic gains that ultimately enhanced the combined powers of the partners. Conversely, Walt argued, the end of the Cold War would eliminate the overriding common security interest and consequently loosen economic ties as well. In fact, Walt already sees the signs of this trend in the US shift in economic activity from Europe to Asia; he warns that such a shift "will inevitably lead U.S. policymakers to devote more energy and attention to the latter [meaning Asia]". In addition, the expansion of the European Union, he suggests, will create further tensions. The euro, Walt explains, has the potential to challenge the dollar as the principal international reserve currency.
A further element inducing fragmentation and disorientation in transatlantic relations, Walt argues, is the decline of a sense of commitment to the Atlantic community. Americans are no longer willing to sacrifice for Europe, Walt contends, because of a generational change. "The people that built NATO were East Coast internationalists with strong personal and professional ties to Europe ... They believed that Europe's fate was worth fighting and perhaps dying-for, and they were willing to risk considerable blood and treasure to protect these allies." But, he concludes, this is no longer the case. The end of the Cold War is thus producing a transatlantic split.
The aftermath of 9/11, and the ensuing debates over the legitimacy of attacking Iraq, has produced relevant scholarly debates that reduce the current "world disorder" to a division between the US and Europe, based, yet again, on military and economic reasons. Kagan writes: "... the U.S. is quicker to use military force, less patient with diplomacy, and more willing to coerce (or bribe) other nations in order to get a desired result. Europe, on the other hand, places greater emphasis on diplomacy, takes a much longer view of history and problem solving, and has greater faith in international law and cooperation." His highly controversial argument has been that on major strategic and international questions, "Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus." Kagan argued that powerful states (i.e., the US) see the world differently from weak states (i.e., Europe) because of their power difference.
Kagan's generalization assumes that any change in the relationship between allies is due to a shift in the balance of power. In his view, Europeans want to rebalance American hegemony by empowering international organizations. The assumption is that since Europe was unable to influence the US after 9/11, Europeans must deploy the inherent power of international organizations to balance against, and thus limit, American power.
In addition to 'power' and 'weakness' as determinants of states' behavior, Kagan explains that conceptions of power and power dynamics also influence how much power one state may pursue. For Kagan, Europeans have a Kantian vision of the world, in which force is unnecessary and counterproductive in solving disagreements. Conversely, Americans have a Hobbesian view, and think that the world is a dangerous place and that states always need to keep the use of force as an option.
A less catastrophic, but nonetheless equally pessimist, view has been forwarded by Ronald Asmus and Kenneth Pollack, who observe that the emergence of new threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, mass migration and rogue states will make the United States and Europe "rethink the purpose of the transatlantic relationship." In sum, for Asmus and Pollack the rise of a new threat will once again produce transatlantic political unity. Their conclusion is not shared by some, however. For instance, Ivo Daalder claims instead that 9/11 "reinforced America's strategic shift away from Europe." The fundamental consequence of the end of confrontation with the USSR, he argues, is that America's and Europe's security concerns diverged exponentially. The United States focused globally and Europe locally. In other words, while the US engaged in global leadership Europe concentrated on regional leadership in its immediate backyard (i.e., the former Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe). These differences, Daalder points out, only intensified over the course of the years, especially under the George W. Bush administration. This sample of the various positions within the neorealist camp helps to illustrate the level of theoretical disparity that continues to infuse the debate about the future of the transatlantic relations. In the neo-realist view, the overriding interest in preserving security is the building block of the trans-Atlantic community.
(Continues...)
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Table of Contents
Preface vii
Notes on Contributors ix
Introduction Andrew M. Dorman Joyce P. Kaufman 1
1 Transatlantic Relations: A Theoretical Framework Serena Simoni 16
2 The Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations: A View from Canada David Rudd 33
3 The United States and the Transatlantic Relationship: A Test for U.S. Foreign and National Security Policy Joyce P. Kaufman 56
4 Transatlantic Relations: The United Kingdom Andrew M. Dorman 78
5 France and Transatlantic Relations Adrian Treacher 95
6 Germany: From Civilian Power to International Actor Gale A. Mattox 113
7 Turkey and the US: A Transatlantic Future? Bill Park 137
8 The Transatlantic Relationship: Poland and the United States Anna Zielinska 155
9 Russian Views on the Future of Transatlantic Relations Alex Marshall 174
10 Transatlantic Relations: A View from Ukraine Deborah Sanders 191
11 Georgia and the Transatlantic Relationship: The New Kid on the Block Tracey C. German 211
Conclusions: Reflections on the Future of Transatlantic Relations Andrew M. Dorman Joyce P. Kaufman 232
Glossary 239
Notes 243
Selected Bibliography 299
Index 313