On 7 August 1914 a French corps attacked towards Mulhouse in Alsace and was immediately thrown back by the Germans. On 14 August, two weeks before Tannenberg and three weeks before the Battle of the Marne, the French 1st and 2nd Armies attacked into Lorraine, and on 20 August the German 6th and 7th Armies counterattacked. After forty-three years of peace, this was the first test of strength between France and Germany. In 1929, Karl Deuringer wrote the official history of the battle for the Bavarian Army, an immensely detailed work of 890 pages, chronicling the battle to 15 September. Here, First World War expert and former army officer Terence Zuber has translated and edited this study to a more accessible length, while retaining over thirty highly detailed maps, to bring us the first account in English of the first major battle of the Great War.
On 7 August 1914 a French corps attacked towards Mulhouse in Alsace and was immediately thrown back by the Germans. On 14 August, two weeks before Tannenberg and three weeks before the Battle of the Marne, the French 1st and 2nd Armies attacked into Lorraine, and on 20 August the German 6th and 7th Armies counterattacked. After forty-three years of peace, this was the first test of strength between France and Germany. In 1929, Karl Deuringer wrote the official history of the battle for the Bavarian Army, an immensely detailed work of 890 pages, chronicling the battle to 15 September. Here, First World War expert and former army officer Terence Zuber has translated and edited this study to a more accessible length, while retaining over thirty highly detailed maps, to bring us the first account in English of the first major battle of the Great War.
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Overview
On 7 August 1914 a French corps attacked towards Mulhouse in Alsace and was immediately thrown back by the Germans. On 14 August, two weeks before Tannenberg and three weeks before the Battle of the Marne, the French 1st and 2nd Armies attacked into Lorraine, and on 20 August the German 6th and 7th Armies counterattacked. After forty-three years of peace, this was the first test of strength between France and Germany. In 1929, Karl Deuringer wrote the official history of the battle for the Bavarian Army, an immensely detailed work of 890 pages, chronicling the battle to 15 September. Here, First World War expert and former army officer Terence Zuber has translated and edited this study to a more accessible length, while retaining over thirty highly detailed maps, to bring us the first account in English of the first major battle of the Great War.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780750951791 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | The History Press |
| Publication date: | 09/01/2014 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 160 |
| File size: | 10 MB |
| Age Range: | 18 Years |
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The First Battle of the First World War
Alsace-Lorraine
By Karl Deuringer, Terence Zuber
The History Press
Copyright © 2014 Karl DeuringerAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-7509-5179-1
CHAPTER 1
The Bavarian Army at the Outbreak of War
The Peacetime Army
The Bavarian Army at the outbreak of the war can be considered from two points of view. From the outside it appeared to be an integral part of the German Army, but from within it was a complete, separate and independent army. The titular commander of the army was the King of Bavaria; the War Minister exercised command in his name, as well as having administrative authority. The Bavarian General Staff was subordinate to the Bavarian War Ministry. This was in contrast to Prussia, where, in addition to the War Ministry, the Military Cabinet, Great General Staff, Corps Commanding Generals and General Inspectors of the various arms all had immediate access to the King.
The peacetime Bavarian Army consisted of three corps, each with two divisions:
24 infantry regiments (72 battalions)
2 Jäger (light infantry) battalions
1 machine-gun section
12 cavalry regiments (57 squadrons)
12 field artillery regiments (72 field artillery batteries, 3 horse artillery batteries)
3 foot (heavy) artillery regiments (22 batteries and 4 draught horse sections)
4 engineer battalions (14 companies)
1 railroad battalion
2 telegraph battalions (5 companies and a draught horse section), plus a cavalry telegraph school
1 transportation battalion (1 airship and 1 truck company)
1 aviation battalion (aviation company and flight school)
3 supply battalions (12 companies)
The production, procurement and administration of military equipment was the responsibility of the Bavarian Quartermaster Office, which included a small-arms factory in Amberg, a gun foundry and munitions plant in Ingolstadt, an artillery maintenance plant in Munich, the central laboratory and a powder works in Ingolstadt, as well as seven artillery depots and three supply depots. Bavaria also administered a separate military educational system, with a General Staff college, artillery, engineer and infantry schools, and a corps of cadets, a school of military equitation and a non-commissioned officer (NCO) academy. Bavaria also possessed a separate army archive, topographic bureau, army museum and library.
Bavaria had three Major Training Areas at Grafenwöhr, Hammelburg and Lechfeld. Troop support was provided by civil servants: commissary officers, facilities managers, garrison administrators and finance officials, etc. There was a military hospital system, including a military medical school. Bavaria had its own military justice system and a military police (MP) corps, with a MP headquarters and a detachment in each of the eight regional governments. The personnel replacement system consisted of three Landwehr inspectorates and thirty-four county replacement commands. The Bavarian fortress at Germersheim had gained in importance and been equipped as a bridgehead over the Rhine. The fortress at Ingolstadt had been reduced to caretaker status.
The authorised peacetime strength of the Bavarian Army at the start of the war was 3,375 officers, 289 doctors, 102 veterinarians, 1,015 senior and mid-grade administrators, 11,830 NCOs, 71,295 enlisted men and 16,918 horses.
After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1 Bavaria adopted the Prussian military system in accordance with the alliance treaty of 23 November 1870. This did not affect the independence of the Bavarian Army, however. Only with the declaration of war – at the beginning of mobilisation – did the Bavarian Army fall under the command authority of the German Emperor, but still remained an independent element of the German Army under the command and administration of the King of Bavaria. In peacetime, the German Emperor had the right and duty to inspect the Bavarian Army to insure that it was complete and combat effective. Initially, these inspections were entrusted to Prussian officers. In 1892 the Bavarian General of Cavalry, Prince Leopold of Bavaria, was named commander of the newly established Fourth Army Inspectorate in Munich, with a Prussian officer as chief of staff. His successor (in 1912) was General of Infantry Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. Bavaria also maintained a military representative in Berlin.
The King of Bavaria enjoyed complete freedom in military personnel matters, and could determine the locations of garrisons. All other units of the German Army received numbers according to the Prussian system, except the Bavarian units. To support the army, Bavaria annually received a portion of the German tax revenues, based on the authorised strength of the army. The internal financial administration was the responsibility of the Bavarian Army.
The Bavarian Army before the war had shortcomings, which it shared with the rest of the German Army. The important role that technology played in all aspects of modern war was recognised too slowly in training and equipping the army: vehicular mobility was underdeveloped; communications between aircraft and ground units was not thought through, tested and insured; and stocks of ammunition held in peacetime were not nearly adequate to feed the modern quick-firing weapons. Above all, the army was numerically weak. While France conscripted no fewer than 80 per cent of those eligible, which is to say anyone who could possibly serve, Germany did not exploit its numerical superiority. Even considering the far higher physical standards in the German Army, a considerable percentage of physically fit young German men were never conscripted; the size of the peacetime army, set by law, did not allow it. Those who were not conscripted were to have served for a short training period, but even this proved to be impossible. No preparations were made to train, equip and arm these men, and form them into units on the outbreak of war. The Great General Staff attempted to realise reforms several times before the war, but was continually prevented from doing so by false economy. This at a time (7 August 1913) when the French passed the Three Year Service law, laying the heaviest of burdens on its citizens.
In 1913 in Bavaria, 66,338 men were mustered for conscription. In total, 3,603 were removed as permanently unfit and 133 found ineligible to serve because of a criminal record, so that 3,736 men, or 5.6 per cent, were immediately found unsuitable. Consequently, 42,915 were found completely fit for service, or 64.7 per cent, but of these, including 5,139 volunteers, only 41,158 were inducted, or 62.1 per cent. No fewer than 1,757 (45,000 in all of Germany) completely fit men (2.6 per cent) were declared supernumerary or, due to family circumstances, sent to the Landwehr or the Ersatz (replacement) reserve, together with 19,687 limited duty or temporarily unavailable (27.9 per cent). Therefore, in Bavaria in one year alone 21,444 young men, almost a third (32.3 per cent), who in France for the most part certainly would have been conscripted, were free from service and remained without training whatsoever. If, as in France, 80 per cent were conscripted instead of 62.1 per cent – 11,912 more men in 1913 alone – Bavaria could have raised a seventh infantry division in peacetime and a second reserve corps in wartime.
The spirit and inner constitution of the Bavarian Army was sound. The army worked with feverish determination, year in and year out, but perhaps too much as, at the beginning of the war, many of the officers and NCOs were not fresh and well rested. To some degree this was due to the increasing workload heaped on the officers, with many units short of lieutenants. Many of the company commanders, who are the backbone of their units in peace and war, were too old – in the infantry even the youngest were 36 years old.
Strict discipline in peacetime did not undermine the trust between officers, NCOs and men, but rather reinforced it. In spite of its stiff formalities, the old army was characterised by fairness and comradeship. Promotion to the highest ranks was open to every man without regard to origin and birth. The Bavarian units in the last peacetime years could stand comparison with any other in the German Army.
Mobilisation
The mobilisation of the army was prepared in detail. In addition to the necessary quantities of clothing, equipment, tools, weapons and ammunition, the mobilisation calendar (written each winter and put into effect on 1 April) contained exact instructions for the sequence of mobilisation measures – nothing was forgotten. The short mobilisation order served to set the entire machine in motion. As well as the mobilisation of the regular army, there were also reserve, Landwehr, Ersatz, Landsturm and rear-echelon, units that had to be created outright.
In the last years before the war, the mobilisation calendar had become more complex, as the possibility of a sudden enemy attack increased, especially after France introduced the three-year conscript duty, which in turn raised the number of troops present for duty in each French unit and reduced the length of time the French needed to mobilise. Special measures were taken to quickly recall reservists in the winter because that year's class of conscripts was still untrained. Further measures were introduced for a 'Period Preparatory to War'. As the situation became more serious at the end of July, a series of non-threatening measures were taken in order to insure the smooth functioning of a later mobilisation. As of 28 July, armed railwaymen guarded the most important installations against foreign or domestic sabotage. On 30 July I/Foot Artillery R (Regiment) 1 provided anti-aircraft gun protection for the Rhine bridge at Germersheim.
Because the fortress of Metz was exposed to surprise attack, on 26 July I/Foot Artillery R 2 occupied its wartime positions in the armoured gun positions of the west-facing Forts Lothringen, Leipzig and Kronprinz. On 29 July Infantry Regiment (IR) 4 and IR 8 conducted a field training exercise in blue peacetime uniforms in their wartime defensive positions on the Gravelotte–St Privat battlefield and occupied the armoured forts there with security detachments, and Cheveauleger (light cavalry) R 3 deployed security posts to the border. All Bavarian troops at the Major Training Areas and all troops on leave were ordered to return to garrison.
At 1400hrs on 31 July the order to institute the 'Period Preparatory to War' arrived from Berlin at the Bavarian War Ministry and was transmitted to the Bavarian Army. Between 120 and 410 reservists per infantry regiment (about ten to thirty-five per infantry company) were recalled to bring these units to the highest peacetime manning level. All rail installations were provided with security detachments, which were local home guardsmen, but in the Rhineland-Palatinate, close to the French border, they were reinforced by troops from 3 Infantry Division (ID). Four infantry regiments also secured Rhine bridges at Speyer and Germersheim, and another a bridge in Lorraine. The previously deployed border security units (IR 4, IR 8, plus all of Chevauleger R 3) occupied their defensive positions in earnest. All troops were given strict instructions not to initiate hostilities, open fire or enter French territory. On the other hand, French patrols crossed the border on 30 July at St Marie-aux-Chênes, northwest of Metz. A press blackout on military activities was instituted. The Rhineland-Palatinate was placed under martial law.
At 1740hrs on 1 August the order to mobilise the German Army was issued in Berlin, arriving in Munich at 1800hrs, with the first day of mobilisation set for 2 August.
The French Army, with three-year conscript service, enjoyed a higher state of readiness than the Germans, who only had a two-year service. In particular, the infantry companies of French border corps were kept at a peacetime strength of 150-200 men, which would allow early attacks into German territory. This required the German Army to immediately deploy a covering force to the border. At 2000hrs on 2 August, the first day of mobilisation, each of the three Bavarian corps deployed an infantry brigade, reinforced with one or two cavalry squadrons and an artillery section. All these units were at peacetime strength, the infantry battalions with 11 to 14 officers and 456 to 614 men on 14 horse-drawn vehicles (including ammunition wagons and field kitchens), the cavalry squadrons with 5 to 8 officers and 142 to 165 men, the artillery with 4 light howitzers, but with only the guns and ammunition caissons, and no light ammunition columns. These units then mobilised on the border on 5 and 6 August. The covering force was reinforced by the Bavarian Cavalry Division (b. KD) and the Bavarian Jäger Battalions (Bn) 1 and 2, whose reservists reported directly to their units on the first and second days, and were ready to move on the second and third days of mobilisation.
For the most part, the mobilisation proceeded smoothly and according to plan. The men reported to the district recruiting office and were then transported as a group by train to the troop units; the reservists travelled on the second, third and fourth mobilisation days; the Landwehr men on the fourth, fifth and sixth days, some earlier. For reasons of speed and simplicity it was not always possible to allow every man to return to the unit with which he had conducted his peacetime service. Only the reservists or Landwehr men who had served in the Household Infantry Regiment (Infanterie-Leibregiment, in effect the Bavarian Guard Regiment) were returned to the regiment. Many Bavarians who had moved to other parts of Germany were sent to non-Bavarian units.
The necessary riding and draft horses were requisitioned from the first to the seventh mobilisation days, though a high proportion of the horses found fit for duty were not used – only 61 per cent in the Bavarian III Corps (III b. AK) area, for example. The horses and their escorts were sent in groups, usually by road, to the troop units. The unequal distribution of horses made some rail movement necessary. At the same time, the necessary wagons and harnesses for the combat and rear-echelon supply units were requisitioned, as were motor vehicles.
In general, the units were given two days after the arrival of the last reservists and requisitioned horses to organise themselves. The active duty troops had to turn in peacetime blue uniforms and be issued with wartime field grey; the reservists had to be issued everything, including boots, field equipment and weapons. The harnesses had to be fitted to the horses, the unridden horses broken and the horse teams trained to pull together. So far as possible, the units established their inner cohesion during this time.
The active army infantry and divisional cavalry were ready to deploy on the fifth and sixth mobilisation days (6 and 7 August), the field artillery between the fifth and seventh days, the heavy artillery on the eighth day, engineers on the sixth day, signals on the fourth and fifth days, aviation on the fifth day, medical on the fifth, sixth and eighth days, ammunition and supply on the eighth, ninth and tenth days, and the field bakeries on the third and fifth days.
The reserve combat units were ready to deploy on the eighth, signal units already on the fourth day, ammunition and supply on the ninth and tenth days, and field bakeries on the sixth day. Landwehr units that were to be used in the field were in part ready on the ninth, in part on the twelfth day. The fortress garrisons were ready between the fifth and eighth days, and the labour units on the fourth day. Some of the lines-of-communication troops, lorry columns and railway units were available immediately or on the first day, and the mass of the rear-echelon units ready on the twelfth day.
The larger part of the professional officers remained with the manoeuvre units. Nevertheless, only a quarter of the infantry and field artillery platoon leaders were professional officers, half were reserve officers and a quarter were active army or reserve officer candidates. Conversely, professional officers predominated the cavalry units.
In reserve infantry and field artillery units the regimental, battalion and artillery section commanders were professional officers. Five-sixths of the infantry company commanders and three-quarters of the artillery battery commanders were professional officers, while the platoon leaders were either reserve officers or officer candidates, generally in the proportion of 2:1 or 1:1.
In the Landwehr infantry, only the regimental commanders and battalion commanders were professional officers. Company commanders were reserve officers or former professional officers, while platoon leaders were equal parts reserve and Landwehr officers, officer candidates and NCOs.
The Ersatz battalions of infantry regiments usually had four to eight (sometimes up to fourteen) professional officers, while the field artillery Ersatz detachments had two to four. All other replacement units had either former professional officers or reserve officers. Many positions were filled with officer candidates and NCOs.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The First Battle of the First World War by Karl Deuringer, Terence Zuber. Copyright © 2014 Karl Deuringer. Excerpted by permission of The History Press.
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Table of Contents
Contents
Quote,Preface,
Translator/Editor Preface,
A Note on the Maps,
Glossary,
1 The Bavarian Army at the Outbreak of War,
2 Covering Force, Deployment and Combat to 19 August,
3 The Battle in Lorraine and the Vosges, 20–22 August,
4 The Battle at Nancy-Épinal 23 August – 14 September,
Order of Battle,
Copyright,