This report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. The factors that fuel the success or failure of insurgencies are an important and debated topic in national security circles. This work examines the cases of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, an insurgency failure, and the Frente Sandinista de Liberation Nacional (FSLN) in Nicaragua, an insurgency success, to determine why certain Latin American insurgencies succeed while others fail. Common theories, particularly in Latin America, attribute successful insurgencies to U.S. intervention on behalf of the host nation government, or focus on structural and material factors or regime type. Though these factors play a role, insurgent success in Latin America relies more heavily on the insurgency's ability to cultivate a broad-based coalition of support both externally and domestically, coupled with shrewd political strategy that focuses on pragmatism and compromise. By examining state strategies for dealing with insurgents and best practices for counterinsurgency, the author concludes that efforts focused on alleviating the population's concerns through legitimate societal and political reform, coupled with attempts to undermine the insurgent's critical base of support, are the most efficient strategies for successful counterinsurgency operations.
This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
For militaries across the globe, few issues are more pressing than the need to effectively counter insurgent groups. Whether a military operates in South America, Africa, or Asia, insurgency is an ongoing military issue. Why do insurgencies succeed or fail? There are many competing theories, ranging from large-power intervention to regime type. To better understand this question, this thesis compares and contrasts failed and successful leftist insurgencies in post-Cuban revolution Latin America, examining the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia between 1964 and 1999, and the Frente Sandinista de Liberation Nacional (FSLN, also simply the Sandinistas) in Nicaragua between 1961 and 1979. Why did the FARC fail to overthrow the government of its country, but the Sandinistas were able to succeed? The groups are broadly similar: they are both leftist groups with political origins that rose up and conducted insurgencies due to unpopular governments and policies. The FARC formed in 1964 and the FSLN formed in 1961, both soon after the first elections after a period of military rule in Colombia and Nicaragua. Additionally, both the insurgencies were inspired, at least in part, by Marxist-Leninist ideals. Both groups used guerrilla tactics and they were both opposed by the U.S. at some point. However, the FSLN was most directly opposed by the U.S. with the U.S.-backed Contras, yet Nicaragua was the lone successful revolution, which echoes the Cuban Revolution. I contend that the FSLN's success and the FARC's failure was not due to U.S. involvement, material or structural factors, or even regime type. While these may be important factors in an insurgency's success, I will show that building a broad coalition of support, domestically and internationally, combined with forming a shrewd political strategy of compromise-based pragmatism and exploiting regime political illegitimacy, is the main reason an insurgency succeeds.
