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Overview
Given the unsatisfactory outcomes of the counterinsurgency (COIN) wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military is now in a heated debate over whether wars involving COIN operations are worth fighting. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of COIN through key historic episodes and concludes that the answer is an emphatic "no," based on a dominant record of U.S. military or political failure, and inconsistency in the reasons for the rare cases of success. The author also examines the implications of his findings for U.S. foreign policy, defense policy, and future weapons procurement.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781440830099 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Bloomsbury Academic |
| Publication date: | 07/19/2013 |
| Series: | Praeger Security International |
| Pages: | 189 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.40(w) x 9.30(h) x 0.80(d) |
About the Author
Table of Contents
1 Introduction: Quagmire: The Usual Outcome of Counterinsurgency Warfare 1
What Is an Insurgency? 2
Guerrillas Have the Advantage in COIN Wars 3
Guerrillas Not Winning the Support of the People Is Rare 6
Governments Disregard History and Continue to Jump into COIN Wars 7
2 When to Battle Insurgents 17
The Different Types of Guerrilla Wars 18
Losing COIN Both Militarily and Politically 19
Winning COIN Militarily, but Losing Politically 27
Losing COIN Militarily, but Winning a Larger Conflict 32
COIN War Ending in Negotiated Settlement or Concessions by COIN Forces 33
Closely Examining the Minority of Cases in which COIN Forces Won Both Militarily and Politically 35
Conclusion 42
3 Classic COIN Strategy 45
Scorched Earth Sometimes Succeeds 46
In the Modern World, a Classical COIN Strategy Is Probably Best 47
But COIN Doesn't Always Work 49
Insurgency More Cost Effective Than Counterinsurgency 50
A Classic COIN Strategy Requires More Forces Than Does Blasting Rebels 52
Conclusion 54
4 COIN and Compromise 57
Successful Episodes Involving Concessions or Compromise 57
Missed Opportunities 60
Conclusion 62
5 The Disadvantage of Foreign Occupiers 63
A Nationalist Reaction Against Foreign Occupation Can Make Revolt Potent 63
Nationalist-Based Insurgencies Are the Most Effective 64
Even Factionalized Nationalist Movements Can Win a Guerrilla War 66
Governments Can Occasionally Hold the Nationalist Card Vis-à-Vis Guerrillas 66
But It Doesn't Always Take Nationalist Movements to Win Guerrilla Wars 67
Guerrillas Have Advantages in Propaganda Use 68
Foreign Occupiers Are Rarely Given the Benefit of the Doubt by Locals 69
… And Some Local Guerrillas Can (Literally) Get Away with Murder 70
Foreign Occupiers Are Handicapped by Poor Knowledge of Local Conditions 71
If Foreign Forces Are Used Instead of Training Local Ones, Winning Is Problematical 73
The Advantage of Local Forces Compared to an Outsider 74
Conclusion 75
6 The Guerrilla Advantage 77
Despite Advances in Technology, Guerrillas Retain Advantages 78
Guerrillas May Try to Provoke COIN Forces into an Overreaction 80
Conclusion 83
7 COIN Forces' Advantages: Firepower, Numbers, and Technology 85
COIN Forces' Use of Excessive Firepower Often Backfires 88
Targeted Killings of Guerrilla Leaders May Backfire as a COIN Strategy 91
Scorched Earth Policies Can Sometimes Work 92
Sometimes Even Benevolent Policies Are Not Successful 93
Lack of Political Will Can Be a Problem in COIN 94
Expanding Indigenous Forces to Take Over Can Be Difficult 95
COIN Forces May Develop Tactical Innovations but Still Lose the War 95
Waging COIN Is a Difficult Balancing Act 99
Conclusion 101
8 Time Favors the Insurgents 103
Guerrillas Are Often in No Hurry 103
Some Insurgents Are Still Waiting 104
Trying to Win Too Quickly Can Hurt Insurgents 105
A Key Center of Gravity Is Public Support for the COIN War at Home 106
Foreign COIN Forces Are Challenged Because Their Time Is Likely Fleeting 107
Conclusion 109
9 COIN Wars: The Political Aspects 111
Local Governments Engaged in COIN Likely Already Suffer Legitimacy Problems 113
Military Organizations' Forte Is Not the Armed Social Work Needed for COIN 114
Instituting Democracy Is Often a Facade and Isn't Always a Plus for COIN Warfare 115
The Results of Even Fair Elections Are Not Always Predictable 117
COIN Often Unwisely Tries to Strengthen Local Central Government 117
Conclusion 119
10 The Guerrilla Win and External Support 121
Guerrillas Who Won Militarily or Politically Without External Aid 121
Even Without External Aid Some Rebels Persevere 122
Walls Can Be Effective in Keeping Out Aid and Fighters, But Not Permanently 123
Guerrillas Who Likely Could Have Won Without External Aid 123
Could Losers Win With External Assistance? 124
Assisting the Enemy 124
Conclusion 124
11 The United States and Politically Dominated Wars 127
Politics of Weapons Buying Stops Great Powers from Equipping for COIN 128
Conclusion 130
12 Prospects for Pending COIN Wars 131
U.S. Occupation of Iraq 131
U.S. Occupation of Afghanistan 134
Counterinsurgency From the Air: The Drone Wars in Yemen and Somalia 140
The General War on Terror 145
Conclusion 148
13 U.S. Track Record on COM: Implications for Forces and Weapons 151
U.S. Vital Interests Do Not Usually Require COIN Warfare 151
What about the Unlikely Scenario of a Necessary COIN War? 155
Conclusion 158
14 The Domestic Effects of Overseas Counterinsurgency Wars 161
Vietnam War 164
The War on Terror 166
Conclusion 172
Bibliography 175
Index 181
About the Author 189