The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991

The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991

by Fantahun Ayele
The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991

The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991

by Fantahun Ayele

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Overview

The Ethiopian popular revolution of 1974 ended a monarchy that claimed descent from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, and brought to power a military government that created one of the largest and best-equipped armies in Africa. In his panoramic study of the Ethiopian army, Fantahun Ayele draws upon his unprecedented access to Ethiopian Ministry of Defense archives to study the institution that was able to repel the Somali invasion of 1977 and suppress internal uprisings, but collapsed in 1991 under the combined onslaught of armed insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray. Besides military operations, The Ethiopian Army discusses tactical areas such as training, equipment, intelligence, and logistics, as well as grand strategic choices such as ending the 1953 Ethio-American Mutual Defense Agreement and signing a treaty of military assistance with the Soviet Union. The result sheds considerable light on the military developments that have shaped Ethiopia and the Horn in the twentieth century.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780810130111
Publisher: Northwestern University Press
Publication date: 10/30/2014
Pages: 328
Product dimensions: 5.90(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.00(d)

About the Author

Fantahun Ayele is an assistant professor of history at Bahir Dar University in Ethiopia. He was the second recipient of the Global Encounters postdoctoral appointment in African Studies at Northwestern University, funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.

Read an Excerpt

The Ethiopian Army

From Victory to Collapse, 1977â"1991


By Fantahun Ayele

Northwestern University Press

Copyright © 2014 Northwestern University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8101-3011-1



CHAPTER 1

The Army of the Ethiopian Empire (1941–1974)


The imperial tradition

The army has been, beyond all dispute, one of the oldest institutions in Ethiopia. The imperial army existed, in one form or another, since the Aksumite times. Despite the army's indispensability for maintaining law and order, it remained traditional in its organization for a long time. Apart from sporadic attempts of medieval rulers to get military and other technical assistance from Europe, no attempt was made to organize the army along modern lines until the nineteenth century.

It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that Emperor Téwodros II, who reigned from 1855 to 1868, single-handedly tried to create a well-organized, well-disciplined, and better-equipped professional army. Among other things, Téwodros introduced new military titles by way of promoting the existing chain of command. It was also his intention to combine the regional armies to form a disciplined national army. Probably the most remarkable aspect of Téwodros's military reform was his determination to produce modern weapons locally. And the country did begin to produce mortars and cannons. Eventually, however, all those attempts failed to bring about the desired result.

Téwodros's successor, Yohannes IV, followed a different path to equip his army. He managed to acquire modern weapons through reward (from the British military expedition in return for assistance against Téwodros II) and capture (from the Egyptian invaders at the Battles of Gundät and Gura in 1875 and 1876).

Likewise, Menilek II was obsessed more with the acquisition of modern weapons than with the modernization of his army. He maintained the medieval military organization of regional forces under regional governors, which coexisted with a standing army stationed around the royal court. The latter embraced such units as the Baldäras (Keepers of Royal Horses), Barud Bét (House of Gunpowder), and Tämänja Yazh (Bearers of Rifles), all eventually brought under the generic appellation of Mähal Säfari (Soldiers Stationed at the Center). These units of the imperial army were put under the command of an official called the fitawarari, who was, in turn, answerable to the emperor. When the ministerial system was introduced in 1907, the fitawarari ended up as the war minister.


Modernizing the army

The institution of the modern army had some antecedents in Harär. Ras (a title of nobility) Mäkonnen is said to have organized a professional police force to maintain law and order in the town, reviving an old practice of the emirs of Harär. Inspired by the establishment of the Dhawaria (as the police came to be called at the time) in Harär, Menilek II brought some of the policemen to Addis Ababa and assigned them to enforce curfew in the capital. New recruits soon joined the police and, by 1916, they numbered about three hundred.

A year later, a unit different from the police was organized. Named Yämäträyäs Zäbäñña (Machine Gun Guards), the new unit was probably the first force to be organized along modern lines. Gerazmach (a military title meaning commander of the left wing) Gäbrä Yohannes Woldä Mädhen, a former NCO who had served in the British colonial army in Kenya, became the first commander of this force. According to the Ministry of National Defense (MOND) archives, Yämäträyäs Zäbäñña was the first uniformed army unit. In 1919, Ras Mäkonnen's son Ras Täfäri (later Emperor Haylä Sellasè, also spelled Haile Selassie) assigned those Ethiopians who had been serving in the British colonial army as the King's African Rifles to train the bodyguard in collaboration with some Russian émigré officers. The training given at home was augmented by foreign military studies. Thus, in the 1920s, some young Ethiopians were sent to the French military academy of St.-Cyr. In 1924, the bodyguard was issued grand uniforms following Täfäri's tour of Europe. By 1928, Täfäri had about 5,000 well-trained members of the bodyguard. It was in the same year that the Yämäträyäs Zäbäñña was given a new name—the Imperial Bodyguard.

A year later, the Belgian Military Mission under the leadership of an officer known only as Major Dothée came to Ethiopia to take over the organization and training of the Imperial Bodyguard. The Belgian officers began to train the bodyguard in earnest, and their contract was renewed until 1935. The Imperial Bodyguard was expanded with new recruits from Addis Ababa and its environs. The troops were issued green khaki uniforms similar to those worn by the Belgian army with berets imported from Japan. But they wore no boots. Although the Imperial Bodyguard was based in the capital at Jan Méda, some of its units were stationed at various provincial outposts in Harärgé, Balé, and Wälläga. On the eve of the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935–1936, the Imperial Bodyguard had four battalions of infantry, a company of machine gun units, and a squadron of cavalry, which were all put under a regiment consisting of 5,000 soldiers.


The Italian invasion

Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, putting the Imperial Bodyguard to a severe test. Since it had little or no experience of actual combat, the bodyguard stayed with the emperor as a reserve force. Although the Italians had already gained the upper hand in earlier engagements, the Imperial Bodyguard took the field in the final confrontation, the Battle of Maychäw. While it failed to reverse the military situation, it earned the admiration of even the Italian commander, who remarked, "The Imperial Guard, supported by a lively fire, moved against our positions, advancing in rushes and making good use of the ground, giving proof of solidity and a remarkable degree of training combined with a superb contempt of danger."

After the fall of Addis Ababa, the Holäta cadets, together with other intellectuals, founded the Black Lion Organization and fought against the Fascist occupation under Ras Emeru until the latter's capture. Those cadets who had been living in Addis Ababa after the Italian "amnesty" became the primary targets of the February Massacre of 1937, when the Italians killed as many as 30,000 Ethiopians. The precious few who survived in exile in Sudan during the Fascist occupation were destined to occupy the highest military posts after 1941.


Haylä Sellasè modernizes the army

Soon after the restoration of his power in 1941, Emperor Haylä Sellasè put the modernization of the army, a prewar project aborted by the Italian aggression, high on the agenda. Pinning all his hopes on the British, he earnestly asked Sir Philip Mitchell, political officer of the British army in East Africa, to take up the issue with his government.

The British, who assumed a dominant position in Ethiopia as a result of their involvement in the war to liberate the country from Italian rule, agreed to finance, train, and equip the new Ethiopian army. It was to be organized into ten infantry battalions, a regiment of mounted (pack) artillery, a regiment of armored cars, and engineer and signal units.

Before the British took over the whole responsibility, the Ethiopian government gathered the prewar cadets and graduates of Holäta and St.-Cyr and organized the army under the newly established Ministry of War. Although it was poorly equipped, the new army came into existence in June 1941. When the British Military Mission to Ethiopia (BMME), headed by Major General Stephen Seymour Butler, arrived, the groundwork had already been put in place.

When the BMME began the organization and training of the army, the main problems facing it were the absence of stores, lack of supplies and equipment, and shortages of clerical and technical staff. With regard to the problem of supplies, the BMME signed contracts with private firms in Addis Ababa in March 1942. For instance, Messrs. Calderon, a firm later bought by Messrs. Diamonds and Co., began to manufacture and supply uniforms and blankets to the army. Similarly, an Armenian resident in Addis Ababa signed a contract to produce cap badges. By the end of 1942, all the soldiers were fitted out with uniforms, but only 35 percent of them were given berets.

The organization of the army and procurement of military supplies, which were initially sluggish, began to show marked progress. The BMME decided to strengthen the ten infantry battalions with other supporting units. According to the BMME's plan, each battalion was supposed to have seventy-five infantrymen mounted on mules. Given the shortage of military vehicles and the limited nature of Ethiopia's roads, the training of mounted infantry units was absolutely essential. Needless to say, if such units were to operate, pack animals should be made available. Accordingly, about 1,000 mules were bought in addition to the hundreds of mules and horses captured from the Italians. By 1942, therefore, the army possessed about 250 horses and 2,100 mules. Some of these were given to the Imperial Regiment of Artillery, a unit established in late 1941. By the end of 1942, the artillery regiment had two batteries with full strength and the third was in the process of formation. Another unit, the Armored Car Regiment, was organized in May 1942 and had 205 troops. There were still three other units that had to be set up: the engineering, signal, and medical corps. The engineering unit consisted of a field company (with 300 men trained in field engineering and bridge construction) and the Works and Parks Company (with 760 people). The latter was engaged in the construction of military barracks, maintenance of army headquarters, and completion of the signal school.

The signal unit had a total of one hundred and fifty men and included a wireless section (staffed by fifteen Ethiopian operators) assigned to seven military outposts (Adwa, Däbrä Marqos, Dässé, Gondär, Jimma, Nägällé, and Wondo), telephone and visual signal sections, and a signal school.

The last unit was composed of medical corps. Dressers—physician's assistants—were trained and assigned to various army units. The dressers attached to army units in the provinces were included in the payroll of the local hospitals.

All these British-organized army units were stationed in Bägémeder, Gojjam, Harär, Jimma, Sidamo, and Tigray (also spelled Tegray, Tigrai, or Tigre). Several British officers were assigned to all battalions. Accommodation in some of the barracks, especially at Asäbä Täfäri and Däbrä Marqos, was deplorable. The provincial stations had no electric power or running water.

Despite the poor living conditions, a significant improvement in disciplinewas noticeable. Such disciplinary problems as desertion (often with weapons), drunkenness, quarrelling, and assaults on guards became less frequent. Troops who had been decorating uniforms with nonmilitary ornaments or wearing them with civilian clothes abandoned such habits. Disciplinary cases were mainly tried by Ethiopian adjutants. It was only in rare cases that offenders were brought before British officers.

Although the BMME wielded much influence on the army, two units remained outside the British orbit: the Imperial Bodyguard and the Territorial Army. Reorganized in 1941 and put under Swedish officers, the former was kept as an elite force completely independent from the Ministry of War. By 1946, the Imperial Bodyguard had seven battalions with a total of 3,100 troops. Whereas five of its battalions were stationed in Harär and Gojjam, the remaining two stayed in Addis Ababa. In the same year, the Imperial Bodyguard set up its own officer training school at Bélla in the capital. Until 1960, the Imperial Bodyguard continued to receive the attention and special favor of the emperor.

The creation of the Territorial Army, on the other hand, had something to do with the war of liberation from Italian rule and its immediate aftermath. During the war, a considerable number of armed bands ranged over various parts of the country. After liberation, these armed bands, to the government's dismay, continued to roam the countryside. The government thus organized the Territorial Army in 1941 to absorb all the armed bands and prevent them from resorting to banditry. As a matter of rule, only men who possessed rifles could enlist. The organization of the Territorial Army was, in effect, killing two birds with one stone. In the first place, the government managed to boost its military power at a stroke. Secondly, it improved the country's security by bringing unregistered weapons under state control.

Initially, however, the Territorial Army was loosely controlled, and its members were on the whole poorly trained and ill disciplined. To avoid such problems, the government wanted to bring the Territorial Army under the BMME. But the British authorities ignored the Ethiopian request and even held up military supplies until the signing of the second Anglo-Ethiopian agreement at the end of 1944. Once that pact was signed, the BMME agreed to shoulder the responsibility of training the Territorial Army, somewhat to the BMME's advantage. For instance, Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson, the British commander in chief of East Africa, said of the new responsibility of the BMME that the "strengthening of the police forces throughout the country, into which several thousand territorial soldiers will be drafted, will provide for greater tranquility in those parts of Ethiopia adjoining the Reserved Areas and Ogaden."

By 1945, therefore, eleven battalions of the Territorial Army were brought under the BMME in addition to the ten battalions of the regular army. Later, General Anderson's prediction turned out to be true—many of the territorial soldiers were gradually absorbed by the regular army and the police force. The absorption of the Territorial Army into the army and the police continued until 1958, when the government decided to maintain and even expand the Territorial Army as a viable reserve force.

Although the BMME had agreed to bring the Territorial Army up to the re-quired standard, there were still feelings of uneasiness on the part of the Ethiopian government. In 1945, in the very year the BMME assumed the additional responsibility of training eleven battalions of territorial troops, the British government ordered the BMME to slash its £1-million budget by £370,000 instead of raising it.


Aid from other nations

In the eyes of the Ethiopian government, the British were becoming increasingly unreliable and uncommitted despite the signing of the 1944 agreement. In the political arena, as well, the British did more harm than good, especially in Eritrea and the Ogadén region of southeastern Ethiopia. Ethiopia's quest for a more reliable source of military assistance seems to have emanated from these unhealthy relations. The net result was the signing of the Ethiopian-American Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on May 22, 1953. Lured by the immense strategic importance of Ethiopia, the Americans received a communications base and naval facilities in Eritrea, a former Italian colony along the Red Sea now federated with Ethiopia. The former Italian radio station Radio Marina in Asmära (later renamed Qañäw) was given to Americans. This communications base was used by the United States as a relay station for the Middle East and the Far East. On their part, they agreed to provide Ethiopia with military assistance for twenty-five years. The agreement included the secondment of an America team, the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), to the Ethiopian army. MAAG, which replaced the BMME, was supposed to train and equip three divisions of the Ethiopian army, each with 6,000 men. In an attempt not to fall under the sway of a single foreign power, the Ethiopian government invited military missions from other countries. Accordingly, the Swedes were put in charge of the Imperial Bodyguard and the air force. The Norwegians were assigned to organize and train the navy. Likewise, an Indian military mission established and ran the Harär Military Academy.


(Continues...)

Excerpted from The Ethiopian Army by Fantahun Ayele. Copyright © 2014 Northwestern University Press. Excerpted by permission of Northwestern University Press.
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Table of Contents

Acknowledgments
Preface
Introduction
1. Background: The Ethiopian Army 1941-1974
1.1. Organization of the Army
1.2. Training and Equipment
1.3. Operations
2. Recruitment, Training and Equipment 1977-1991
2.1. Recruitment/Conscription and Training
2.2. Equipment
3. Structure, Logistics and Command and Control 1977-1991
3.1. Organization of the Army
3.2. Logistics
3.3. Command and Control
3.3.1. The Triangular Command
3.3.2. The 1989 Abortive Coup
4. Military Intelligence 1977-1991
4.1. Organization of the Military Intelligence Department and its Activities
4.2. Some Limited Achievements of the Military Intelligence Department
4.3. Major Intelligence Failures
4.4. Counter-Intelligence
5. Operations: The Somali-Ethiopian War 1977-1978
6. Operations: Counter-Insurgency Campaigns in Northern Ethiopia
6.1. The Battles for Naqfa 1976-1986
6.2. The Afabét and Sheré Debacles
6.3. From Sheré to Karra Mesheg: Worsening Military Reverses
6.4. The Last Days of the Army
7. The Revolutionary Army and its External Patrons
7.1 The Revolution and the Revolutionary Army
7.2. The Role of Soviet Military Advisers
8. Conclusions: Why did the Army Lose the War?
8.1. Loss of Public Support
8.2. Failure to Apply the Right Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics
8.3. Intelligence Failure
8.4. Problems of Command and Control
8.5. Conscription, Training and Organizational Problems
8.6. War Weariness and Disillusionment
 
Endnotes
Bibliography
Appendices
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