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Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780810135581 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Northwestern University Press |
| Publication date: | 07/15/2017 |
| Series: | Rereading Ancient Philosophy |
| Pages: | 192 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.00(d) |
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CHAPTER 1
The Learning Procedure
The Philebus begins with a "restatement" in the sense that it begins with Socrates reporting on an already ongoing conversation. Socrates recounts two theses that have been offered about the nature of the good. And thus we expect that we are reading an "ethical" dialogue. This expectation, however, seems not to be fulfilled immediately. Instead this beginning leads the interlocutors to discuss what it is to give an account ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) of something. Indeed, after only a few pages outlining each candidate for the good life (i.e., the lives of pleasure and knowledge), the dialogue becomes entangled in a dense problem about the nature of accounts, a dense logical quandary about the one and the many. What I will show here is that this logical problem is not only connected to Socrates's vision of the good life but also provides us with a way to take part actively in constituting the good life as a one-many structure, or mixture.
First, however, we must ask, what is Socrates's argument for understanding the good life as a mixture? Socrates introduces this problem by way of pointing out an error inherent in the very kind of account ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) the hedonists in the dialogue are giving. Indeed, from the opening line of the dialogue, different kinds of account-giving are represented by Socrates, on the one hand, and by his interlocutors Philebus and Protarchus, on the other. Philebus accounts for the good life as one thing alone (i.e., pleasure), while Socrates implicitly accounts for it as a life of an orderly plurality wherein some things, such as knowledge, are prior to others in the order of inclusion. But before Socrates can actually defend this structure, he must first argue that any account of the good life stating that the good life consists of only one kind of thing is always already a failed account.
As I will argue, Socrates shows that any account of something must involve a reference to that thing "as such and such." For this reason, a genuine account of something, for example, a definition, could never be true unless what it accounts for can be manifest as a multiplicity. If what we account for could not itself be genuinely multiple, then our definitions of it would "falsify" and cover over the supposedly non-multiple reality they account for. If the good were only one thing alone, no account of it could ever emerge as true. If we are to give an account of the good life at all, therefore, we must express the good as a multiplicity and account for the good life as a plurality. The very form of Protarchus's claim that pleasure is the only good — and that it cannot be differentiated into kinds — therefore precludes the claim's truth. Only by first exposing this logical difficulty can Socrates proceed to fully examine the claims of hedonism.
Still, while Socrates will engage in refutation here, he also suggests a kind of positive way forward out of the impasse he identifies in the hedonists' failed account-giving practice. To the extent that Protarchus (and Philebus, who refuses even to speak on his own behalf) allows neither that pleasure is itself multiple nor that the good life is multifaceted, Socrates diagnoses him with a fear of account-giving. To quell this fear Socrates introduces the "learning procedure," which shows how any genuine account of something posits that thing as a unity and, if it exists, also posits it as manifold in a way that does not conflict with the unity in question. By unfolding this plurality we come to grasp the specific nature of each reality in question. And while the dialectical learning procedure may not by itself lead us to a completely definite and final account of the good life, the procedure nevertheless sets us on the right track. It reveals the definition of the posited object as much as is possible for the inquirers. The realization that the good life itself must be treated in this way is what sets the dialogue on its longer path of discerning the right order of the good life's elements.
1.1. The Two Candidates and the Two Kinds of Accounts
On close examination, the first lines of the Philebus reveal that the dialogue is not about the good life as separate from account-giving. Rather, the interlocutors are already implicitly engaged in an exploration of different ways of giving and receiving accounts ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). Socrates begins: "Well, then, Protarchus, consider just what the thesis [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] is that you are now taking over from Philebus — and what our thesis [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] is that you are going to argue against, if you find that you do not agree with it. Shall we summarize them both?" (11a). We discover Protarchus and Socrates in the middle of a dialogue in which two different accounts of the good life have already been given. Protarchus is charged with inheriting an account of pleasure as the good, an account already built and defended "once and for all" by Philebus, who is no longer willing to participate (11c5). Socrates by contrast explicitly speaks of the account he will defend as "ours" (11a2), as something shared, and, we shall see, as something that can be kept alive for us, can be restated, and will be resaid again and again through Socrates's continued presence with us. Socrates, of course, defends knowledge; but it is his mode of defense that stands out.
The next passage offers additional evidence that different modes of account-giving are at stake in the introduction. For the characters embody their discourses very differently:
Socrates: Philebus holds that what is good [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] for all creatures [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] is to enjoy themselves [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]], to be pleased [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] and delighted [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]], and whatever else goes together with that kind of thing. We contend that not these, but knowing [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]], understanding [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]], and remembering [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]], and what belongs with them, right opinion [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] and true calculations [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]], are better [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] than pleasure and more agreeable to all who can attain them; those who can [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]], get the maximum benefit possible from having them, both those now alive and future generations. Isn't that how we present our respective positions, Philebus?
Philebus: Absolutely, Socrates.
Socrates: Do you agree Protarchus, to take over this thesis that's now offered you.
Protarchus: I am afraid I have to. Fair Philebus has given up on us [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] (11b3-c6).
Philebus does not simply defend pleasure. He accounts for the good life as consisting of only what agrees with one "kind" ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) (11b5). Protarchus is thus left to defend pleasure's kind as the sole good for all living beings. By contrast, Socrates's summary already shows important structural differences. First, he defends reason and intellection "and what belongs together with them [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]]" as better for any of "those who are capable [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]]" of sharing in them. Presumably those capable may include any number of kinds of living things; and Socrates does not yet specify or delimit who is capable. Second, Socrates's use of the comparative "better [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]]" commits him neither to making knowledge the only kind of good nor to the claim that knowledge, as good, excludes goods other than knowledge. His account already makes room for others.
Furthermore, Socrates is depicted in the opening lines not simply as adopting the testimony of others regarding what is good but rather as seeking it originally for himself. By contrast, Protarchus defends an inherited account whose very source, Philebus, also himself appears to have adopted the account entirely from others. This inheritance becomes clear in the closing lines of the dialogue, when Socrates and Protarchus expand on Philebus's sources:
Socrates: In view of all the considerations laid out here and out of distaste for Philebus' position pronounced by countless others on many occasions, I maintained that reason is far superior to [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] pleasure and more beneficial [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] for human life [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]]. ... And did not pleasure turn out to receive fifth position, according to the verdict we reached in our discussion? ... But not first place, even if all the cattle and horses and the rest of the animals gave testimony by following pleasure. Now, many people accept their testimony, as the seers do that of the birds, and judge that pleasures are most effective in securing the happy life; they even believe that the animal passions [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] are more authoritative witnesses than is the love of argument [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] that is constantly revealed under the guidance of the philosophic muse (66e1–67b7).
Philebus appears to have inherited his vision of the good from his observation of animals' desires or from others who accept their testimony. As to whether there might be a specifically human element worth desiring, and as to whether each person must explore this element for him- or herself, he appears utterly indifferent. Rather, an imitation of others' desiring is enough for him. What he desires, he desires precisely because it is desired.
By contrast, Socrates does not define the good life by what is already desired. He is not satisfied with imitation or inheritance of desire but seeks originally the "possession or state of the soul" that makes for a good life (11d4). And this element, in turn, will be "the one that can render life happy [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] for all human beings" (11d5). Thus, instead of delimiting the inquiry to what we already desire, or to what others happen to desire, Socrates seeks the element that originally defines and measures desirability. In this way, the good that remains to be discovered in the forthcoming inquiry, if it can be discovered, will define the seeker and the happiness of the seeker; the seeker's nature will not define beforehand the good that is to be discovered. This is perhaps why Socrates allows so much latitude when he says that knowledge offers a better life for any of those "capable" of it. The task of discerning who is capable remains an open inquiry; it is not something predefined. The question could only ever be decided in the course of the inquiry, that is, only if we first inquire. It is thus open to all who seek it. Only in this way — by first seeking the measure itself that accounts for the presence of goodness in any good life — can we come to discover the element that can make life happy for humans.
This order plays a vital role in Socrates's argument. For later, once both true and false pleasures have been examined, it becomes clear that knowledge is always good for the participant capable of it, while pleasure is not. For this reason knowledge has priority. Thus, the opening of the Philebus already suggests that the dialogue will be concerned not only with differing opinions but also, essentially, with a vision of the right order for account-giving, and with what is required for an account to be a good account. A Protarchus who inherits his vision of the good from Philebus, who in turn inherits it from the animals, is contrasted with a Socrates who originally inquires for himself into the original defining source itself. This original inquiry is the first prerequisite of truth in any account of the matter.
1.2. The Requirement to Distinguish between Pleasures
The floodgates have now been opened for the discussion of the requirements of account-giving itself. The issue arises explicitly for the first time when Socrates objects to Philebus's habit (noted at 12b7) of linking the name of the goddess Aphrodite to the name of pleasure. At 12c1–d5, Socrates says,
I always feel more than human dread over what names to use for the gods — it surpasses the greatest fear. So now I address Aphrodite by whatever title pleases her. But as to pleasure, I know that it is complex [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] and, just as I said, we must make it our starting point and consider carefully what sort of nature it has. If one just goes by the name it is one single thing [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]], but in fact it comes in many forms [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] that are in some way quite unlike each other [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]]. Think about it: we say that a debauched person gets pleasure, as well as a sober-minded person takes pleasure in his very sobriety. Again, we say that a fool, though full of foolish opinions and hopes, gets pleasure, but likewise a wise man takes pleasure in his wisdom. But surely anyone who said in either case that these pleasures are like one another would rightly be regarded as a fool? (12c1–d5).
Socrates notices that to link pleasure to the name of Aphrodite generates at least an apparent conflict with the claim that pleasure is also many things ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). Assuming pleasure is indeed pleasure, the problem is that, if we are to name pleasure with the name of another (i.e., of a goddess, and eventually of "the good"), then we must be assuming not only that different pleasures are all alike in their emergence as pleasures, but also that pleasure is, in each differing case, the same as some additional character (and never its opposite). Socrates is thus pressing Protarchus to see if the claim that "pleasure is Aphrodite" (or, later, "pleasure is good") is consistent with the claim that pleasures are manifold and unlike one another while still remaining pleasures. If each pleasure is different, and each is still a pleasure, then may we also consistently say that each of them is also called Aphrodite (or, later, called "good")? Or, rather, should only some of them be called thus?
Socrates initiates a familiar tactic here. He tests Protarchus for consistency. Typically an elenchus will show that an interlocutor who thinks of himself as holding consistent beliefs is actually holding (implicitly or explicitly) at least one belief that is inconsistent with one or more of the others. This elenchus, however, proceeds differently. For Protarchus appears to predict that Socrates will try and identify a contradiction in his position. Protarchus's response, then, will be to deny preemptively that pleasure is indeed many ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) things, and he will do so in order to save the identity of pleasure with the good. He will deny the very phenomenon of pleasure's plurality in hopes of saving himself from possible refutation. While this defensive tactic contains no logical inconsistency in itself, Socrates will treat it as a pre-dialectical and anti-dialectical retreat from honesty with oneself, one on a par with dialectical inconsistency.
Socrates is thus forced to engage in a kind of proto-dialectic with Protarchus to show that it is not necessary to deny the plurality of pleasures. To see this, we must analyze three elements from out of the concession Socrates is presently seeking (in 12c1–d5 above). First, he has asked whether, in linking the names of pleasure and Aphrodite (or by implication pleasure and the good), Protarchus intends to consider pleasures to be (1) alike one to another in some respect in addition to their being alike as pleasures. He then asks whether there really are pleasures that are (2) manifold and unlike one to another. Finally, he asks whether Protarchus believes (3) that to consider pleasures as unlike in some respect or another is to threaten the status of pleasures as being alike as pleasures. Protarchus's response clearly indicates that he holds (1) and (3); but while he admits that pleasures do indeed seem different from one another, he nevertheless takes the drastic route of denying a version of thesis (2) altogether. Pleasures are not really different from one another, he claims: "Well, yes, Socrates — the pleasures come from opposite [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] things. But they are not at all opposed to one another [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]]. For how could pleasure not be, of all things, most like [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] pleasure? How could that thing not be most like itself [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]]?" (12d7–e2). Protarchus not only denies that pleasures can be "opposed to one another [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]]" insofar as they are all pleasures. He also insists that they, all being pleasures, are themselves "maximally alike to one another" ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). Any apparent differences stem from the opposite things that occasion them, or cause them to occur, but not from differences in the pleasures themselves.
We should note two points about Protarchus's denial of a version of (2). First, we find in this passage Protarchus's first use of the plural in the dialogue to talk about pleasure. Protarchus's very language thus contains the implicit concession that pleasure is not only one thing but also many (even though he still denies any unlikeness between pleasures). Second, Socrates had not in fact requested from Protarchus the concession that Protarchus in fact rejects in the above passage. Protarchus rejects, let us call it (2'), that is, the claim that pleasures may be "opposed to one another [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]]." Socrates had in fact requested that he accept not the stronger (2') but the weaker (2), namely the concession at 12c9 that pleasures are "unlike each other [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]]." These are importantly different concessions.
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "The Emerging Good in Plato's Philebus"
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