The Economics of Executive Compensation

by Kevin F. Hallock, Kevin J. Murphy

Overview

The rapid rise in the earnings of top executives is a distinctive feature of modern capitalism. This important two volume collection presents some of the most influential published theoretical and empirical papers on executive compensation.

Topics include: Theoretical Foundations of Executive Pay; Executive Compensation and Company Performance; Relative Performance Evaluation; Determinants of Executive Compensation; The Effects of CEO Pay; Accounting Measures in Executive Contracts; CEO Turnover; CEO Pay Internationally; Economic Environments and Executive Pay.

The Economics of Executive Compensation draws together a wide range of literature and will be an essential reference guide for students, researchers and practioners.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781858987941
Publisher:	Edward Elgar Publishing
Publication date:	01/01/1999
Series:	The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics
Pages:	1312
Product dimensions:	6.12(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)

About the Author

Edited by Kevin F. Hallock, Dean, SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University and Kevin J. Murphy, Professor of Finance and Business Economics, Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, US

Table of Contents

Contents:

Volume I: Introduction

Part I: Theoretical Foundations of Executive Pay
1. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’
2. Bengt Holmstrom (1979), ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’
3. Eugene F. Fama (1980), ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’
4. Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), ‘Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts’
5. Bengt Holmstrom (1982), ‘Moral Hazard in Teams’
6. Sherwin Rosen (1982), ‘Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings’
7. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1983), ‘An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem’
Part II: Executive Compensation and Company Performance
8. Wilbur G. Lewellen and Blaine Huntsman (1970), ‘Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance’
9. Kevin J. Murphy (1985), ‘Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis’
10. Anne T. Coughlan and Ronald M. Schmidt (1985), ‘Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation’
11. Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), ‘Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives’
12. Sherwin Rosen (1992), ‘Contracts and the Market for Executives’
13. Joseph G. Haubrich (1994), ‘Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem’
Part III: Relative Performance Evaluation
14. Rick Antle and Abbie Smith (1986), ‘An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives’
15. Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), ‘Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers’
Part IV: Determinants of Executive Compensation
16. Kevin J. Murphy (1986), ‘Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts’
17. Wilbur Lewellen, Claudio Loderer and Kenneth Martin (1987), ‘Executive Compensation and Executive Incentive Problems: An Empirical Analysis’
18. Charles A. O’Reilly III, Brian G. Main and Graef S. Crystal (1988), ‘CEO Compensation as Tournament and Social Comparison: A Tale of Two Theories’
19. Jonathan S. Leonard (1990), ‘Executive Pay and Firm Performance’
20. Richard A. Lambert, David F. Larcker and Robert E. Verrecchia (1991), ‘Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation’
21. Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1992), ‘Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence’
22. David Yermack (1995), ‘Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively?’
Name Index

Volume II:
Part I: The Effects of CEO Pay
1. Robert Tempest Masson (1971), ‘Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance’
2. James A. Brickley, Sanjai Bhagat and Ronald C. Lease (1985), ‘The Impact of Long-Range Managerial Compensation Plans on Shareholder Wealth’
3. Hassan Tehranian and James F. Waegelein (1985), ‘Market Reaction to Short-Term Executive Compensation Plan Adoption’
4. Anup Agrawal and Gershon N. Mandelker (1987), ‘Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions’
5. John M. Abowd (1990), ‘Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate Performance?’
6. Patricia M. Dechow and Richard G. Sloan (1991), ‘Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem: An Empirical Investigation’
7. Keith C. Brown, W.V. Harlow and Laura T. Starks (1996), ‘Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry’
Part II: Accounting Measures in Executive Contracts
8. Paul M Healy (1985), ‘The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions’
9. Robert M. Bushman and Raffi J. Indjejikian (1993), ‘Accounting Income, Stock Price, and Managerial Compensation’
10. Richard G. Sloan (1993), ‘Accounting Earnings and Top Executive Compensation’
11. Jennifer J. Gaver, Kenneth M. Gaver and Jeffrey R. Austin (1995), ‘Additional Evidence on Bonus Plans and Income Management’
12. Robert W. Holthausen, David F. Larcker and Richard G. Sloan (1995), ‘Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings’
Part III: CEO Turnover
13. Jerold B. Warner, Ross L. Watts and Karen H. Wruck (1988), ‘Stock Prices and Top Management Changes’
14. Michael S. Weisbach (1988), ‘Outside Directors and CEO Turnover’
15. Kevin J. Murphy and Jerold L. Zimmerman (1993), ‘Financial Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover’
Part IV: CEO Pay Internationally
16. Steven N. Kaplan (1994), ‘Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States’
17. Steven N. Kaplan (1994), ‘Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany’
18. Martin Conyon, Paul Gregg and Stephen Machin (1995), ‘Taking Care of Business: Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom’
19. John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno (1995), ‘International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation’
Part V: Economic Environments and Executive Pay
20. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Ross L. Watts (1992), ‘The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies’
21. Stuart C. Gilson and Michael R. Vetsuypens (1993), ‘CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis’
22. R. Glenn Hubbard and Darius Palia (1995), ‘Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry’
23. Paul L. Joskow, Nancy L. Rose and Catherine D. Wolfram (1996), ‘Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence From the Electric Utility Industry’
Name Index

Editorial Reviews

This two-volume set, arranged by them, collects both widely cited and newer contributions across the entire spectrum of economics. Volume I (22 papers) discusses theoretical foundations of executive pay, executive compensation and company performance, relative performance evaluation, and determinants of executive compensation. Volume II (23 papers) addresses the effects of CEO pay, accounting measures in executive contracts, CEO turnover, CEO pay internationally, and economic environments and executive pay. Each volume contains a name index but lacks a subject index. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknew.com)

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